连续对策上的计策问题

限定一个连续对策不是平凡地无意义（例如对某个局中人绝对有利等），我们提出了连续对策上的计策的基本概念。最后得到结论，如果局中人1使用经典对策，那么他的赢得期望必不是赢得函数的最大值。如果局中人1使用计策成功（即使得局中人2中计），那么局中人1必取得赢得函数的最大值，局中人2也有对偶的结果。     

Two-target pursuit-evasion differential games in the plane

Two-target versions of the game of two cars and the homicidal chauffeur game are introduced. This enables us to consider pursuitevasion withouta priori role assignment. A generic example of the two-target homicidal chauffeur game is considered in detail; in particular, a map of the game and its corresponding winning strategies are found using Lyapunov methods of analysis. The effects of altering game parameters, such as the speed and maneuverability ratios, and the weapon system parameters are then presented. It is found that certain winning strategies include a swerve-type maneuver and that, for certain sets of parameters, regions of stagnation and different modes of draw occur.This work was partially supported by a grant from Control Data.     

Computational complexity of winning strategies in two-person polynomial games

One considers two-person games, with players called I and II below. In order, they choose natural numbers, for example, for length 4, I chooses x₁, II chooses x₂. I chooses x₃, II chooses x₄. Then I wins if P(x₁,x₂,x₃,x₄)=0.Here P is a polynomial with integer coefficients. An old theorem of von Neumann and Zermelo shows that such a game is determined, i.e., there exists a winning strategy for one player or the other but not necessarily a computable winning strategy or one computable in polynomial time. It will be shown that there exists a game of polynomial type of length 4 for which there do not exist winning strategies for either player which are computable in polynomial time.Translated from Zapiski Nauchnykh Seminarov Leningradskogo Otdeleniya Matematicheskogo Instituta im. V. A. Steklova AN SSSR, Vol. 192, pp. 69–73, 1991.     

Games with Unknown Past

We define a new type of two player game occurring on a tree. The tree may have no root and may have arbitrary degrees of nodes. These games extend the class of games considered by Gurevich-Harrington in [5]. We prove that in the game one of the players has a winning strategy which depends on finite bounded information about the past part of a play and on future of each play that is isomorphism types of tree nodes. This result extends further the Gurevich-Harrington determinacy theorem from [5].     

Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games

An absorbing game is a repeated game where some action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage.  We prove that every multi-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium payoff. In other words, for every ε>0 there exists a probability distribution p _ε over the space of pure strategy profiles that satisfies the following. With probability at least 1−ε, if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p _ε and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than ε in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy. Received: April 2001/Revised: June 4, 2002     

Lion and man—can both win?

This paper is concerned with continuous-time pursuit and evasion games. Typically, we have a lion and a man in a metric space: they have the same speed, and the lion wishes to catch the man while the man tries to evade capture. We are interested in questions of the following form: is it the case that exactly one of the man and the lion has a winning strategy?As we shall see, in a compact metric space at least one of the players has a winning strategy. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, there are examples in which both players have winning strategies. We also construct a metric space in which, for the game with two lions versus one man, neither player has a winning strategy. We prove various other (positive and negative) related results, and pose some open problems.     

On Erdős's Eulerian Trail Game

 Paul Erdős proposed the following graph game. Starting with the empty graph on n vertices, two players, Trailmaker and Breaker, draw edges alternatingly. Each edge drawn has to start at the endpoint of the previously drawn edge, so the sequence of edges defines a trail. The game ends when it is impossible to continue the trail, and Trailmaker wins if the trail is eulerian. For all values of n, we determine which player has a winning strategy. Received: November 6, 1996 / Revised: May 2, 1997     

Vector linear programming in zero-sum multicriteria matrix games

In this paper, a multiple-objective linear problem is derived from a zero-sum multicriteria matrix game. It is shown that the set of efficient solutions of this problem coincides with the set of Paretooptimal security strategies (POSS) for one of the players in the original game. This approach emphasizes the existing similarities between the scalar and multicriteria matrix games, because in both cases linear programming can be used to solve the problems. It also leads to different scalarizations which are alternative ways to obtain the set of all POSS. The concept of ideal strategy for a player is introduced, and it is established that a pair of Pareto saddle-point strategies exists if both players have ideal strategies. Several examples are included to illustrate the results in the paper.     

A single-shot game of multi-period inspection

This paper deals with an inspection game of Customs and a smuggler during some days. Customs has two options of patrolling or not. The smuggler can take two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take an action during a limited number of days but they may discard some of the opportunities. When the smuggling coincides with the patrol, there occurs one of three events: the capture of the smuggler by Customs, a success of the smuggling and nothing new. If the smuggler is captured or no time remains to complete the game, the game ends. There have been many studies on the inspection game so far by the multi-stage game model, where both players at a stage know players’ strategies taken at the previous stage. In this paper, we consider a two-person zero-sum single-shot game, where the game proceeds through multiple periods but both players do not know any strategies taken by their opponents on the process of the game. We apply dynamic programming to the game to exhaust all equilibrium points on a strategy space of player. We also clarify the characteristics of optimal strategies of players by some numerical examples.     

Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium

It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with minimization of strategy complexity, Rubinstein and co-authors studied forms of Nash equilibrium where strategies are maximally simplified in that no strategy can be further simplified without sacrificing payoff. Inspired by this line of work, we introduce a notion of equilibrium whereby strategies are also maximally simplified, but with respect to a simplification procedure that is more careful in that a player will not simplify if the simplification incents other players to deviate. We study such equilibria in two-player machine games in which players choose finite automata that succinctly represent strategies for repeated games; in this context, we present techniques for establishing that an outcome is at equilibrium and present results on the structure of equilibria.     

Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in n-person games

We study the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a “random” n-person non-cooperative game in which all players have a countable number of strategies. We consider both the cases where all players have strictly and weakly ordinal preferences over their outcomes. For both cases, we show that the distribution of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria approaches the Poisson distribution with mean 1 as the numbers of strategies of two or more players go to infinity. We also find, for each case, the distribution of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria when the number of strategies of one player goes to infinity, while those of the other players remain finite.     

Coalitions and payoffs in three‐person sequential games: Initial tests of two formal models

In this paper we develop two formal models predicting coalitions and payoffs among rank striving players in a sequential three‐person game. We test the models’ predictions with data from a laboratory study of eleven male triads. Each triad plays a sequence of games; in each game a two‐person coalition forms and divides the coalition's point value between the two coalition partners. Participants know that the sequence of games will end without warning at a randomly chosen time; at the sequence's end each player's monetary payoff is a linear function of the rank of his accumulated point score, relative to those of the other members of his triad. The complexity of this situation prevents players and analysts from representing it as a single game; thus they are unable to use n‐person game theory to identify optimal strategies. Consequently, we assume that players, unable to develop strategies that are demonstrably optimal in the long run, adopt certain bargaining heuristics and surrogate short run objectives.

The two models follow the same basic outline; they differ, however, in the planning horizon they assume players to use. Proceeding from a priori assumptions concerning each player's decision calculus and the bargaining process, the two models state the probability that each coalition forms and predict the point divisions in the winning coalition. The laboratory data provide consistently strong support for the predictions of both models.     

The blind bartender's problem

We present a two-player game with restricted information for one of the players. The game takes place on a transitive group action. The winning strategies depend on chains of structures in the group action. We also study a modification of the game with further restrictions on one of the players.     

On the NP-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs

Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a joint strategy where each player has an expected payoff of at least r is NP-complete as a function of the number of nodes in the extensive-form representation of the game. Received January 2001/Final version May 1, 2001     

连续对策之判断下的最优策略集

本文引进连续对策上的判断块、判断准确、判断下的最优策略集等概念，得到了如下几个主要结果：1.判断下的最优策略集是一个局部凸空间的非空有界闭凸集；2.两个判断下的最优策略集相等的充要条件是这两个判断位于同一判断块中；3.若局中人判断准确，则在一次性对策下不论他使用此判断下的那一个最优策略（不论是纯的还是混合的），都可无风险地取得最优赢得。     

A <Emphasis Type="Italic">q</Emphasis>-player impartial avoidance game for generating finite groups

We study a q-player variation of the impartial avoidance game introduced by Anderson and Harary, where q is a prime. The game is played by the q players taking turns selecting previously-unselected elements of a finite group. The losing player is the one who selects an element that causes the set of jointly-selected elements to be a generating set for the group, with the previous player winning. We introduce a ranking system for the other players to prevent coalitions. We describe the winning strategy for these games on cyclic, nilpotent, dihedral, and dicyclic groups.     

Some undecidable determined games

Computing machines using algorithms play games and even learn to play games. However, the inherent finiteness properties of algorithms impose limitations on the game playing abilities of machines. M. Rabin illustrated this limitation in 1957 by constructing a two-person win-lose game with decidable rules but no computable winning strategies. Rabin's game was of the type where two players take turns choosing integers to satisfy some decidable but very complicated winning condition. In the present paper we obtain similar theorems of this type but the winning conditions are extremely simple relations (polynomial equations). Specific examples are given.     

Preferred coalitions in cooperative differential games

There are many interesting situations which can be described by anN-person general-sum differential game. Such games are characterized by the fact that the strategy of each player depends upon reasonable assumptions about the strategies of the remaining players; and, thus, these games cannot be considered asN uncoupled optimal control problems. In such cases, we say that the game is not strictly competitive, but involves a mutual interest which makes it possible for all of the players to reduce their costs by cooperating with one another, provided the resulting agreement can be enforced. When cooperation is allowed and there are more than two players, there is always the question of whether all possible subcoalitions will be formed with equal ease. This work considers the situation in which a particular subcoalition is preferred. A theory of general-sum games with preferred coalitions is presented, together with constructive examples of alternative approaches which are unsatisfactory.     

On (strong) α-favorability of the Wijsman hyperspace

The Banach-Mazur game as well as the strong Choquet game are investigated on the Wijsman hyperspace from the nonempty player's (i.e. α's) perspective. For the strong Choquet game we show that if X is a locally separable metrizable space, then α has a (stationary) winning strategy on X iff it has a (stationary) winning strategy on the Wijsman hyperspace for each compatible metric on X. The analogous result for the Banach-Mazur game does not hold, not even if X is separable, as we show that α may have a (stationary) winning strategy on the Wijsman hyperspace for each compatible metric on X, and not have one on X. We also show that there exists a separable 1st category metric space such that α has a (stationary) winning strategy on its Wijsman hyperspace. This answers a question of Cao and Junnila (2010) [6].     

Complexity of winning strategies

Rabin has given an example of a game with recursive rules but no recursive winning strategy. We show that such a game always has a hyperarithmetical winning strategy, but arbitrarily high levels of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy may be needed. We also exhibit a recursively enumerable game which has no hyperarithmetical winning strategy.