Van Gulick’s solution of the exclusion problem revisited

The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept. Also called The Problem of Causal Exclusion.     

A Platonic Theory of Truthmaking

A Platonic explanation of non-modal and modal truths is explained and defended using non-spatiotemporal entities as their truthmakers. It is argued, further, that this theory is parsimonious, naturalistic, and ontologically serious. These features should commend the view to a wide swath of philosophers.     

A Priori knowledge contextualised and Benacerraf’s dilemma

In this article, I discuss Hawthorne’s contextualist solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma. He wants to find a satisfactory epistemology to go with realist ontology, namely with causally inaccessible mathematical and modal entities. I claim that he is unsuccessful. The contextualist theories of knowledge attributions were primarily developed as a response to the skeptical argument based on the deductive closure principle. Hawthorne uses the same strategy in his attempt to solve the epistemologist puzzle facing the proponents of mathematical and modal realism, but this problem is of a different nature than the skeptical one. The contextualist theory of knowledge attributions cannot help us with the question about the nature of mathematical and modal reality and how they can be known. I further argue that Hawthorne’s account does not say anything about a priori status of mathematical and modal knowledge. Later, Hawthorne adds to his account an implausible claim that in some contexts a gettierized belief counts as knowledge.     

Causal Truthmaking

This paper provides an outline of a theory of causal truthmaking according to which contingent truths are made true by causal facts and dispositional mechanisms. These facts and mechanisms serve to account for the truth of propositions by explaining in a non-epistemic fashion why they have come about as truths. Given that negative causation is allowed for, we are able to provide truthmakers for negative truths without making appeal to negative facts, lacks or absences. The paper takes its starting point in the following claims by George Molnar: (1) the world is everything that exists; (2) everything that exists is positive; (3) some negative claims about the world are true; and (4) every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists. The conclusion is reached that we can keep (1–4) in a consistent manner if causal truthmaking is permitted.     

Lewis’ Modal Realism and Absence Causation

A major criticism of David Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation is that it allows too many things to count as causes, especially since Lewis allows, in addition to events, absences to be causes as well. Peter Menzies has advanced this concern under the title “the problem of profligate causation.” In this paper, I argue that the problem of profligate causation provides resources for exposing a tension between Lewis’ acceptance of absence causation and his modal realism. The result is a different problem of profligate causation—one that attacks the internal consistency of Lewisian metaphysics rather than employing common sense judgments or intuitions that conflict with Lewis’ extensive list of causes.     

Moral responsibility for unprevented harm

That we are morally responsible for what we do willingly and knowingly is a commonplace. That our moral responsibility extends as far as to cover at least the intended consequences of our voluntary actions and perhaps also the ones we did not intend, but could or did foresee, is equally beyond dispute. But what about omissions? Are we, or can we be, (equally) morally responsible for the harm that has occured because we did not prevent it, even though we could have done so? Say, for all the enormous suffering, caused daily by famine, deprivation and curable diseases in the Third World countries?Moral intuitions and practices that one could consult in this matter seem to leave us in the dark. We regularly ascribe responsibility to people for harms resulting from their negligence or failure to fulfill professional duties. On the other hand, we tend to think that unless there is some evidence of the causal contribution that agents made to a harmful event and/or state, it is not really fair to blame it on them. And finally, to complicate things even more, most of us deny that omissions could effect anything (any change) in the world and consequently regard them as causally impotent (as well as possibly harmless).Most of the proposed solutions to this perplexing issue simply take negative moral responsibility for granted and then either try to revise our ordinary notion of causation accordingly or, alternatively, weaken the conditions for holding someone morally responsible. In the paper I present and defend the relative merits of the third approach, one sceptical of the notion of moral responsibility for the ‘outcomes’ of omissions. I try to show that for some identifiable core notion of moral responsibility and paradigmatic cases of omissions, the prospects for a happy marriage are rather slim.     

Program explanations and causal relevance

Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism against Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument according to which non-reductive physicalism is committed to epiphenomenalism because irreducible mental properties are ‘screened off’ from causal relevance by their physical realizers. Jackson and Pettit’s most promising explication of a program explanation appeals to the idea of invariance of effect under variation of realization, but I show that invariance of effect under variation of realization is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal relevance.     

Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws

This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts.     

Two comments and a problem for David Davies’ performance theory

This paper considers the view, recently put forward by David Davies in Art and Performance, that works of art should be identified with the generative performances that result in the object, rather than with the object. It attempts to disarm two of Davies arguments by, first, providing a criterion by which the contextualist can accommodate all and only the relevant generative properties as properties of the work, and, second, providing an alternative explanation for his modal intuitions. Finally, it draws attention to Davies’ difficulties in providing a clear criterion for the identity of the work of art.     

Non-Realist Cognitivism,Truth and Objectivity

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that (i) normative judgments are beliefs; (ii) that some normative beliefs are true; (iii) that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and (iv) that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim of this article is to argue that Parfit’s theory is problematic because its defenders have no resources to make sense of the nature of normative truth, which is an essential element of their view. I do this by showing how the traditional theories of truth are not available for the non-realist cognitivists.     

Inductive and Deductive Justification of Knowledge: Flexible Judgments Underneath Stable Beliefs in Teacher Education

Personal epistemological beliefs are considered to play an important role for processes of learning and teaching. However, research on personal epistemology is confronted with theoretical issues as there is conflicting evidence regarding the structure, stability, and context-dependence of epistemological beliefs. We give evidence how theoretical and methodological issues can partly be resolved by distinguishing between relatively stable “epistemological beliefs” and situation-specific “epistemological judgments.” A qualitative content analysis of a series of semistructured interviews (study 1) with pre-service teachers, teachers, and teacher educators as well as a statistical analysis of pre-service teachers’ extensive answers in questionnaires (study 2), both on the topic of “mathematical discovery,” reveal not only beliefs of the participants but also different qualities of judgments. Therefore, in further research both aspects of beliefs should be considered in a more differentiated manner when categorizing belief structures.     

Unrestricted Quantification and Reality: Reply to Kim

In my book, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise, I use the novel idea of modal tense to respond to a number of arguments against modal realism. Peter van Inwagen’s million-carat-diamond objection is one of them. It targets the version of modal realism by David Lewis and exploits the fact that Lewis accepts absolutely unrestricted quantification. The crux of my response is to use modal tense to neutralize absolutely unrestricted quantification. Seahwa Kim says that even when equipped with modal tense, I am unsuccessful, given my view of reality and the proper use of modal tense in speaking of reality. I counter her attempt at resurrecting van Inwagen’s objection and clarify how we should use modal tense and how we should talk about reality.     

Extending possibilistic logic over Gödel logic

In this paper we present several fuzzy logics trying to capture different notions of necessity (in the sense of possibility theory) for Gödel logic formulas. Based on different characterizations of necessity measures on fuzzy sets, a group of logics with Kripke style semantics is built over a restricted language, namely, a two-level language composed of non-modal and modal formulas, the latter, moreover, not allowing for nested applications of the modal operator N. Completeness and some computational complexity results are shown.     

In Defense of Epistemic Circularity

In this paper I defend epistemic circularity by arguing that the “No Self-Support” principle (NSS) is false. This principle, ultimately due to Fumerton (1995), states that one cannot acquire a justified belief in the reliability of a source of belief by trusting that very source. I argue that NSS has the skeptical consequence that the trustworthiness of all of our sources ultimately depends upon the trustworthiness of certain fundamental sources – sources that we cannot justifiably believe to be reliable. This is a problem, I claim, because if the trustworthiness of all of our sources depends upon sources that we should not believe to be reliable, then a reflective individual should not trust any of his sources at all. The hidden cost of rejecting epistemic circularity is thus the unacceptable skeptical thesis that reflective individuals like you and I have no justified beliefs whatsoever.     

图模型及其在统计建模中的应用

图模型是近年来兴起的一个新的统计研究方向,主要借助拓扑图的直观形式对多维概率分布进行统计推断和因果分析。本文对图模型的基本概念、原理、建模及应用进行了简单介绍。     

Two Semantical Approaches to Paraconsistent Modalities

In this paper we extend the anodic systems introduced in Bueno-Soler (J Appl Non Class Logics 19(3):291–310, 2009) by adding certain paraconsistent axioms based on the so called logics of formal inconsistency, introduced in Carnielli et al. (Handbook of philosophical logic, Springer, Amsterdam, 2007), and define the classes of systems that we call cathodic. These classes consist of modal paraconsistent systems, an approach which permits us to treat with certain kinds of conflicting situations. Our interest in this paper is to show that such systems can be semantically characterized in two different ways: by Kripke-style semantics and by modal possible-translations semantics. Such results are inspired in some universal constructions in logic, in the sense that cathodic systems can be seen as a kind of fusion (a particular case of fibring) between modal logics and non-modal logics, as discussed in Carnielli et al. (Analysis and synthesis of logics, Springer, Amsterdam, 2007). The outcome is inherently within the spirit of universal logic, as our systems semantically intermingles modal logics, paraconsistent logics and many-valued logics, defining new blends of logics whose relevance we intend to show.     

Measuring Differences Between Cognitive Maps

A causal cognitive map is a directed network representation of an individual's beliefs concerning a particular domain at a point of time. The nodes and the arcs joining them indicate causal beliefs. There have been few attempts to develop quantitative measures for such maps. The measures could be used to compare the maps of different individuals and also to track the changes in the beliefs of a single individual over time. They would assist in providing a more objective basis for qualitative analysis. In this paper we review current cognitive mapping research and then propose some measures for computing the difference between two maps, illustrating this work with a managerial example.     

On Knowing How I Feel About That—A Process-Reliabilist Approach

Human subjects seem to have a type of introspective access to their mental states that allows them to immediately judge the types and intensities of their occurrent emotions, as well as what those emotions are about or “directed at”. Such judgments manifest what I call “emotion-direction beliefs”, which, if reliably produced, may constitute emotion-direction knowledge. Many psychologists have argued that the “directed emotions” such beliefs represent have a componential structure, one that includes feelings of emotional responses and related but independent representations of what those feelings are about. I argue that such componentiality may help to explain how emotion-direction knowledge is achievable. I begin by developing a hybrid view of introspection that combines David Chalmers’ phenomenal realism with Alvin Goldman’s “partial redeployment” account of meta-belief content. I then provide a process-reliabilist account of introspectively gained emotion-direction knowledge that outlines the minimum conditions of reliably forming emotion-direction beliefs, and specifies several ways in which the warrant of such beliefs could be defeated by relevant counterfactual alternatives. The overall account suggests how distinct introspective processes might be epistemically synergistic.     

Cohomology with Causally Restricted Supports

De Rham cohomology with spacelike compact and timelike compact supports has recently been noticed to be of importance for understanding the structure of classical and quantum Maxwell theory on curved spacetimes. Similarly, causally restricted cohomologies of different differential complexes play a similar role in other gauge theories. We introduce a method for computing these causally restricted cohomologies in terms of cohomologies with either compact or unrestricted supports. The calculation exploits the fact that the de Rham–d’Alembert wave operator can be extended to a chain map that is homotopic to zero and that its causal Green function fits into a convenient exact sequence. As a first application, we use the method on the de Rham complex, then also on the Calabi (or Killing–Riemann–Bianchi) complex, which appears in linearized gravity on constant curvature backgrounds. We also discuss applications to other complexes, as well as generalized causal structures and functoriality.     

Semiotic open complex systems: Processes and behaviors

An H‐system is a conceptual or semiotic model of reality formed in the mind of the subject. Understanding the behavior of the system means being able to infer causal relationships that explain this system to the Observer‐subject, and therefore having access to mechanisms to construct a mental or ontological mathematical model of the system under study. A process is a mechanism involving a series of successive operations between stimuli and responses. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 21: 388–396, 2016