水电施工企业创新行为市场演化博弈分析

针对水电施工企业如何选择创新战略,政府如何引导企业进行创新,运用演化博弈理论分析了创新行为与市场结构的演化规律.研究表明,市场中企业采取自主创新或模仿创新的行为战略最终演化稳定均衡,即市场中总有一定比例的企业进行自主创新,其余的企业采取模仿创新,并且企业自主创新投资的概率与企业的规模成正比,与创新风险成正比,与创新成本成反比.由此我们得出,若企业个体规模小、自主创新成本高、创新所获收益小,则可采取模仿创新战略,反之,采取自主创新战略;对于政府若想维护市场稳定,提高行业技术水平和国际竞争力,对自主创新成本高、创新所获收益小的可采取补贴、减税等优惠政策,以鼓励企业采取自主创新.     

考虑声誉激励的供应链合作伙伴演化博弈模型

在考虑企业声誉激励的前提下.运用间接演化方法,提出了供应链合作伙伴(Supply Chain Partnerships,SCP)系统中企业合作偏好度的演化博弈(Evolutionary Game)模型,分析了SCP系统的内在演化机制,研究了仅与产量相关以及与产量和企业合作偏好度都相关的企业声誉激励机制对SCP系统企业合作偏好度演化稳定的影响,得到了相关的结论.     

棚户区改造的PPP模式研究:基于演化博弈视角

随着棚户区改造工作的大规模推进,传统棚改模式面临着融资困难等问题.在现有研究基础上,提出棚户区改造的PPP模式,该模式有助于解决传统模式的资金问题,提高棚户区改造的质量,同时在有限理性基础上构建以政府和企业为主体的演化博弈模型,分析在PPP模式下双方的稳定均衡策略.运用MATLAB仿真分析,通过改变参数模拟不同因素变化,探讨不同条件下的稳定演化均衡.根据稳定演化均衡结果提出改进棚户区改造PPP模式的对策建议.     

不完全信息下房地产价格的演化博弈分析

基于PAB(Pay-As-Bid)竞价机制,探讨不完全信息情况下供需关系对房屋成交价格的影响.在购房者对房屋价格预期不确定和购房者有限理性的假设下,利用鲁棒优化技术和演化博弈论中的"复制动态"思想,提出鲁棒演化博弈均衡的概念,建立相应的复制动态系统,并对系统的鲁棒演化均衡的渐进稳定性进行分析,得到在不同市场供需情况下购房者价格策略演化的一般规律.最后选用数值算例对模型加以验证.     

两类零售企业竞争策略选择的演化博弈分析

运用演化博弈理论分析了在同一市场两类零售企业行为的演化过程.根据两类企业竞争策略的复制者动态方程,分析了两类企业策略选择的演化均衡特征,并分析了一些主要参数对企业竞争策略选择的影响.结果表明,企业的相对实力和两企业竞争成本的乘积对企业行为的演化起着至关重要的作用.     

有限理性下种群博弈中合作均衡的稳定性

本文首先定义了理性函数,构造了有限理性模型,研究了有限理性下种群博弈NTU核的稳定性;其次,又进一步定义了种群博弈另一种合作均衡即强均衡的概念,并且采用类似的方法研究了有限理性下该强均衡的稳定性.研究结果表明:在我们所构造的有限理性模型框架下,对大多数的种群博弈(在Baire分类意义下)其NTU核和强均衡都是稳定的.     

基于参与主体异质性条件下囚徒困境合作演化博弈模型研究

利用演化博弈理论,对参与主体异质性条件下的囚徒困境模型进行了探讨,求出了满足不同条件下的演化稳定策略,并对种群中个体异质性对演化稳定策略的影响进行了分析,得出种群中选择相同策略的个体异质性差异越大,参与个体选择合作行为作为演化稳定策略的可能性就越大.极端地,当个体的异质性趋向于无穷大时,合作成为唯一的演化稳定占优策略,为现实大多数合作系统中能保持长期的一种合作稳定状态提供了合理地解释.     

基于强互惠理论的企业合作创新行为演化研究

基于强互惠理论构建了企业合作创新行为演化模型,将企业分成投机、纯合作与强互惠三种类型,对基本的演化博弈模型进行了分析,利用复制动态方程求出基本模型的两个演化稳定均衡解,并通过仿真方法对放松约束后的演化模型做进一步分析,发现了新的系统均衡状态并给出解释。研究结果表明:强互惠行为可以通过演化生成,并抑制企业合作创新中的投机行为,与其他两种类型企业共同发展,并形成企业合作创新系统的演化稳定均衡。研究结果为企业合作创新组织的管理提供了决策依据,同时有助于推动企业合作创新理论的深入发展。     

污染产业转移下府际间合作治理大气污染的演化博弈分析

大气污染具有跨区域性,府际间合作治理是大气污染防治的必由之路,合作治理中存在“搭治污便车”的困境。由于府际间大气污染治理博弈的具有长期性和动态性,由此建立了多人两策略的演化博弈模型。分别研究,无约束机制和有约束机制两种情况下地方政府演化稳定策略及其影响因素。考虑到政府间污染产业转移,建立了污染产业转移政府对承接方政府治污补偿机制下的演化博弈模型,分别研究无约束和有约束两种情形下(补偿,治理)策略成为演化稳定均衡状态的条件。研究表明:府际间的合作治理策略选择不会受到外部效应的影响,大气污染治理成本、治理时污染物减排量、不治理时污染物排放增加量、中央政府对治理的奖励和对不治理的惩罚力度是影响地方政府决策的重要因素。将大气质量作为政绩考核的重要指标,提高其权重系数,可有效促使地方政府策略向参与合作治理演化。无约束下自主选择时,最优策略(补偿,治理)不会成为稳定均衡策略,引入中央政府约束后,当经济惩罚在一定范围内,(补偿,治理)成为稳定均衡策略。     

异质预期下双寡头企业碳减排决策的复杂性分析

针对碳减排环境下的政府碳配额分配和企业产量与减排研发决策问题,基于古诺双寡头垄断模型,建立了考虑有限理性和异质性预期的碳排放依赖型企业碳减排决策模型,从市场复杂性演化的内部视角出发,分析市场竞争波动的内在机制;并通过非线性动力学理论探讨企业不同的响应速度对于市场稳定性的影响。结果表明,技术减排成本系数、碳交易价格对低碳产品的偏好系数是影响两企业竞争策略的关键因素,两个因素的取值不同甚至会彻底改变均衡状态下两企业相对的减排投资力度和相对的盈利能力及市场的稳定性。针对市场竞争出现的波动现象,通过时滞反馈控制方法高效、快速的控制动力系统的不稳定行为,使得市场迅速恢复稳定、有序的状态,为决策者有效解决市场不稳定现象提供了科学依据。     

Detecting all evolutionarily stable strategies

In evolutionary game theory, the central solution concept is the evolutionarily stable state, which also can be interpreted as an evolutionarily stable population strategy (ESS). As such, this notion is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept in that it requires an additional stability property. In the present paper, an algorithm for detectingall ESSs of a given evolutionary game consisting of pairwise conflicts is presented which both is efficient and complete, since it involves a procedure avoiding the search for unstable equilibria to a considerable extent, and also has a finite, exact routine to check evolutionary stability of a given equilibrium. The article also contains the generalization of these results to the playing-the-field setting, where the payoff is nonlinear.     

基于Moran过程的消费者众筹策略演化动态

考虑混合均匀的N个消费者众筹策略演化动态,每个消费者可选择参与众筹或者不参与众筹两个策略。基于Moran过程的扎根概率,计算出有限消费者群体中,参与众筹策略和不参与众筹策略成功入侵的概率。比较个体扎根的概率和中性入侵的概率大小,分别得到两策略在强选择性和弱选择性强度下占优的条件。研究发现,强选择性条件下,消费者数量小于某个数值时,不参与众筹策略演化稳定侵占整个种群,众筹融资失败。弱选择性条件下,消费者依据净收益和支出成本两因素决定是否参与众筹,净收益大于支出成本三倍,演化稳定于众筹成功,净收益小于支出成本二分之三倍,演化稳定于众筹失败。     

环境规制中地方政府与中央政府的演化博弈分析

针对环境规制中地方政府与中央政府之间的行为互动,从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了地方政府与中央政府的决策演化过程。通过建立地方政府与中央政府的非对称演化博弈模型,考察了环境规制中参与者的行为特征。根据复制动态方程得到了参与者的行为演化规律、分析了参与者的演化稳定策略及其影响因素。研究表明,环境规制系统的初始状态、地方政府的环境规制成本和环境规制收益、中央政府的监查成本以及中央政府对地方政府的处罚额都会影响地方政府与中央政府的演化稳定策略。降低中央政府的监查成本、加强中央政府对地方政府的监查力度和违规处罚力度,降低环境规制成本、提高环境规制收益,将有利于促使地方政府执行环境规制,从而达到改善环境质量的目的。     

INACCESSIBLE CONTINUOUSLY STABLE STRATEGIES

ABSTRACT. The evolutionary stability concepts continuously stable strategies (CSS) and evolutionarily stable neighborhood invader strategies (ESNIS) share two properties in common. First, they are both evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Secondly, given any strategy in the close neighborhood of the CSS or ESNIS, there are some strategies that are closer to the CSS or ESNIS that can invade it. An ESNIS is a CSS but the converse is not true in general. We examine evolutionary adaptive dynamics in the neighborhood of a CSS that is not an ESNIS. We show that if an evolutionary game possesses a CSS which is not an ESNIS, the succession of strategies mediated by natural selection become arbitrarily close to the CSS but the precise value of the CSS cannot be attained unless the CSS is the first strategy to invade into the environment and is henceforth never perturbed. Thus if evolution does not start with the CSS that is not an ESNIS, we will have a phenomenon of bounded evolutionary succession that does not come to an end. The analysis is applied to a class of monomorphic population evolutionary game models in which species ecological interaction is modeled by the Lotka‐Volterra equations.     

On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics

We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman (Econometrica 59:637–666, 1991), each of their interior fixed points is an equilibrium and each interior equilibrium is one of its fixed points. Furthermore, every interior evolutionarily stable strategy is an asymptotically stable fixed point, and every strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable state and an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. We also employ the ray-projection on a set of functions related to the relative fitness function and show that several well-known evolutionary dynamics can be obtained in this manner.     

Wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective

This paper develops a one-population (indirect) evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer/supplier and many (a sufficiently large number of) retailers to study how the retailer’s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price, its observability, the error probability of the observed result on the rival’s preference, the market scale and the retailer’s bargaining power. This paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer. We find that the profit (revenue) maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high (low). Given an appropriate wholesale price, the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers’ population. The larger the market scale, the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price. The cross effects of the retailer’s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process.     

Evolutionarily stable sets

This paper provides definitions for the evolutionary stability of sets of strategies based on simple fitness comparisons in the spirit of the definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) by Taylor and Jonker (1978). It compares these with the set-valued notions of Thomas (1985d) and Swinkels (1992). Provided only that the fitness function is analytic, our approach yields an alternative characterization of Thomas' evolutionarily stable sets (ES Sets) which does not rely on the structure or topology of the underlying strategy space. Moreover, these sets are shown to have a very special geometric structure and to be finite in number. For bimatrix games ES Sets are shown to be more uniformly robust against mutations than apparent from the definition and hence to be equilibrium evolutionarily stable sets in the sense of Swinkels (1992). Received November 1995/Final version December 2000     

Controlled predatory pricing in a multiperiod Stackelberg game: an MPEC approach

We analyze a multiperiod oligopolistic market where each period is a Stackelberg game between a leader firm and multiple follower firms. The leader chooses his production level first, taking into account the reaction of the followers. Then, the follower firms decide their production levels after observing the leader’s decision. The difference between the proposed model and other models discussed in literature is that the leader firm has the power to force the follower firms out of business by preventing them from achieving a target sales level in a given time period. The leader firm has an incentive to lower the market prices possibly lower than the Stackelberg equilibrium in order to push the followers to sell less and eventually go out of business. Intentionally lowering the market prices to force competitors to fail is known as predatory pricing, and is illegal under antitrust laws since it negatively affects consumer welfare. In this work, we show that there exists a predatory pricing strategy where the market price is above the average cost and consumer welfare is preserved. We develop a mixed integer nonlinear problem (MINLP) that models the multiperiod Stackelberg game. The MINLP problem is transformed to a mixed integer linear problem (MILP) by using binary variables and piecewise linearization. A cutting plane algorithm is used to solve the resulting MILP. The results show that firms can engage in predatory pricing even if the average market price is forced to remain higher than the average cost. Furthermore, we show that in order to protect the consumers, antitrust laws can control predatory pricing by setting rules on consumer welfare.     

互联网租车市场的演化博弈分析

通过分析互联网租车市场的出现对传统租车市场造成的影响,以探究通过何种策略避免两个租车市场的恶性竞争,构建了基于Bertrand模型的互联网租车方和传统租车方在合作与非合作条件下的静态博弈,结果显示两者在合作模式下会受困于个体理性与集体理性冲突的矛盾中。因此,为了解决这个矛盾,加入政府部门构建多主体合作演化博弈模型,推导出政府和两个租车市场的演化稳定策略,并对模型的演化路径和演化结果进行研究,以期为政府部门对租车市场的管理决策提供参考。     

再制造市场OEM与UOEM的博弈与学习研究

在再制造利益的驱动下,一些非原始设备制造商(UOEM)欲进入再制造市场。为探究UOEM参与再制造的进入博弈,应用演化博弈理论构建了原始设备制造商(OEM)和UOEM策略选择的复制动态。研究表明:博弈双方的回收价格、UOEM排除障碍的成本会影响UOEM的策略选择;OEM选择默许而潜在的UOEM进入再制造品市场是二维动态系统唯一的演化稳定策略。进一步考虑了参与人的学习行为,将噪声项引入复制动态方程中,得到了一个非子博弈完美均衡,即当带着噪声项的OEM采取竞争策略时,进入者的最优策略是置身于市场之外。