Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Explanation Condition for Moral Responsibility: a Reply to Swenson

Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are supposed to constitute counter-examples to the principle of alternate possibilities, for they are cases in which we have the intuition that an agent is morally responsible for his action, even though he could not have done otherwise. In a recent paper, Swenson (2015) rejects this conclusion, on the basis of a comparison between standard FSCs, which typically feature actions, and similar cases involving omissions. Because the absence of alternate possibilities seems to preclude moral responsibility in the cases of omissions, and because there is no morally relevant difference between the cases of actions and omissions, Swenson concludes that agents are not morally responsible in standard FSCs. In the present paper, I argue that Swenson’s argument fails because there are at least two very important differences between both types of cases. First, there is a difference about whether agents in such cases actually perform the relevant action: while agents actually perform the relevant action in standard FSCs, they do not in FSCs supposedly involving omissions, for omissions require the possibility to have done otherwise. Second, while the agent’s behavior in standard FSCs actually explain that he performed the relevant action, the agent’s behavior in FSCs including omission actually fails to explain why the agent did not perform the relevant action. Beyond Swenson’s argument, I end up discussing what factors ultimately explain (and justify) our intuitions about FSCs involving omissions.     

Farewell to direct source incompatibilism

Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible for any action. This paper is a critique of a kind of source incompatibilism, namely, direct source incompatibilism. Direct source incompatibilists reject PAP on the basis of Frankfurt-style examples. Since PAP is one of two premises in the traditional argument for INC, direct source incompatibilists opt for a version of the direct argument, which argues for INC with the aid of some non-responsibility transfer principle. I demonstrate that this option is not available, for there is a tension between the following two claims.     

Moral responsibility—What is all the fuss about?

Examination of several accounts regarding the nature of moral responsibility allows the extraction of a conceptual core common to all of them. Relying on that core conception of moral responsibility, the paper explores what human life without moral responsibility would be like. That exploration establishes that many robust forms of human relationship and nonmoral normativity could continue, absent moral responsibility, even if moral responsibility were abandoned on incompatibilist grounds. Much more importantly, it also establishes, contra Waller and Pereboom, that only some forms of morality—so-called “behavioral” forms—remain possible without moral responsibility. The paper argues that normative moral approaches that take into account agent intentions in order to assess the moral status of action cannot be applied without moral responsibility of agents. Thus, morality without responsibility needs to be behavioral, not consequentialist, as has often been thought.     

The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding: A response to McKenna and Pereboom

Readers familiar with Harry Frankfurt’s argument that we do not need leeway-liberty (or the power to bring about alternative possible actions or intentions) to be morally responsible will probably also know that the most famous and popular response on behalf of leeway-libertarianism remains a dilemma posed in similar forms by David Widerker, Robert Kane, and Carl Ginet: either the agent retains significant residual leeway in Frankfurt-style cases, or these cases beg the question by presupposing causal determinism. In the last few years, there have been several different attempts to defend Frankfurtian critiques of PAP in response this dilemma. In a novel approach, Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna present cases in which all deliberatively relevant or “robust” alternatives are blocked, but the agent’s act or decision is not determined. Pereboom and McKenna argue that any plausible leeway-condition on responsibility must characterize the required alternatives as robust in two ways: being voluntary performances and having a practical relevance accessible to the agent’s mind. I agree with the requirement of robustness, and argue that we can build this notion into a complex concept of agent-possibility, or “agentive-can.” However, I argue that both McKenna’s and Pereboom’s conceptions of robustness are too demanding: they exclude alternatives that are intuitively relevant. Moreover, I argue that the alternative of refraining from deciding, or voluntarily failing to decide, is robust in the right sense. In agreement with a tradition running from Ockham back through Scotus to Aquinas, I argue that this robust alternative is necessary for responsibility. If the Frankfurt-controller eliminates it, then the agent’s responsibility is undermined. In particular, I argue that Pereboom’s tax evasion cases do not refute this leeway-condition on moral responsibility.     

Research, practice, uncertainty and responsibility

Three issues concerning the relationship between research and practice are addressed. (1) A certain ‘prototype mathematics classroom’ seems to dominate the research field, which in many cases seems selective with respect to what practices to address. I suggest challenging the dominance of the discourse created around the prototype mathematics classroom. (2) I find it important to broaden the school-centred discourse on mathematics education and to address the very different out-of-school practices that include mathematics. Many of these practices are relevant for interpreting what is taking place in a school context. That brings us to (3) socio-political issues of mathematics education. When the different school-sites for learning mathematics as well as the many different practices that include mathematics are related, we enter the socio-political dimension of mathematics education.On the one hand we must consider questions like: Could socio-political discrimination be acted out through mathematics education? Could mathematics education exercise a regimentation and disciplining of students? Could it include discrimination in terms of language? Could it include sexism and racism? On the other hand: Could mathematics education bring about competencies which can be described as empowering, and as supporting the development of mathematical literary or a ‘mathemacy’, important for the development of critical citizenship?However, there is no hope for identifying a one-way route to mathemacy. More generally: There is no simple way of identifying the socio-political functions of mathematics education. Mathematics education has to face uncertainty, and this challenge brings us to the notion of responsibility.     

On I-Cauchy nets and completeness

In this paper we extend the idea of usual Cauchy condition of nets to I-Cauchy condition by using the concept of ideals. This Cauchy condition arises naturally from the notion of I-convergence of nets introduced by Lahiri and Das (2008). As the underlying structure for the whole study we take a uniform space so that our notion and results extend the idea of statistical Cauchy sequences very recently introduced in uniform spaces by Di Maio and Ko?inac (2008). In particular we try to give partial answers to an open problem posed by Di Maio and Ko?inac and examine the relationship between this new Cauchy condition and usual completeness of a uniform space.     

A simplicial approach to factorization systems and Kurosh-Amitsur radicals

Regarding categories as simplicial sets via the nerve functor, we extend the notion of a factorization system from morphisms in a category, to 1-simplexes in an arbitrary simplicial set. Applied to what we call the simplicial set of short exact sequences, it gives the notion of Kurosh-Amitsur radical. That is, we present a unified approach to factorization systems and radicals.     

Hard- and soft-line responses to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument

Derk Pereboom has advanced a four-case manipulation argument that, he claims, undermines both libertarian accounts of free action not committed to agent-causation and compatibilist accounts of such action. The first two cases are meant to be ones in which the key agent is not responsible for his actions owing to his being manipulated. We first consider a “hard-line” response to this argument that denies that the agent is not morally responsible in these cases. We argue that this response invites a dialectically uncharitable reading of the argument. We then propose an alternative interpretation; it affirms that, at least prima facie, the manipulated agent in the first two cases is not responsible. Finally, we question Pereboom’s rationale for why the manipulation in these cases subverts responsibility.     

Risk sensitive impulse control of non-Markovian processes

We consider the problem of an optimal stochastic impulse control of non-Markovian Processes when the expression of the cost functional integrates sensitiveness with respect to the risk. For this class, we try to establish the existence of an optimal strategy. We prove that our impulse control problem could be reduced to an iterative sequence of optimal stopping ones. Basically, the problem is solved using techniques involving the Snell envelope notion.     

Asymptotic almost-equivalence of Lipschitz evolution systems in Banach spaces

In this paper we introduce a notion of asymptotic almost-equivalence of two evolution systems and provide simple tests that guarantee that two evolution systems have the same qualitative asymptotic properties. In this way we are able to unify and extend many previously known results and also to understand what is behind equally behaved systems. In particular, we establish convergence, ergodic convergence and almost-convergence of almost-orbits both for the weak and the strong topologies based on the behavior of the orbits.     

Hume, the Occult, and the Substance of the School

I have not been able to locate any critique of Hume on substance by a Schoolman, at least in English, dating from Hume's period or shortly thereafter. I have, therefore, constructed my own critique as an exercise in ??post facto history??. This is what a late eighteenth-century/early nineteenth-century Scholastic could, would, and should have said in response to Hume's attack on substance should they have been minded to do so. That no one did is somewhat mysterious. My critique is precisely in the language of the period, using solely the conceptual resources available to a Schoolman at that time. The arguments, however, are as sound now as they were then, and in this sense the paper performs a dual role??contributing to the defence of substance contra Hume, and filling, albeit two hundred?years or so too late, a gap in the historical record.     

The calculus of ethical voting

Papers by Feddersen and Sandroni (Am Econ Rev, 2006a; Q J polit Sci, 2006b) and Coate and Colin (Am Econ Rev, 94:1476–1504, 2004) provide an explanation for turnout in large elections. These papers introduce ethical agents who are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are morally obligated to do so. Unlike previous duty-based models of participation, ethical agents’ moral obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents. In order to predict outcomes, a solution concept called consistency links agents’ preferences with actual behavior in a manner analogous to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we address the foundational problems in ethical participation models. We show the restrictions consistency imposes on the central notion of group identity, the incentive constraints on ethical reasoning, and the existence and uniqueness of consistent profiles.     

Continuity between Cauchy and Bolzano: issues of antecedents and priority

In a paper published in 1970, Grattan-Guinness argued that Cauchy, in his 1821 Cours d'Analyse, may have plagiarized Bolzano's Rein analytischer Beweis (RB), first published in 1817. That paper was subsequently discredited in several works, but some of its assumptions still prevail today. In particular, it is usually considered that Cauchy did not develop his notion of the continuity of a function before Bolzano developed his in RB and that both notions are essentially the same. We argue that both assumptions are incorrect, and that it is implausible that Cauchy's initial insight into that notion, which eventually evolved to an approach using infinitesimals, could have been borrowed from Bolzano's work. Furthermore, we account for Bolzano's interest in that notion and focus on his discussion of a definition by Kästner (in Section 183 of his 1766 book), which the former seems to have misrepresented at least partially.     

Particularism, perception and judgement

According to the most detailed articulation and defence of moral particularism, it is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reasons. This paper addresses aspects of particularist epistemology. In rejecting the existence and efficacy of principles in moral thinking and reasoning particularists typically appeal to a theory of moral knowledge which operates with a ‘perceptual’ metaphor. This is problematic. Holism about valence can give rise to a moral epistemology that is a metaethical variety of atomistic empiricism. To avoid what could be called the Myth of the Moral Given, particularism has made use of a judgement-centred account of moral epistemology. This paper critically examines that account with reference to a proposed analogy between our moral knowledge and our knowledge of similarities.     

Fluid limits for an ALOHA-type model with impatient customers

Random multiple-access protocols of type ALOHA are used to regulate networks with a star configuration where client nodes talk to the hub node at the same frequency (finding a wide range of applications among telecommunication systems, including mobile telephone networks and WiFi networks). Such protocols control who talks at what time sharing the common idea “try to send your data and, if your message collides with another transmission, try resending later”. In the present paper we consider a time-slotted ALOHA model where users are allowed to renege before transmission completion. We focus on the scenario that leads to overload in the absence of impatience. Under mild assumptions, we show that the fluid (or law-of-large-numbers) limit of the system workload coincides a.s. with the unique solution to a?certain integral equation. We also demonstrate that the fluid limits for distinct initial conditions converge to the same value as time tends to infinity.     

Contextualism for consequentialists

If, as I have argued elsewhere, consequentialism is not fundamentally concerned with such staples of moral theory as rightness, duty, obligation, moral requirements, goodness (as applied to actions), and harm, what, if anything, does it have to say about such notions? While such notions have no part to play at the deepest level of the theory, they may nonetheless be of practical significance. By way of explanation I provide a linguistic contextualist account of these notions. A contextualist approach to all these notions makes room for them in ordinary moral discourse, but it also illustrates why there is no room for them at the level of fundamental moral theory. If the truth value of a judgment that an action is right or good varies according to the context in which it is made, then rightness or goodness can no more be properties of actions themselves than thisness or hereness can be properties of things or locations themselves.     

Abstract Logics, Logic Maps, and Logic Homomorphisms

What is a logic? Which properties are preserved by maps between logics? What is the right notion for equivalence of logics? In order to give satisfactory answers we generalize and further develop the topological approach of [4] and present the foundations of a general theory of abstract logics which is based on the abstract concept of a theory. Each abstract logic determines a topology on the set of theories. We develop a theory of logic maps and show in what way they induce (continuous, open) functions on the corresponding topological spaces. We also establish connections to well-known notions such as translations of logics and the satisfaction axiom of institutions [5]. Logic homomorphisms are maps that behave in some sense like continuous functions and preserve more topological structure than logic maps in general. We introduce the notion of a logic isomorphism as a (not necessarily bijective) function on the sets of formulas that induces a homeomorphism between the respective topological spaces and gives rise to an equivalence relation on abstract logics. Therefore, we propose logic isomorphisms as an adequate and precise notion for equivalence of logics. Finally, we compare this concept with another recent proposal presented in [2]. This research was supported by the grant CNPq/FAPESB 350092/2006-0.     

A primer of substitution tilings of the Euclidean plane

This paper is intended to provide an introduction to the theory of substitution tilings. For our purposes, tiling substitution rules are divided into two broad classes: geometric and combinatorial. Geometric substitution tilings include self-similar tilings such as the well-known Penrose tilings; for this class there is a substantial body of research in the literature. Combinatorial substitutions are just beginning to be examined, and some of what we present here is new. We give numerous examples, mention selected major results, discuss connections between the two classes of substitutions, include current research perspectives and questions, and provide an extensive bibliography. Although the author attempts to represent the field as a whole, the paper is not an exhaustive survey, and she apologizes for any important omissions.     

Black the libertarian

The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) comes in the form of a dilemma: either the counterexample presupposes determinism, in which case it begs the question; or it does not presuppose determinism, in which case it fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate all alternatives that might plausibly be thought to satisfy PAP. I respond to this challenge with a counterexample in whichconsidering an alternative course of action is anecessary condition fordeciding to act otherwise, and the agent does not in fact consider the alternative. I call this a “buffer case,” because the morally relevant alternative is “buffered” by the requirement that the agent first consider the alternative. Suppose further that the agent’s considering an alternative action—entering the buffer zone—is what would trigger the counterfactual intervener. Then it would appear that PAP-relevant alternatives are out of reach. I defend this counterexample to PAP against three objections: that considering an alternative isitself a morally relevant alternative; that buffer cases can be shown to containother alternatives that arguably satisfy PAP; and that even if the agent’spresent access to PAP-relevant alternatives were eliminated, PAP could still be satisfied in virtue ofearlier alternatives. I conclude that alternative possibilities are a normal symptom, but not an essential constituent, of moral agency.