考虑事故风险损失的爆炸物品经济订货批量模型研究

爆炸物品在储存过程中存在发生爆炸事故,从而给人类和环境带来伤害的可能,因此在对爆炸物品进行采购决策时必需考虑由此带来的风险损失.在给出爆炸物品事故风险损失度量方法的基础上,建立了爆炸物品的经济订货批量模型,证明了模型存在唯一最优解,并给出了模型的求解步骤,为相关企业合理制定采购决策提供了理论依据.数字算例分析了事故概率、赔偿标准、单位库存费、单次采购费对最优批量的影响,比较了考虑事故风险损失与否时的最优批量,结果表明,当事故概率或赔偿标准较高时,两者对应的最优批量差异明显.这也说明,当事故概率或赔偿标准达到一定程度时,考虑事故风险损失是十分必要的.     

考虑消费者转移的双渠道定价决策研究

产品的双渠道销售不仅给企业带来更多的利润收益,同时给企业在应对市场复杂需求方面带来冲突和挑战.以拥有双渠道销售的制造商为研究对象,基于消费者对制造商线下渠道和线上渠道存在的策略型行为,研究了渠道之间考虑存在消费者转移的双渠道产品定价及协调策略.首先,构建了"线下主导"和"线上主导"的Stackelberg分散决策博弈模型,得到分散决策模式下的双渠道最优定价均衡解,并分析了策略型消费者所占比例、线上消费者购买到产品概率、消费者转移概率对最优定价和总利润的影响.然后,构建了双渠道集中决策定价模式,通过分析得出存在唯一的双渠道最优定价策略,并给出其解析解表达式.最后,通过数值算例仿真分析进行验证.     

随机双曲折现下的消费与最优投资策略探究

在本文中,我们主要讨论在随机双曲折现中,当投资者的消费行为是一个布朗运动时,其用于投资风险资产的最优投资额.基于汉密尔顿-雅克比-贝尔曼方程计算常数绝对风险厌恶型投资者的效用函数下的最优投资组合,并给出这组方程的近似解.在此基础上,我们分析当消费服从Wiener过程时风险资产投资的一些重要性质,研究消费行为与风险资产投资行为之间的关系.     

服务水平约束下动态定价与库存管理

本文研究服务水平约束下的动态定价与库存管理问题。企业在有限期内销售某种产品,产品的需求为随机需求,且期望需求依赖于产品价格。在每一期期初,企业需要在满足服务水平约束的条件下同时决定订货量和产品价格。本文首先构建了动态定价和订购联合决策的随机动态规划模型,并证明了最优解的存在性。进一步,通过对最优解的结构进行刻画,将原问题的求解转化为若干子问题的求解,降低了问题求解的难度。通过对最优解的分析发现,当期初库存增大时,产品最优价格降低。通过分析目标服务水平对利润的影响,证明了服务水平与利润之间存在权衡,实现高的服务水平需要承受利润损失。数值模拟表明,相对于传统的静态定价策略,采用动态定价策略可以降低追求服务水平所带来的利润损失,验证了动态定价策略的有效性。     

考虑零售商退出风险的供应链鲁棒模型分析

新产品市场需求信息的缺失以及供应链初构建时的不稳定性导致了零售商退出的高风险,而退出必然给供应链各成员带来巨大的损失,因此供应链需要及时制定应对策略.文章以存在零售商退出风险的新产品供应链为研究对象,运用Scarf在1958年提出的部分信息下的鲁棒决策方法,分析了二级供应链双方的博弈过程,并求得了最优解存在的条件与其表达式.通过理论推演与仿真分析发现:零售商退出风险对供应商和零售商的最优决策和利润造成冲击,同时发现,受冲击的程度与退出标准密切相关,建议零售商在可承受的因低销量带来的利润损失之内,应适当降低退出标准.     

单向可替代产品价格和库存的联合决策

考虑单周期问题中零售商同时销售两种可单向替代的产品,以期望利润为目标函数建立数学模型.将库存和替代价格共同作为零售商决策变量,证明其目标函数是凹函数,并得到求模型最优解的充要条件及解存在的范围.最后假设产品需求为正态分布,通过数值实验对模型的最优解进行分析,结果表明:实行最优替代价格策略可以有效提高零售商期望利润;允许替代销售不一定提高市场服务水平;被替代产品的销售价格和残值对零售商的最优替代价格决策没有显著影响.     

考虑借款企业决策行为的供应链CVaR利率决策模型

贷款利率是银行和其他金融机构用于权衡风险和收益的重要指标之一.考虑借款企业的决策行为,采用CVaR的风险度量准则作为决策标准,建立了基于条件风险价值最小的银行贷款利率决策模型,得到了权衡风险和收益条件下的最优利率.通过模型求解和数值分析发现:决策者的风险容忍水平直接对利率决策产生影响,CVaR风险度量准则可以帮助银行权衡收益和风险:借款企业利润率和自有资金是银行规避风险时需要着重考虑的关键因素.     

广告分担、价格折扣与供应链的纵向合作广告

研究了生产商和零售商的纵向合作广告问题。分别在广告分担和价格折扣策略下，探讨了双方的均衡结果和利润。当生产商的边际利润较小时，生产商的最优决策是不采取任何一种策略。当生产商的边际利润达到一定范围时，广告分担策略是双方共同的最优选择。而无论在什么样的条件内，价格折扣策略都不会使双方同时满意。为了增加双方的收益，供应链成员应该在广告上集成决策。最后给出了系统集成的可行最优解的范围和Nash讨价还价解。     

总量控制和交易环境下考虑随机需求的企业决策分析

总量控制和交易(Cap-and-Trade, C&T)给排放企业运营决策带来了新的挑战。本文提出一个非线性优化模型分析C&T环境下的企业最优产量,并在绿色改进和碳权交易之间有效权衡。模型不仅考虑了随机需求和碳价波动,还考虑了绿色改进的边际递减效果和实施绿色生产的风险。理论分析证明了最优解的存在性,并给出了排放企业的最优决策及C&T环境下企业新的生产条件。解析分析表明:与非C&T环境相比,新的最优产量更低,实际排放下降;碳配额虽然影响企业利润和碳权交易量,但不影响最优产量和最优改进投资;碳价和绿色改进系数越大,越有利于促进企业实施绿色改进减少排放;企业利润随绿色改进系数和碳配额的增加而上升,随单位产品碳排放的增加而下降。数值分析验证了理论模型及其分析结果;蒙特卡洛模拟揭示利润波动受需求风险、绿色改进风险和碳价波动的影响,但需求风险对利润波动的影响更为显著。     

基于模糊厌恶视角的最优固定利率与可变利率贷款组合决策行为研究

分析具有对边际融资成本不确定性存在模糊信念的竞争性商业银行的最优固定利率与可变利率贷款组合决策行为.采用银行的期望收益的正斜率和凹函数表示其模糊厌恶偏好.导出银行可变利率贷款占优于固定利率贷款的条件.表明,如果银行可以同时做出固定利率贷款和可变利率贷款组合决策,那么两类贷款的总额既不取决于银行的模糊厌恶偏好,也不取决于融资成本的不确定性风险.结论指出,银行的模糊厌恶成度的增加将引起其对企业发放更少固定利率贷款和更多可变利率贷款.因此,银行的模糊厌恶偏好在对企业的固定利率和可变利率贷款组合的最优决策行为中起着至关重要的作用.     

Determining optimal selling price and lot size with a varying rate of deterioration and exponential partial backlogging

In this paper, a deterministic inventory model for deteriorating items with price-dependent demand is developed. The demand and deterioration rates are continuous and differentiable function of price and time, respectively. In addition, we allow for shortages and the unsatisfied demand is partially backlogged at a negative exponential rate with the waiting time. Under these assumptions, for any given selling price, we first develop the criterion for the optimal solution for the replenishment schedule, and prove that the optimal replenishment policy not only exists but also is unique. If the criterion is not satisfied, the inventory system should not be operated. Next, we show that the total profit per unit time is a concave function of price when the replenishment schedule is given. We then provide a simple algorithm to find the optimal selling price and replenishment schedule for the proposed model. Finally, we use numerical examples to illustrate the algorithm.     

部分延迟订购的易变质品联合定价与生产策略

构建了一个需求同时依赖于销售价格和库存水平,生产率和变质率均为常数,允许缺货且缺货量部分延迟订购的易变质品联合定价与生产控制模型。首先证明了在销售价格给定的情况下,系统的总利润函数是关于生产计划的严格凹函数,平均利润函数是严格的伪凹函数,即存在唯一的最优解,并给出其充分条件。接着给出问题的一个数值求解算法。最后通过算例,展示了模型及相关算法的应用,并对相关参数进行了灵敏度分析,结果显示:当产品的生产成本、缺货成本和机会成本增加时,系统的平均利润将下降;生产成本和延迟订购阻力系数对最优定价和生产策略以及平均利润的影响较大。     

Admission control for a multi-server queue with abandonment

In a M/M/N+M queue, when there are many customers waiting, it may be preferable to reject a new arrival rather than risk that arrival later abandoning without receiving service. On the other hand, rejecting new arrivals increases the percentage of time servers are idle, which also may not be desirable. We address these trade-offs by considering an admission control problem for a M/M/N+M queue when there are costs associated with customer abandonment, server idleness, and turning away customers. First, we formulate the relevant Markov decision process (MDP), show that the optimal policy is of threshold form, and provide a simple and efficient iterative algorithm that does not presuppose a bounded state space to compute the minimum infinite horizon expected average cost and associated threshold level. Under certain conditions we can guarantee that the algorithm provides an exact optimal solution when it stops; otherwise, the algorithm stops when a provided bound on the optimality gap is reached. Next, we solve the approximating diffusion control problem (DCP) that arises in the Halfin–Whitt many-server limit regime. This allows us to establish that the parameter space has a sharp division. Specifically, there is an optimal solution with a finite threshold level when the cost of an abandonment exceeds the cost of rejecting a customer; otherwise, there is an optimal solution that exercises no control. This analysis also yields a convenient analytic expression for the infinite horizon expected average cost as a function of the threshold level. Finally, we propose a policy for the original system that is based on the DCP solution, and show that this policy is asymptotically optimal. Our extensive numerical study shows that the control that arises from solving the DCP achieves a very similar cost to the control that arises from solving the MDP, even when the number of servers is small.     

The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs

We provide a characterization of the optimal loan contract with costly state verification for the bank when the entrepreneur is risk averse and holds a belief different from that of the bank.While the optimality problem is formally infinite dimensional, under realistic assumptions it becomes finite dimensional. We provide conditions and examples to show that when the borrower is more optimistic than the bank, there may be only one verification region.A simple example, based on Bernanke and Gertler (1989), shows that as the borrower becomes more optimistic the financial accelerator (Bernanke et al., 1999) becomes more potent.     

A stochastic investiment model for a survival conscious firm

A stochastic investiment is analyzed to show the consequences of an unwillingness by the entrepreneur to accept any positive risk of the firm's failure. The entrepreneur does not invest in additional capacity, even in the face of continuing positive expected profits, if that investment would infringe on the firm's ability to survive. Survival of the firm conditions all investment decisions, which are functions (via the physical and financial capital accounts) of the random outcomes observed at the time of decision. This conditioning shows how worse than expected outcomes will affect the firm's net asset position and its ability to survive. Managerially, the entrepreneur has principles by which to explicitly consider unpleasant surprises in planning for the continued growth of the firm. In contrast, knowledge of the random outcomes is shown to be of no consequence in an alternative model where maximization of expected profits is the sole criterion of the entrepreneur. In that model, the optimal investiment decisions can be made at the beginning of the firm's life, because those decisions are not functions of the future yields. Reduction of the survival model to a linear programming (LP) problem highlights the additional complexity of the survival problem. This reduction means that the maximum value of the objective function for the primal (expected profits) equals the minimum value of the objective function for the dual (resource costs), which economists interpret as zero profits. The zero profit consequence is in accordance with Knight's long-standing economic conjecture: If all risks are measureable, total risk aversion will result in no profits. Also, LP methods provide a way in application to analyze a wide range of risk possibilities from acceptance of no risk of failure to acceptance of some risk of failure.The economist as such does not advocate criteria of optimality. He may invent them. ... the ultimate choice is made by the procedures of decision making inherent in the institutions, laws and customs of society. Tjalling C. Koopmans, Nobel Memorial Lecture, 11th December 1975.     

需求依赖价格下港口存货质押业务中质押率研究

港口与银行合作办理质押贷款业务,不仅能增加港口的存储收入和金融收入,同时也能吸引更多的客户,从而增加其主营业务收入。在银行统一授信港口情况下,本文分析了质押物品的需求依赖价格条件下,风险中性的港口质押贷款业务中的最优质押率计算方法。并分别分析了在乘积型和加型随机需求函数条件下,质押产品价格、企业违约概率和质押物品数量以及质押期限对最优质押率和港口最大期望收益的影响,并通过数值分析验证了所有结论。     

Designing coalition-based fair and stable pricing mechanisms under private information on consumers’ reservation prices

We model the relation between an aggregator and consumers joining a coalition to reduce the risk resulting from the unpredictability of their base load demand, as a Stackelberg game formulated as a mathematical bilevel program with private information on the consumers’ reservation prices. At the upper-level of the Stackelberg game, the aggregator optimizes his daily price profile so as to reach a net targeted profit which is the maximum value guaranteeing that no consumer will leave the coalition - to contract with a conventional retailer considered here as a fixed alternative - while meeting fairness criterion imposed by the cost-sharing mechanism. At the lower-level, the consumers are asked to provide in day ahead an estimate of their base load hourly demand profile and to schedule their shiftable loads depending on the price signal sent by the aggregator. We provide algorithms that determine the unique price profile and consumer shiftable load schedules as functions of the reservation price estimates. The Stackelberg game between the aggregator and the consumers being repeated for a period of time, the aggregator has the possibility to update his estimates of the reservation prices relying on a feedback function which depends on the percentage of activated loads. A randomized algorithm for consumers’ reservation price learning based on regret minimization is provided. For four cost-sharing mechanisms such as uniform allocation, stand-alone cost, Shapley value, separable and non-separable costs, we determine the closed form of the aggregator’s optimal net targeted profit guaranteeing the stability of the coalition. We also determine conditions guaranteeing the core non-emptiness and prove that for a profit-maximizing aggregator, the stand-alone cost is always preferable to the Shapley value, which coincides with the uniform allocation. Furthermore, the optimal size of the coalition - in terms of the aggregator’s profit - can be determined analytically when the Shapley value is implemented as cost-sharing mechanism. The results are illustrated on a case study where we show that there exists an optimal net targeted profit below which the consumers energy bill is lower when joining the aggregator than with the conventional retailer. Coalition dynamics is also analyzed numerically depending on the consumer inertia in their energy supplier choice process, for each cost-sharing mechanism.     

基于CAPM框架下的创业企业风险资本融资契约设计

从组合的视角出发,考虑创业企业家的风险厌恶程度,通过等价利率将创业企业的风险资本融资契约适应到CAPM框架下,利用纳什议价解刻画双方在信息不对称下的均衡解,基于风险-收益的角度建立了最优融资契约设计模型,为创业企业融资提供了契约设计和风险资本类型选择的一个依据,并通过算例说明了模型的可行性。研究还表明,创业企业引入风险资本优于纯债务融资,而股权的分配则取决于双方的议价力。同时,风险厌恶程度越低的创业企业家越趋向于选择独立的风险投资机构;风险厌恶程度越高的创业企业家越趋向于选择公司背景的风险投资机构;而风险厌恶程度不高,考虑后期贷款的创业企业家则趋向于选择银行背景的风险投资机构。     

持股策略下随机需求低碳供应链融资决策均衡

随机市场需求且受制造商减排水平影响,考虑碳限额与交易机制,研究制造商进行单纯银行借贷和供应商投资持股的组合融资时的最优决策和利润情况,分析消费者低碳偏好、碳交易价格和供应商的投资持股比例对供应链的最优决策变量和利润的影响。研究发现:无资金约束、单纯银行借贷和组合融资下,消费者低碳偏好、碳交易价格和持股比例与制造商的减排水平和利润以及供应链系统的利润正相关,而供应商的批发价格和制造商的生产量与消费者低碳偏好正相关,与碳交易价格负相关,而持股比例与供应商的批发价格负相关,与制造商的生产量和减排水平正相关;持股策略下制造商的减排水平和生产量最大,无资金约束时次之,单纯银行借贷时最小;而无资金约束时供应商的批发价格最高,单纯银行借贷时次之,持股策略时最低;在持股比例满足一定条件下,供应商和制造商的利润优于单纯银行借贷时的利润,并且可以优于无资金约束时的利润,提高了供应链的竞争力和效率。