Optimal policy for a dynamic,non-stationary,stochastic inventory problem with capacity commitment

This paper studies a single-product, dynamic, non-stationary, stochastic inventory problem with capacity commitment, in which a buyer purchases a fixed capacity from a supplier at the beginning of a planning horizon and the buyer’s total cumulative order quantity over the planning horizon is constrained with the capacity. The objective of the buyer is to choose the capacity at the beginning of the planning horizon and the order quantity in each period to minimize the expected total cost over the planning horizon. We characterize the structure of the minimum sum of the expected ordering, storage and shortage costs in a period and thereafter and the optimal ordering policy for a given capacity. Based on the structure, we identify conditions under which a myopic ordering policy is optimal and derive an equation for the optimal capacity commitment. We then use the optimal capacity and the myopic ordering policy to evaluate the effect of the various parameters on the minimum expected total cost over the planning horizon.     

Design of contract parameters in a closed-loop supply chain

We study an extended joint economic lot size problem which incorporates the return flow of remanufacturable used products. The supply chain under consideration consists of a single supplier and a single buyer. The buyer orders a single product from the supplier, uses it for her own needs, and collects the remanufacturable items after use. The ordered items are shipped from the supplier to the buyer in the lot-for-lot fashion by a vehicle which also returns the collected used items from the buyer to the supplier for remanufacturing and subsequent service of the buyer’s demand in the next order cycle. For satisfying the total demand, the supplier manufactures new items or remanufactures used ones received from the buyer. For given demand, productivity, collection rate, disposal cost, setup cost, order cost, holding cost for serviceable and nonserviceable products at the supplier as well as the buyer the lot size (order size) for the supplier (buyer) has to be found which minimizes the total cost. Furthermore, we address a decentralised decision making of the parties under a two-part tariff and determine their equilibrium strategies within the Nash framework.     

Manufacturer-buyer coordination for newsvendor-type-products with two ordering opportunities and partial backorders

In a recent paper [Weng, Z.K., 2004. Coordinating order quantities between the manufacturer and the buyer: A generalized newsvendor model. European Journal of Operational Research 156, 148–161], a newsvendor-type coordination model was developed for a single-manufacturer single-buyer channel with two ordering opportunities. This paper further extends the model to the case where the excess demand after the first order is partially backlogged and both parties share the manufacturing setup cost of the second order (if happened). We show that the decentralized system would perform best if the manufacturer covers utterly the second production setup cost, which is opposite to that obtained in Weng (2004). Another extension in the present paper is that in the centralized system, the second order decision is made by the buyer based on the channel’s benefit rather than based on the buyer’s benefit as in Weng (2004). It is proved that the expected profit of the system in our paper is always larger than that in Weng (2004). In order to maximize the expected profit of the channel, two coordinated policies are proposed to achieve perfect coordination: a two-part-tariff policy for the special case that the buyer pays all the manufacturing setup cost, and a revised revenue-sharing contract for the case that two parties share the manufacturing setup cost.     

An economic order quantity with imperfect quality and quantity discounts

Previous studies in the issue of inventory models with imperfect quality assumed the defectives could be sold in a batch by the end of the inspection process and the manufacturing systems were push systems. However, the above assumptions may not be true in the pull system in which buyer is powerful. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a new inventory model for items with imperfect quality and quantity discounts where buyer has exerted power over its supplier. Based on the concept of powerful buyer, there are three considerations included in this new model: (1) the order quantity is manufactured at one setup and is shipped over multiple deliveries, (2) the defectives are screened out by a 100% inspection for each shipment but sold in a batch by the end of inspection at the last shipment of each cycle, and (3) the supplier offers quantity discounts to response the request of the powerful buyer. Further, an algorithm is developed to help the powerful buyer to determine the optimal order policy accurately and quickly. Two numerical examples are available in this paper to illustrate the proposed model and algorithm. Besides, based on the numerical examples, a sensitivity analysis is made to investigate the effects of four important parameters (the inspection rate, the defective rate, the receiving cost, and the ordering cost) on the optimal solution.     

An integrated economic lot-size model for vendor–buyer inventory system when input is random

An integrated strategy is discussed for both vendor and buyer when the input is random. It is shown numerically that the cooperative approach is beneficial to reduce the cost when compared with an independent decision by both the parties. Though the integrated total cost decreases, the buyer’s cost increases due to random input in his inventory. To encourage the buyer to order a large quantity, a trade credit is offered by the vendor to the buyer to settle the account. A conciliation factor is suggested to share the benefits.     

Supply chain coordination for newsvendor-type products with two ordering opportunities and demand information update

This paper studies a coordination issue with two ordering opportunities in a two-echelon supply chain, where one manufacturer sells a single newsvendor-type product through one buyer. The manufacturer does not hold inventory and activates production or order with an infinite capacity and a fixed setup cost in response to the buyer’s order. The buyer places two orderings during the selling period of the product: one happens at the beginning of the period and the other at some specified time within the selling period. The whole selling period is divided into two stages or sub-periods by the buyer’s second order. The stochastic demands in the two sub-periods are assumed to be auto-correlated. The excess demand before the second order is partially backordered, whereas the excess demand at the end of the selling season is utterly lost. Under both the centralized and decentralized settings, we develop the models of how the buyer determines his two-ordering policies. We analyse the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solutions to the models and present the corresponding analytical solutions. Furthermore, we propose an improved revenue-sharing contract that can realize the perfect coordination of the supply chain and study how the revenue-sharing policies affect the supply chain members’ decisions. Finally, we show the superiority of the presented two-ordering strategy through numerical examples.     

A fuzzy mathematical model for the joint economic lot size problem with multiple price breaks

This paper applies fuzzy mathematical programming to solve the joint economic lot size problem with multiple price breaks. In order to entice the buyer to increase the order quantity, it is a common practice for the seller to offer quantity discounts to the buyer. From the system viewpoint, the joint cost for the seller and buyer can be minimized only when the buyer increases his economic order quantity. The problem is how to determine the number of price breaks, as well as the quantity discount and order quantity at each price break, to achieve the optimal joint cost. Fuzzy mathematical programming provides a very efficient algorithm to solve the above problem simultaneously from the perspectives of the seller and the buyer. Another common problem in joint economic lot size model is how to split the system profit between the seller and the buyer. Whereas the traditional approach to this problem is to divide the profit based on a certain ratio determined by the bargaining power of both parties, fuzzy mathematical programming can achieve the same satisfaction level to both parties based on their respective cost functions.     

提前期需求为模糊随机条件下的连续库存补货策略

考虑提前期内需求为模糊随机变量且提前期为可缩短情形下,建立由购买商和供应商所组成的简单供应链连续库存补货策略优化模型,其中订单量、再订货点和提前期为决策变量.首先推导出模糊随机需求条件下购买商和供应链的成本函数,然后,进一步考虑总需求为三角模糊数,推导出供应商、购买商和供应链的模糊成本函数.在此基础上分别从购买商成本最小和供应链成本最小角度对模型进行求解,结合具体算例对模型进行应用分析和比较分析,结果表明模型具有有效性和实用性,并得出如下结论:从购买商本身角度考虑订购策略所产生的供应链成本总是大于从供应链整体角度考虑订货策略所产生的供应链成本,同时从购买商本身角度考虑订货策略所产生的最优订购量、购买商成本低于从供应链整体角度考虑订货策略所产生的最优订购量、购买商成本.     

A bargaining model with asymmetric information for a single supplier–single buyer problem

Banerjee’s joint economic lot size (JELS) model represents one approach to minimizing the joint total relevant cost of a buyer and a supplier by using a joint optimal order and production policy. The implementation of a jointly optimal policy requires coordination and cooperation. Should the buyer have the market power to implement his own optimal policy as that one to be used in the exchange process no incentive exists for him to choose a joint optimal policy. A joint policy can therefore only be the result of a bargaining process between the parties involved. The supplier may make some sort of concession such as a price discount or a side payment in order to influence the buyer’s order policy. A critical assumption made throughout in supply chain literature is that the supplier has complete knowledge about the buyer’s cost structure. Clearly, this assumption will seldom be fulfilled in practice. The research presented in this paper provides a bargaining model with asymmetric information about the buyer’s cost structure assuming that the buyer has the power to impose its individual optimal policy.     

需求依赖于服务水平的易变质品库存策略研究

本文研究需求依赖于上一周期服务水平、缺货时订单部分损失的两周期易变质品库存问题。分别考虑一次订货和多次订货两种情况,以平均利润最大化为目标构建库存模型,证明了模型解的存在性和唯一性,得到了最优库存服务水平和最优补货策略。最后,通过算例给出两个模型的应用,对重要参数进行了灵敏度分析,并且将两种模型的结果进行了对比分析。结果表明:订单损失率的增加会提高服务水平,但会使得利润降低;顾客期望服务水平的提高会降低第一阶段的服务水平,同时使利润减少;单位库存持有成本或变质率的增加会降低服务水平和平均利润。通常情况,企业通过多次订货能获得更大的利润,而只有当库存持有成本极小时,一次订购才能够获得更大的利润。同时,结果也表明:服务水平对库存策略有较大的影响,因此在进行库存决策时考虑服务水平具有重要的作用。     

Sourcing under incomplete information and negative capacity-cost correlation

We study a sourcing problem where a buyer reserves capacity from a set of suppliers. The suppliers have finite capacity and their unit production cost is a decreasing function of their capacity, implying scale economies. The capacity of each supplier and therefore the cost is his private information. The buyer and other suppliers only know the probability distribution of the supplier’s capacity. The buyer’s demand is random and she has to decide how much capacity to reserve in advance from a subset of suppliers and how much to source from marketplace. In this study we determine the buyer’s optimum reservation quantity and the size of the supply base. We find the presence of such capacity cost correlation leads to supply base reduction.     

Single-vendor multi-buyer integrated production-inventory model with controllable lead time and service level constraints

This paper presents an integrated production-inventory model where a vendor produces an item in a batch production environment and supplies it to a set of buyers. The buyer level demand is assumed to be independent normally distributed and lead time of every buyer can be reduced at an added crash cost. The buyers review their inventory using continuous review policy, and the unsatisfied demand at the buyers is completely backordered. A model is formulated to minimize the joint total expected cost of the vendor–buyers system to determine the optimal production-inventory policy. Since it is often difficult to estimate the stock-out cost in inventory systems, and so instead of having stock-out cost component in the objective function, a service level constraint (SLC) corresponding to each buyer is included in the model. A Lagrangian multiplier technique based algorithmic approach is proposed, which evaluates a very limited number of combinations of lead time of the buyers to find simultaneously the optimal lead time, order quantity and safety factor of the buyers and the number of shipments between the vendor and the buyers in a production cycle. Finally, a numerical example and effects of the key parameters are included to illustrate the results of the proposed model.     

An integrated producer–buyer supply chain with delivery cost under stochastic transportation time

An integrated producer–buyer supply chain is used to simultaneously determine the optimum levels of the safety stock, delivery quantity, and number of shipments in this paper. The scenario is created by scheduling a single-setup at the producer with multiple deliveries to the buyer, and all shipments to the buyer are equal-sized batches. This study attempts to study the effects of delivery cost and transportation time, assumes that there is a stochastic transportation time between both producer and buyer, and that shortages are allowed. The transportation time is assumed to be Weibull distributed. The objective functions of the integrated model include the setup cost, inventory carrying cost, and delivery cost. We analyze the scenario where the delivery cost is explicitly considered in the model rather than considered as part of the fixed ordering cost or insignificant. A numerical example is also presented to demonstrate the proposed model using actual shipping rate data. In particular, the results show that when the producer's and buyer's carrying costs are low, and/or the mean time of transportation and delivery costs are high, then this can benefit both parties with regard to sharing total profit.     

Supply chain coordination with controllable lead time and asymmetric information

This paper considers coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain consisting of a vendor and a buyer with controllable lead time. We analyze two supply chain inventory models. In the first model we assume the vendor has complete information about the buyer’s cost structure. By taking both the vendor and the buyer’s individual rationalities into consideration, a side payment coordination mechanism is designed to realize supply chain Pareto dominance. In the second model we consider a setting where the buyer possesses private cost information. We design the coordination mechanism by using principal-agent model to induce the buyer to report his true cost structure. The solution procedures are also developed to get the optimal solutions of these two models. The results of numerical examples show that shortening lead time to certain extent can reduce inventory cost and the coordination mechanisms designed for both symmetric and asymmetric information situations are effective.     

Economic selection of process mean for single-vendor single-buyer supply chain

Process mean selection for a container-filling process is an important decision in a single-vendor single-buyer supply chain. Since the process mean determines the vendor’s conforming and yield rates, it influences the vendor–buyer decisions regarding the production lot size and number of shipments delivered from the vendor to buyer. It follows, therefore, that these decisions should be determined simultaneously in order to control the supply chain total cost. In this paper, we develop a model that integrates the single-vendor single-buyer problem with the process mean selection problem. This integrated model allows the vendor to deliver the produced lot to buyer in number of unequal-sized shipments. Moreover, every outgoing item is inspected, and each item failing to meet a lower specification limit is reprocessed. Further, in order to study the benefits of using this integrated model, two baseline cases are developed. The first of which considers a hierarchical model where the vendor determines the process mean and schedules of production and shipment separately. This hierarchical model is used to show the impact of integrating the process mean selection with production/inventory decisions. The other baseline case is studied in the sensitivity analysis where the optimal solution for a given process is compared to the optimal solution when the variation in the process output is negligible. The integrated model is expected to lead to reduction in reprocessing cost, minimal loss to customer due to the deviation from the optimum target value, and consequently, providing better products at reduced cost for customers. Also, a solution procedure is devised to find the optimal solution for the proposed model and sensitivity analysis is conducted to investigate the effect of the model key parameters on the optimal solution.     

Competitive strategies and market segmentation for suppliers with substitutable products

This research studies the competition between two coexisting suppliers in a two-echelon supply chain. The suppliers have different inventory cost structures (holding cost and setup cost). Each supplier offers one type of the two substitutable products to multiple buyers. Buyers’ preferences between the substitutable products differ. Each buyer has a particular order profile (order frequency and quantity). A buyer chooses between the suppliers based on the prices offered by both suppliers and his/her own preference. A Hotelling-type model is used to describe buyers’ preferences for the products. We are able to describe the conditions for buyers to switch between the suppliers, and therefore spot the buyer groups that may or may not switch when the suppliers compete. Pricing strategies for different buyer groups are suggested to the competitive suppliers accordingly. Furthermore, equilibrium prices, market segments, and overall profits for the suppliers are revealed based on Game Theory. An algorithm is also proposed to forecast buyers’ reactions to suppliers’ pricing strategies given the buyers’ order profiles and preferences between the substitutable products.     

An integrated inventory model under conditions of order processing cost reduction and permissible delay in payments

This article develops an integrated inventory model to determine the optimal policy under conditions of order processing cost reduction and permissible delay in payments. Both the vendor and the buyer participate in order processing cost reduction by applying information technologies. The order processing cost can be reduced by certain expenditures and will affect lot-size decisions. Simultaneously, the existence of the credit period serves to reduce the cost of holding stock to the buyer, because it reduces the amount of capital invested in stock for the duration of the credit period. The article derives the total cost function and shows that the function possesses some kinds of convexities. A solution procedure is provided to determine the optimal order policy. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the solution procedure.     

Optimal Risk-Sharing When Risk Preferences are Uncertain

In many cases, a firm or agency needs a product that only one vendor can supply and for which the final cost is uncertain. An optimal risk-sharing arrangement is sought when the buyer and contractor agree on the probability distribution of cost but the buyer is uncertain of the contractor's risk-preferences. We find that when the buyer and contractor have exponential utilities, the optimal profit arrangement for the higher risk-averse contractor is no longer linear but concave in the costs. The degree of concavity is affected by the probabilistic beliefs on the contractor's risk-preferences. As the more risk-averse contractor becomes more likely, her chosen profit arrangement becomes less concave approaching the ideal, linear arrangement. The less risk-averse contractor is provided a profit arrangement with a certainty equivalent above her reservation price. This is the price the buyer must pay in order to entice a less risk-averse contractor into agreeing to accept a more risky profit arrangement.Another formulation is considered that assumes the buyer and contractor maximize approximations to their certainty equivalents in order to provide a more practical and possibly viable approach to sole-source contracting.     

Strategic capability investments and competition for supply contracts

Suppliers often make proactive investments to strategically position themselves to win contracts with a large buyer. Such investments reduce the suppliers’ variable costs of serving the buyer’s demand. We show that an auction mechanism does not always benefit the buyer, the supply chain, or the society. We identify scenarios where the buyer can implement the supply chain and socially optimal solution by committing to a bilateral relationship with fair reimbursement, and forgoing the benefits of competition altogether. We explore the role of commitment by the buyer (to a procurement mechanism) and by the suppliers (to an investment level) by analyzing different timing games under symmetric and asymmetric information about suppliers’ types. We show that it never benefits anyone for the suppliers to commit first. Equilibrium investments and cost structures depend upon the buyer’s bargaining power (opportunity cost). However, the winning supplier’s investments are almost always below the supply chain optimal level.     

基于两层供应链的VMI系统可行性分析研究

一般来说，供应商管理用户库存（VMI）能够给购买方带来更高的利润，而对供货方的影响却是不确定的。而现实中很多VMI策略都是由购买方主导的，购买方一般不愿和供货方分享收益，因此供货方必须自己判断是否接受VMI策略。本文在基于对安徽奇瑞汽车集团的零部件库存进行的调查的基础上，对VMI系统可行性分析的研究分两步进行：（1）假设供货方已经接受了购买方主导的VMI策略，它如何制定自己的最优送货策略；（2）通过比较供货方分别在RMI和VMI下的最小成本，供货方决定是否接受购买方主导的VMI策略。