Pricing and market segmentation using opaque selling mechanisms

In opaque selling certain characteristics of the product or service are hidden from the consumer until after purchase, transforming a differentiated good into somewhat of a commodity. Opaque selling has become popular in service pricing as it allows firms to sell their differentiated products at higher prices to regular brand loyal customers while simultaneously selling to non-loyal customers at discounted prices. We develop a stylized model of consumer choice that illustrates the role of opaque selling in market segmentation. We model a firm selling a product via three selling channels: a regular full information channel, an opaque posted price channel and an opaque bidding channel where consumers specify the price they are willing to pay. We illustrate the segmentation created by opaque selling as well as compare optimal revenues and prices for sellers using regular full information channels with those using opaque selling mechanisms in conjunction with regular channels. We also study the segmentation and policy changes induced by capacity constraints.     

Privacy and pricing personal information

The issues we address here are – How should a firm (e.g. Internet service provider (ISP)) that is capable of collecting personal information (browsing information, purchase history, etc.) about consumers, price its service, given that consumers vary in their valuation for privacy, and also vary in terms of the value of their personal information to a third party (firms that need consumer information)? Should the firm have a blanket policy of never collecting, or a policy of always collecting and revealing information? Surprisingly we find that in some cases the collector of information may be no worse off in the asymmetric information case than in the full information case. The paper provides a justification for the strategy of some firms such as ISP’s which never collect information and also for the strategy of other firms, like grocery stores that do. We also find that it is non-optimal for the firm to design contracts where the consumer can choose an intermediate level of privacy.     

全渠道服务商在线上自助服务技术背景下的定价策略研究

在线上自助服务技术兴起的背景下,研究餐饮业服务商整合全渠道的定价策略。分析归纳了三种提供服务的渠道(线下取号排队、线上取号排队、线上预定);利用排队论以及依据消费者效用对服务系统进行理论建模,并结合数值分析,为服务商如何应对不同的消费者与市场环境指明了方向。研究发现:(1)给出了三种服务渠道的最优定价模型表示,并结合市场情况分析不同的定价策略,如在服务高峰期可以采取歧视定价策略;(2)指明了线上取号与线上预定两种渠道不宜同时提供,并给出了最优的线上预定的预留容量比例,对商家设计渠道具有指导意义;(3)发现了不管线下消费者比例如何,服务商营收曲线必定经过同一点,对服务商采取措施引流具有启发意义。本文对服务商全渠道理论建模具有启发意义。     

Value of capacity pooling in supply chains with heterogeneous customers

We investigate the value of pooling capacity in supply chains that serve product demands of different variabilities. We build and analyze models that integrate production queuing models with base stock inventory systems serving demands with different inter-arrival time distributions. The first model combines hyperexponential and exponential demand inter-arrival time distributions. Exact analysis of the model allows us to develop insights into the impact of the difference in demand variabilities on the value of pooling capacity. Simulation experiments allow us to validate these insights for more general settings. We then find one special case that combines exponential and deterministic demand arrivals with deterministic service, where pooling capacity results in increasing the total cost.     

Make-or-buy service capacity decision in a supply chain providing after-sales service

We consider a supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer supplies a product to the retailer, while the retailer sells the product bundled with after-sales service to consumers in a fully competitive market. The sales volume is affected by the retailer’s service-level commitment. The retailer can build service capacity in-house at a deterministic price before service demand is realized, or buy the service from an outsourcing market at an uncertain price after service demand realization. We find that the outsourcing market encourages the retailer to make a higher level of service commitment, while prompting the manufacturer to reduce the wholesale price, resulting in more demand realization. We analyze how the expected cost of the service in the outsourcing market and the retailer’s risk attitude affect the decisions of both parties. We derive the conditions under which the retailer is willing to build service capacity in-house and under which it will buy the service from the outsourcing market. Moreover, we find that the manufacturer’s sharing with the retailer the cost to build service capacity improves the profits of both parties.     

Optimizing capacity,pricing and location decisions on a congested network with balking

In this paper, we consider the problem of making simultaneous decisions on the location, service rate (capacity) and the price of providing service for facilities on a network. We assume that the demand for service from each node of the network follows a Poisson process. The demand is assumed to depend on both price and distance. All facilities are assumed to charge the same price and customers wishing to obtain service choose a facility according to a Multinomial Logit function. Upon arrival to a facility, customers may join the system after observing the number of people in the queue. Service time at each facility is assumed to be exponentially distributed. We first present several structural results. Then, we propose an algorithm to obtain the optimal service rate and an approximate optimal price at each facility. We also develop a heuristic algorithm to find the locations of the facilities based on the tabu search method. We demonstrate the efficiency of the algorithms numerically.     

Optimal warranties,reliabilities and prices for durable goods in an oligopoly

This paper addresses the problem of durable goods manufacturers in an oligopoly seeking optimal values for three decision variables: product warranty, reliability and price. Each firm seeks a warranty-reliability-price combination that maximizes expected profit subject to quite general constraints on the firm's decision variables. Warranty serves as a signal of product reliability, which is not observable by consumers. We present a game-theoretic model of warranty-reliability-price competition in such a market and examine Nash equilibria for this game. We show that under fairly general assumptions each firm can optimally set its warranty and reliability independently of price and competitors' actions. In addition, we show that optimal warranties and reliabilities are complementary, and we explore the impact of different market factors on the optimal warranty and reliability. Finally, we show that optimal warranties are longer and products more reliable when consumers are risk averse.     

Demand dispersion and logistics costs in one-to-many distribution systems

When an organization decides on which groups of consumers it should target, the locations of these target consumers often play a role. Methods from the field of market segmentation are able to identify target groups with high benefit levels, but the expected costs of supplying products to the target groups are less well understood. These costs can play a large role if the locations of the customers, the demand locations, are geographically widely dispersed. This paper focuses on one-to-many distribution systems in which a central facility serves all demand points. We derive accurate logistics cost estimates from the dispersion of demand points for such systems, enabling a comparison of the expected logistics costs of different candidate target groups. The most accurate measure combines the average distance from the demand locations to a central location and the mutual distances between neighboring demand locations. The average of the distances between all pairs of locations forms a good alternative measure.     

Sourcing decisions with capacity reservation contracts

By committing to long-term supply contracts, buyers seek to lower their purchasing costs, and have products delivered without interruption. When a long-term contract is available, suppliers are less pressured to find new customers, and can afford to charge a price lower than the prevailing spot market price. We examine sourcing decisions of a firm in the presence of a capacity reservation contract that this firm makes with its long-term supplier in addition to the spot market alternative. This contract entails delivery of any desired portion of a reserved fixed capacity in exchange for a guaranteed payment by the buyer. We investigate rational actions of the two parties under two different types of periodic review inventory control policies used by the buyer: the two-number policy, and the base stock policy. When typical demand probability distributions are considered, inclusion of the spot market source in the buyer’s procurement plan significantly reduces the capacity commitments from the long-term supplier.     

Two-stage pricing for custom-made products

A commonly observed two-stage pricing strategy for a custom-made product involves a pre-purchase entry fee for a potential consumer and a purchase price if he decides to buy the product. We solve and compare two settings: In the first, the firm does not commit in advance to the second-stage price and in the second, the firm does. We show that without a commitment mechanism, the two price points are strategic complements, in that the higher pre-product fee implies a higher post-product price. With commitment, the two price points are strategic substitutes and the firm can improve profit over the no-commitment case by offering a low purchase price in the second stage and extracting the surplus through an entry fee. When the production cost is low, the commitment solution benefits both the firm and the consumer.     

A capacitated firm’s pricing strategies for strategic consumers with different search costs

This paper studies pricing strategies of a seller with budget constraints facing two types of strategic consumers with different search costs, and proposes three pricing strategies to motivate all consumers to visit his shop. These are the basic price strategy, differentiated compensation strategy and an improved differentiated compensation strategy. Based on the rational expectations paradigm, we characterize the rational expectations equilibrium in the game and propose a basic pricing strategy. In order to address the interplay between price and demand, we further propose a differentiated compensation strategy to improve the basic model. We then compare the differentiated compensation strategy to the basic pricing strategy when both are feasible. We find that selection of the optimal strategy is independent of composition of consumers but is dependent on the seller’s budget level and the difference between the two search costs. If the budget is large enough and the difference between the search costs is small enough, a differentiated compensation strategy can further improve the seller’s profitability. In addition to these findings, we first propose an improved differentiated compensation strategy to further enhance the firm’s profit. We find that the optimal strategy is to implement the improved differentiated compensation strategy when all three strategies are feasible. Interestingly, the firm may benefit from paying a high compensation to the consumers.     

拥挤的水房——有关打水问题的数学模型

学校的开水房常常十分拥挤,原因何在?如何解决?根据本人亲自观测的数据,运用统计检验分析数据并提出合理假设;用排队论方法定量地描述系统状态;通过灵敏度分析讨论了参数变动对系统状态的影响;并利用设计曲线与控制曲线讨论最优化问题;最后比较了两种排队方式。从而找到了拥挤原因,了解了拥挤程度,并提出解决办法。文中计算结果与实际情况符合较好。     

A discrete long-term location–price problem under the assumption of discriminatory pricing: Formulations and parametric analysis

We consider a competitive location problem in which a new firm has to make decisions on the locations of several new facilities as well as on its price setting in order to maximise profit. Under the assumption of discriminatory prices, competing firms set a specific price for each market area. The customers buy one unit of a single homogeneous price-inelastic product from the facility that offers the lowest price in the area the consumers belong to. Three customer choice rules are considered in order to break ties in the offered prices. We prove that, considering long-term competition on price, this problem can be reduced to a problem with decisions on location only. For each one of the choice rules the location problem is formulated as an integer programming model and a parametric analysis of these models is given. To conclude, an application with real data is presented.     

Controlled predatory pricing in a multiperiod Stackelberg game: an MPEC approach

We analyze a multiperiod oligopolistic market where each period is a Stackelberg game between a leader firm and multiple follower firms. The leader chooses his production level first, taking into account the reaction of the followers. Then, the follower firms decide their production levels after observing the leader’s decision. The difference between the proposed model and other models discussed in literature is that the leader firm has the power to force the follower firms out of business by preventing them from achieving a target sales level in a given time period. The leader firm has an incentive to lower the market prices possibly lower than the Stackelberg equilibrium in order to push the followers to sell less and eventually go out of business. Intentionally lowering the market prices to force competitors to fail is known as predatory pricing, and is illegal under antitrust laws since it negatively affects consumer welfare. In this work, we show that there exists a predatory pricing strategy where the market price is above the average cost and consumer welfare is preserved. We develop a mixed integer nonlinear problem (MINLP) that models the multiperiod Stackelberg game. The MINLP problem is transformed to a mixed integer linear problem (MILP) by using binary variables and piecewise linearization. A cutting plane algorithm is used to solve the resulting MILP. The results show that firms can engage in predatory pricing even if the average market price is forced to remain higher than the average cost. Furthermore, we show that in order to protect the consumers, antitrust laws can control predatory pricing by setting rules on consumer welfare.     

产品服务能力与定价联合优化策略机制研究——基于动态性和非线性视角

为了快速响应客户需求的动态变化和提高产品服务能力的管理效率,运用状态相关需求率函数和成本收益率函数,建立用以解决产品服务需求动态性和非线性难题的排队优化模型。通过考虑产品服务化过程中客户需求变化特征,从服务能力和价格两个维度将客户划分为实惠型、经济型、专业型和品质型四个不同类别。依据客户产品服务需求动态演变阶段,针对服务能力与价格的内在关联性,运用排队优化模型分别构建了成本领先策略、服务能力领先策略、价格领先策略和产品服务能力定价联合策略。最后,借助南阳泵业企业运营实例,验证了产品服务能力定价联合策略的优越性,并给出产品服务能力定价联合策略演化路径及其实施对策。     

Firms can benefit from inaccurate market beliefs

A supplier sells to a retailer who serves a market with uncertain demand. Before the season starts, the retailer preorders from the supplier, who stocks to satisfy at least the preorder. After the actual demand is realized, the retailer can place an at-once order, which is satisfied up to stock availability. Market demand, as perceived by a firm, can differ from what it actually is. We find that a firm can benefit from holding an inaccurate market belief.     

Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games

We consider cost sharing for a class of facility location games, where the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a player-specific matroid defined on the set of resources. We assume that resources have nondecreasing load-dependent costs and player-specific delays. Our model includes the important special case of capacitated facility location problems, where players have to jointly pay for opened facilities. The goal is to design cost sharing protocols so as to minimize the resulting price of anarchy and price of stability. We investigate two classes of protocols: basic protocols guarantee the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium and separable protocols additionally require that the resulting cost shares only depend on the set of players on a resource. We find optimal basic and separable protocols that guarantee the price of stability/price of anarchy to grow logarithmically/linearly in the number of players. These results extend our previous results (cf. von Falkenhausen & Harks, 2013), where optimal basic and separable protocols were given for the case of symmetric matroid games without delays.     

The effect of market segmentation with demand leakage between market segments on a firm’s price and inventory decisions

In this paper, we address the simultaneous determination of price and inventory replenishment in a newsvendor setting when the firm faces demand from two or more market segments in which the firm can set different prices. We allow for demand leakage from higher-priced segments to lower-priced segments and assume that unsatisfied demand can be backlogged. We examine the case where the demands occur concurrently without priority and are met from a single inventory. We consider customer’s buy-down behavior explicitly by modeling demand leakage as a function of segment price differentiation, and characterize the structure of optimal inventory and pricing policies.     

Dynamic Network-Based Discriminatory Pricing

We study the dynamic pricing decisions for competitive network service providers. We assume that each competing firm follows a three-part pricing scheme, which consists of an ongoing membership fee, a usage fee for communications within the networks, and another usage fee for communications across the networks. The difference between the two usage fees is the network-based price discount that allows price discrimination. We study the firms problems as a differential game and establish the optimal pricing policy as a Nash equilibrium feedback strategy depending on only the network sizes (i.e., the number of subscribers). We compare the dynamic network-based discount with the static discount. In the special case of a uniform calling pattern, we find that the firm network-based dynamic discount is always lower than the static discount; we find also that the firm that has a larger network can offer a bigger discount. These results are useful particularly for managers. To get further insights into the dynamic pricing policies, we explore the case of symmetric competition using numerical simulation.Communicated by G. Leitmann     

A literature review on dynamic pricing of electricity

Revenue management and dynamic pricing are concepts that have immense possibilities for application in the energy sector. Both can be considered as demand-side management tools that can facilitate the offering of different prices at different demand levels. This paper studies literature on various topics related to the dynamic pricing of electricity and lists future research avenues in pricing policies, consumers’ willingness to pay and market segmentation in this field. Demand and price forecasting play an important role in determining prices and scheduling load in dynamic pricing environments. This allows different forms of dynamic pricing policies to different markets and customers depending on customers’ willingness to pay. Consumers’ willingness to pay for electricity services is also necessary in setting price limits depending on the demand and demand response curve. Market segmentation can enhance the effects of such pricing schemes. Appropriate scheduling of electrical load enhances the consumer response to dynamic tariffs.