不确定竞争市场的R&D投资决策分析

本文针对不确定的竞争市场 ,分析降低成本的不可逆 R& D投资决策 .考虑到 R& D结果不确定 ,而这种不确定与投资量有关 ,在利用博弈论方法分析和给出了投资结果不确定的投资期权价值后 ,设随机市场需求规模服从均匀分布 ,本文分析了各种因素对 R& D投资的影响 ,发现较大的市场需求预期和较强的成本节约效果鼓励了 R& D投资 ;相反地 ,较大的成功 R& D所需的最大投资量挫败了 R& D投资 ;而投资期望净收益与投资成本之间的权衡使得存在事前最优投资量最大化投资期权价值     

研究与开发投资的多阶段实物期权分析

本文结合技术不确定性和现金流不确定性及专利保护 ,将 R& D项目划分为 R& D阶段和新产品商业化阶段 ,运用实物期权法 ,对 R& D项目进行分析 .由动态规划方法推倒出有关项目价值评估和投资期权评价的方程式 ,并作相应典型数值分析 .     

在折现率大于零的情况下,具有完成时间和残值不确定性的R&D项目的投资策略

利用随机停时理论 ,考虑 R&D项目的连续投资策略 .在折现率大于零的情况下 ,给出了具有建设期和残值的不确定性的 R&D投资模型、放弃 R&D项目投资的临界值和最优决策规则 ,并讨论参数对临界值的影响 .也进一步验证了随机停时理论和实物期权理论在投资决策分析中的一致性 .     

含不动产项目的保险公司再保险-投资策略

站在保险公司管理者的角度, 考虑存在不动产项目投资机会时保险公司的再保险--投资策略问题. 假定保险公司可以投资于不动产项目、风险证券和无风险证券, 并通过比例再保险控制风险, 目标是最小化保险公司破产概率并求得相应最佳策略, 包括: 不动产项目投资时机、 再保险比例以及投资于风险证券的金额. 运用混合随机控制-最优停时方法, 得到最优值函数及最佳策略的显式解. 结果表明, 当且仅当其盈余资金多于某一水平(称为投资阈值)时保险公司投资于不动产项目. 进一步的数值算例分析表明: (a)~不动产项目投资的阈值主要受项目收益率影响而与投资金额无明显关系, 收益率越高则投资阈值越低; (b)~市场环境较好(牛市)时项目的投资阈值降低; 反之, 当市场环境较差(熊市)时投资阈值提高.     

存在水平差异化的多寡头双边平台企业竞争研究

构建了多寡头双边平台企业竞争的Salop双环模型,研究了双边平台企业在不同规模下均衡解的存在性以及均衡解的结构。研究发现:不论双边平台企业规模如何,双边平台企业的收益不仅受平台对买卖双方制定的价格总量的影响,而且还受价格结构的影响;多寡头双边平台企业在竞争中存在明显的买方市场时,买方并不能获得类似单边市场里的主动权,且若卖方存在竞争,则无论买方是否存在竞争,均不存在均衡解;无论是买方竞争还是卖方竞争,若存在均衡解,则对双边平台企业、买方和卖方均有利,出现三方多赢的局面。     

保险公司实业项目投资策略研究

考虑保险公司实业项目投资问题. 假定1)保险公司可以选择在某一时刻投资一实业项目(Real investment), 该项投资可以为保险公司带来稳定的资金收入而不影响其风险;2)保险公司可以将盈余资金投资于证券市场, 该市场包含一风险资产.目标是通过最小化破产概率来确定保险公司实业项目投资时间和风险资产的投资金额.运用混合随机控制-最优停时方法,得到值函数的半显式解, 进而得到保险公司的最佳投资策略: 以固定金额投资证券市场; 当保险公司盈余高于一定额度(称为投资门槛)时进行项目投资, 并降低风险资产投资金额.最后采用数值算例分析了不同市场环境下投资门槛与投资金额, 投资收益率之间的关系. 结果表明:1)项目投资所需金额越少、收益率越高, 则项目投资的门槛越低;2)市场环境较好时(牛市)项目的投资门槛提高, 保险公司应较多的投资于证券市场; 反之, 当市场环境较差时(熊市)投资门槛降低,保险公司倾向于实业项目投资.     

带泊松跳的线性Markov切换系统的随机微分博弈及在金融市场中的应用

研究带泊松跳的线性Markov切换系统的随机微分博弈问题,首先在有限时域内,借助动态规划原理和配方法,得到了Nash均衡解存在的条件等价于其相应的微分Riccati方程存在解,并给出了均衡解及最优性能泛函值函数的显式表达.然后延伸到无限时域进行分析,得到了Nash均衡解存在的条件等价于其相应的代数Riccati方程存在解.最后讨论了金融市场中的投资组合的最优化问题,假设风险资产的价格服从带Markov切换参数的跳扩散过程,两个投资者在相互竞争的情形下进行非零和随机微分投资博弈,利用上述结论得到了最优投资组合策略的解.     

非对称情形下R & D竞争项目的策略性投资

在非对称情形下,考虑具有技术不确定和未来收益不确定的竞争研究与开发(R&;D)项目的不可逆策略性投资.利用期权博弈理论和随机优化方法给出了高效研发公司(主导者) 的最优投资阈值和最优投资规则的解析表达式,并证明了由于两公司的竞争使投资阈值下降.其次讨论了两公司的混合投资策略,并给出每个公司执行投资期权的概率和两公司同时执行投资期权的概率. 在最后给出了数值模拟算例来说明该文结论的合理性.     

乘法需求模式下具有风险厌恶零售商的供应链合作博弈分析

考虑了一个风险中性的制造商和一个风险厌恶型零售商的供应链合作博弈问题.零售商面临依赖于价格的随机市场需求.以条件在险价值(CVaR)作为零售商的风险衡量准则,并采用乘法需求模式表示依赖于价格的随机需求.通过研究在乘法需求模式下具有不同协商权利的Nash博弈问题的最优均衡行为,从而发现平均需求函数为单调递减的凹函数是存在稳定均衡解的充分条件,且稳定均衡解存在与否与随机需求噪声的分布情况,零售商的协商权利都无关.在此前提下,发现在乘法需求模式下当需求噪声服从均匀分布时制造商占整个供应链的利润比例和一般随机需求情况下的一样,且随零售商的风险态度递增,与平均需求的函数形式无关.     

含公共开支的R&D模型

本文给出了一个含公共开支的R&D模型 ,并对模型进行了均衡分析及动态分析 ,得出在一定的条件下 ,模型存在局部稳定的均衡点     

Flow auctions

Flow goods (like electricity) are sold through auctions in a dynamic framework. An important design question is the frequency of such auctions. We use a simple dynamic auction model in continuous time to answer this question. We focus on the relationship between the persistency of bidders’ valuations and the optimal choice of frequency. If the seller focuses on the equilibrium in which bidders follow a repeated static Nash strategy, then the frequency of auctions should typically increase when persistency declines. However, accounting for the fact that bidders can follow different equilibria that are collusive in nature, the comparative statics are reversed, forcing the seller to reduce the frequency when bidders’ valuations are less persistent. The argument builds on the fact that high frequency auctions are more conducive to collusion among bidders.     

On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions

Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favoring Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (ICAs). Several promising ICA formats were developed based on primal–dual and subgradient algorithms. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution. iBundle(3), dVSV and Ascending Proxy Auction result in VCG payoffs when the coalitional value function satisfies buyer submodularity and bidders bid straightforward, which is an ex-post Nash equilibrium in this case. iBEA and CreditDebit auctions do not even require the buyer submodularity and achieve the same properties for general valuations. Often, however, one cannot assume straightforward bidding and it is not clear from the theory how these non-linear personalized price auctions (NLPPAs) perform in this case. Robustness of auctions with respect to different bidding behavior is a critical issue for any application. We conducted a large number of computational experiments to analyze the performance of NLPPAs with respect to different bidding strategies and valuation models. We compare NLPPAs with the VCG auction and with ICAs with linear prices, such as ALPS and the Combinatorial Clock Auction. While NLPPAs performed very well in case of straightforward bidding, we observe problems with revenue, efficiency, and speed of convergence when bidders deviate.     

Computing equilibria of Cournot oligopoly models with mixed-integer quantities

We consider Cournot oligopoly models in which some variables represent indivisible quantities. These models can be addressed by computing equilibria of Nash equilibrium problems in which the players solve mixed-integer nonlinear problems. In the literature there are no methods to compute equilibria of this type of Nash games. We propose a Jacobi-type method for computing solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables. This algorithm is a generalization of a recently proposed method for the solution of discrete so-called “2-groups partitionable” Nash equilibrium problems. We prove that our algorithm converges in a finite number of iterations to approximate equilibria under reasonable conditions. Moreover, we give conditions for the existence of approximate equilibria. Finally, we give numerical results to show the effectiveness of the proposed method.     

一种n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性判别法

本首先给出了n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在的充要条件。然后给出n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性的一种判别方法。最后在判别纯策略纳什均衡存在的条件下，给出判定该静态博弈存在多少纯策略纳什均衡以及哪些纯策略组合是纯策略纳什均衡(解)的方法。     

A note on correlated equilibrium

The set of correlated equilibria for a bimatrix game is a closed, bounded, convex set containing the set of Nash equilibria. We show that every extreme point of a maximal Nash set is an extreme point of the above convex set. We also give an example to show that this result is not true in the payoff space, i.e. there are games where no Nash equilibrium payoff is an extreme point of the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs.     

Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly

We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are N players with heterogeneous costs. In the dynamic game with uncertain market demand, firms of different sizes have different lifetime capacities which deplete over time according to the market demand for their good. We setup the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game and its associated system of HJB partial differential equations in the case of linear demand functions. We characterize certain qualitative features of the game using an asymptotic approximation in the limit of small competition. The equilibrium of the game is further studied using numerical solutions. We find that consumers benefit the most when a market is structured with many firms of the same relative size producing highly substitutable goods. However, a large degree of substitutability does not always lead to large drops in price, for example when two firms have a large difference in their size.     

大博弈中Nash均衡的存在性

研究了具有任意多个局中人的非合作博弈(大博弈)中Nash均衡的存在性.将1969年Ma的截口定理推广得到新的截口定理.用这个新的截口定理进一步证明了:1)大博弈中Nash均衡的存在性;2)纯策略集为紧度量空间而且支付函数为连续函数时,连续大博弈中混合策略Nash均衡的存在性.并且存在性定理推出了2010年Salonen的结果,即此研究结果较Salonen的结论更具普遍意义.     

Equilibrium analysis in batch-arrival queues with complementary services

This paper studies a batch-arrival queue with two complementary services. The two services are complementary and any customer has no benefit from obtaining just one of them. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no works contributed to the batch-arrival queues on analysis of the equilibrium behaviors in queueing systems by now. The properties of batch-arrival queues, which is more practical and universal in reality, induce different Nash equilibria under competition or monopoly compared with the single-arrival queues. We observe the joint effect of batch joining rate and cost structure on the behavior of customers and graphically interpret the equilibrium solutions under competition. Moreover, we discuss the model under three types of price structures and give comparisons from customer and server points.     

A large population job search game with discrete time

A job search problem is considered, in which there is a large population of jobs initially available and a large population of searchers. The ratio of the number of searchers to the number of jobs is α. Each job has an associated value from a known distribution. At each of N moments the searchers observe a job, whose value comes from the distribution of the values of currently available jobs. If a searcher accepts a job, s/he ceases searching and the job becomes unavailable. Hence, the distribution of the values of available jobs changes over time. Also, the ratio of the number of those still searching to the number of available jobs changes. The model is presented and Nash equilibrium strategies for such problems are considered. By definition, when all the population use a Nash equilibrium strategy, the optimal response of an individual is to use the same strategy. Conditions are given that ensure the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium strategy. Examples are given to illustrate the model and present different approaches to solving such problems.