基于商业信用和回购契约的供应链最优化策略研究

本文考虑由单一供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,当供应商为零售商提供回购契约,同时零售商又为下游顾客提供商业信用契约时,供应商如何设计回购契约来有效协调整个供应链,以及零售商又如何借助回购和商业信用契约来做出自身最优订货策略问题,并建立了相应的决策模型。通过模型分析,给出了供应商和零售商在四种情形下的最优契约设计参数,以及零售商的最优订货决策。研究发现,当满足一定的参数范围时,供应链中两主体同时采用协调契约能够更加有效地增加整个供应链中的订货量和利润,为各主体创造更多新的价值。最后,本文结合数值例子,分析了模型参数变化对最优订货策略和各主体利润的影响。     

考虑资金约束时易腐品二级供应链中延迟支付策略研究

文章研究了易腐品二级供应链中的延迟支付策略问题,对于资金充足和资金受限两种情景,分别给出了没有延迟支付和存在延迟支付时零售商及供应商的利润模型及最优策略,并建立了供应商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,设计了求解均衡解的粒子群优化算法.最后,通过数值算例探讨了延付期、批发价格及延付利息的变化对零售商和供应商利润的影响,得到了零售商的最优订货策略以及供应商的最优延迟支付决策,对零售商是否接受延迟支付策略进行了权衡分析.结果表明,短期的延付期是可以提高零售商和供应商的利润,但延付期的延长不一定带来零售商利润的提升,同样供应商也无法从零售商手中赚取额外利息利润,反而降低了供应商的利润.另外,资金受限下零售商采用延付通常能够取得更高的收益,同时供应商能够通过提高批发价和利息获得更大利润.     

基于易逝品需求信息更新的零售商订货策略

供应商为了更好地安排生产计划,降低生产成本,为零售商提供两次订货机会,零售商如何根据供应商提供的订货条件进行合理订货.运用贝叶斯分析的理论建立数学模型,研究了在不同的批发价格下顾客需求信息更新的易逝品的零售商订货策略,扩展了已有的结果并且修正了部分结果.     

供应商资金约束的绿色供应链融资策略研究

在含有单一资金约束供应商和单一零售商的二级供应链中,研究了供应商绿色产品的投入和融资策略,对比分析了银行信贷单一融资渠道和零售商提前支付部分货款与银行信贷的混合融资渠道下,供应商和零售商的运营和融资决策.研究表明,银行信贷单一融资渠道更能激励供应商提高产品的绿色水平和零售商的订购量;而当给定合适的批发价折扣率,零售商提前支付下的混合融资渠道可以实现零供双方的Pareto最优利润,并且,随着生产成本的增加,相对零售商而言,混合融资为供应商创造了更多利润.     

需求信息泄露条件下供应链零售商订货策略研究

针对供应链订货过程中的需求信息泄露现象,通过对比供应商在泄露信息和不泄露信息情况下的收益,研究了供应链需求信息泄露的产生机理。建立了需求信息泄露条件下订货过程中零售商之间的信号博弈模型,通过模型求解得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,并对不同均衡状态下零售商的最优订货策略和最优收益进行了分析。在此基础上,进一步讨论了零售商的订货策略选择问题。最后,通过一个数值算例说明了有关结论的有效性。     

预付款融资下基于熵成本的零售商最优订货策略

在预付款策略中,引入熵成本来构建零售商的库存模型,并结合数值分析探讨零售商的最优订货策略.研究发现,考虑熵成本的预付款模型中,随着供应商要求的预付期的增加,零售商的最优订货周期和最优订货批量下降,单位产品流动产生的熵成本上升,单位时间总成本下降.随着利息率的增加,最优订货周期和最优订货批量下降,单位产品流动产生的熵成本在上升,单位时间总成本上升.订货批量越大,单位产品流动产生的熵成本越小.含有熵成本的模型中的最优订货量稳健性,高于不考虑熵成本的库存模型中的,并且受利息收益率和预付款提前期的影响较小.     

基于M-CVaR和生产资金约束的供应链协调研究

本文针对供应商面临生产资金约束的情况,在需求随机条件下研究了由一个风险中性零售商和一个具有风险偏好的供应商组成的二级供应链的协调问题。文章在零售商享有批发价折扣的提前支付和供应商银行信贷两种融资方式下,分别建立了零售商的最优决策模型以及基于M-CVaR测度工具的供应链整体订购决策模型,并给出了采用两种不同融资模式时零售商和供应链整体的最优订购量以及供应链的协调条件,分析了供应商的风险偏好对供应链整体最优决策及协调条件的影响。最后通过算例验证了文章的主要结论。研究表明,当提前支付价格折扣大于临界值时,零售商会选择提前支付货款;提前支付模式下供应链整体的最优订购量大于银行信贷模式;随着供应商的风险偏好由风险规避向风险喜好转变,供应链整体的最优订购量逐渐增大。     

延期支付条件下零售商的最优售价和订货策略

在供应商给予零售商延期支付和现金折扣的优惠政策下,进一步假设产品的年需求量依赖于零售商产品售价的基础上,建立了由一个零售商和一个供应商所构成的库存决策模型,扩展了经典的经济生产批量(EPQ)模型。通过模型的分析求解,可以得出零售商在上述情况下的最优订货周期、最优售价及最优付款时间的简单判定方法。最后,通过算例,验证了模型的可行性,得出了与实际相符的结论。     

预付款融资下期权契约的协调研究

本文研究零售商占主导、供应商自有资金有限的二级供应链如何通过契约实现协调的问题。在预付款融资的基础上加入期权契约方法,构建用于预付款融资的期权契约模型,并求解出该模型下所能协调供应链的契约参数与此时零售商供应商双方的最优决策系统。研究表明当供应商自有资金大于等于某临界值时通过预付款融资下的期权契约可实现供应链协调。若小于则无法通过该契约协调,并且供应商自有资金约束越大,零售商最优订购数量越多,同时供应商的最优生产数量随着自有资金的减少而减少,供应链的参与者及整个供应链的利润也随着供应商自有资金的减少单调递减;另外,相比于无融资下的期权契约,预付款模式能提高零售商、供应商以及整个供应链的收益。     

供应商存在供应风险时供应链融资模式选择研究

在单供应商和单零售商组成的二级供应链中,零售商面临资金约束,有保兑仓融资和延迟支付融资两种途径完成订货货款的交付,在考虑供应风险时,本文研究零售商对融资模式的选择问题。得知在这两种融资途径下,若供应比率期望值在临界值以下,供应商为了协调好供应链状态,多倾向于设置比较恰当的批发价格;因自有营运资金比率(即零售商与供应商的比率)表现为波动性特征,通常在供应风险波动的情况下,供应商为保证自身利润的最大化,可向零售商提供适宜的融资模式。     

Revenue management for a supply chain with two streams of customers

In this paper, we consider revenue management for a service supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has a limited capacity of a perishable product and both the supplier and the retailer face customers. Each customer may choose to buy a product from either the supplier or the retailer by considering prices and the cost associated with switching. For the centralized model, the supplier determines the selling prices for both herself and the retailer, and the retailer simply collects a commission fee for each product sold. We derive monotone properties for the revenue functions and pricing strategies. Further, we show that the commission fee increases the retailer’s price while decreasing the supplier’s and leads to efficiency loss of the chain. For the decentralized decision-making model, the supplier and the retailer compete in price over time. Two models are considered. In the first, the retailer buys products from the supplier before the selling season and in the second the retailer shares products with the supplier in retailing. For both models, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium and characterize the optimal decisions. Numerical results are presented to illustrate properties of the models and to compare the supply chain performance between the centralized and the decentralized models.     

Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering

This paper investigates a wholesale-price contract of supply chain under the endogenous information structure. This supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer during the selling season. The retailer does not know his selling cost but can spend resources to acquire information. The supplier offers a contract, which induces the retailer to gather information and generate more production orders with beta costs. We find that there exists an upper bound of the information gathering cost such that the supplier induces the retailer to gather information. The increasing cost of information gathering may decrease the order quantity and wholesale price. Moreover, the cost beta has an impact on the expected profits of the two parties. With the increasing cost of information gathering, the supplier’s expected profit is reduced, while that of the retailer becomes ambiguous in terms of the distribution function and the interval of selling cost information. Finally, a numerical example is presented to explain the main results.     

Consignment contracting: Who should control inventory in the supply chain?

Consignment is a popular form of business arrangement where supplier retains ownership of the inventory and gets paid from the retailer based on actual units sold. The popularity of such an arrangement has come with some continued debates on who should control the supply chain inventory, the supplier or retailer. This paper aims at shedding light on these debated issues. We consider a single period supply chain model where a supplier contracts with a retailer. Market demand for the product is price-sensitive and uncertain. The supplier decides his consignment price charged to the retailer for each unit sold, and the retailer then chooses her retail price for selling the product. We study and compare two different consignment arrangements: The first allows the retailer to choose the supply chain inventory, together with her retail price, and is labeled as a Retailer Managed Consignment Inventory (RMCI) program; and the second calls for the supplier to decide the inventory, together with his consignment price, and is labeled as a Vendor Managed Consignment Inventory (VMCI) program. We show that with an RMCI program, the supply chain loses at least 26.4% of its first-best (expected) profit, while with VMCI, it loses just or no more than 26.4% of the first-best profit. Second, we demonstrate that both programs lead to an equal split of the corresponding channel profit between the supplier and the retailer. These results indicate that it is beneficial both to the supplier and to the retailer when delegating the inventory decision to the supplier rather than to the retailer in the channel.     

供应链中的生产能力投资风险分配

在供应链中,每个管理者都会面临各种各样的供应和需求不确定性.这些不确定性会造成生产能力的过剩或不足,从而导致很大的利益损失,但是未必每个公司都会面临生产能力投资风险.针对一个单生产商单零售商系统,本文分析了三种不同的合同设计（推进式批发价合同,拉动式批发价合同和期权合同）对生产商和零售商的利润和生产能力投资风险的影响,推进式批发价合同和拉动式批发价均不能协调供应链,故我们找到其帕累托集;而对于期权合同,它能够协调整个供应链并且整合推进式和拉动式两种批发价合同使得生产商和零售商共同承担生产能力投资风险.在分析的过程中,我们将结果与已有的结果进行了比较,指出了其异同之处.     

Channel coordination under two-level trade credits and demand uncertainty

This study considers a decentralized supply chain where a retailer has an opportunity to order a product from a supplier prior to the sales season to satisfy uncertain demand. The retailer provides trade credit to end customers and makes credit period and order quantity decisions to maximize profits. The end demand is both random and credit period-dependent. On the basis of the newsvendor model, this paper focuses on channel coordination when a retailer provides trade credit to end customers. When the supplier also provides trade credit to the retailer, we show that the traditional trade credit contract cannot coordinate the channel. Four composite contracts based on trade credit (trade credit cost sharing with buy back or quantity flexibility; modified trade credit with buy back or quantity flexibility) are provided to induce the retailer to make decisions while optimizing the channel profit. This paper shows that the retailer provides a longer credit period to its customers and orders a larger quantity from the supplier under the composite contracts. With these contracts, the profit sharing between both parties depends on the wholesale price (Pareto improvement) for the fixed retail price and the purchasing cost.     

碳税政策下时变需求依赖库存与价格的供应链协调模型

研究由一个供应商和一个零售组成的二级供应链系统在碳税政策下的协调问题.对于市场需求率为时变函数且依赖于当前库存水平和销售价格的情形,建立分散式和集中式供应链决策模型.比较两种模型得出供应商和零售商合作能够提高供应链的整体利润但是也会产生更多的碳排放.分别利用批发价格契约和两部收费契约协调分散式决策模型得出供应链协调的条件.最后通过数值算例验证理论结果并分析碳税单价对供应链在两部收费契约下实现协调的影响.     

基于利润—CVaR的期权契约供应链协调

文章以一个风险厌恶销售商与风险中性供应商所组成的两级供应链为背景,以条件风险价值(CVaR)和期望利润的加权平均作为销售商的决策目标,对期权契约下销售商的订购策略及供应链协调问题进行了研究,并对比分析了销售商以CVaR为目标时的情形。在给出销售商在不同风险厌恶程度下的最优订购策略后,文章进一步给出了供应链相应的协调条件,并分析了此时期权权利金,销售商的风险厌恶程度和期望利润权重等参数对供销双方收益的影响,发现“利润-CVaR”法下销售商的风险厌恶程度对供销双方利润的影响与CVaR法下的情况有所不同,但权利金依然起到了分配整体供应链利润的作用,且销售商期望利润权重的增加会降低自身收益水平而提高供应商利润。最后,文章通过数值模拟的方式对上述结论进行了验证。     

Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant

This paper develops an adverse selection model for a two-stage supply chain with one supplier, one retailer, and a potential outside entrant supplier who makes a partially substitutable product. The work is different from most research on entry deterrence that only considers a single-stage model. Our main interest is to investigate how the incumbent supplier can strategically maximize her profit by a wholesale pricing policy when facing the potential entrant. We focus on a model where the entrant supplier will sell her product through the same incumbent retailer. We derive the optimal decisions for each player and study the comparative statics of the equilibrium. To investigate how the supply chain structure may affect the deterrence strategy of the incumbent supplier, we also consider three alternative models with different channel structures, when both suppliers sell their products directly, when the entrant has another independent retailer, and when the entrant sells her product directly. Through the comparison, we find that the existence of the common downstream retailer often enhances the deterring motivation of the incumbent supplier.     

Optimal pricing and inventory policies with reliable and random-yield suppliers: characterization and comparison

In this paper, we study the joint pricing and inventory replenishment problem for a periodic-review inventory system with random demand and dual suppliers, one of the suppliers is reliable but more expensive, the other supplier is less expensive but is unreliable with random yield. We characterize the firm’s optimal policies that simultaneously determine the optimal ordering and pricing decisions in each period over a finite planning horizon, and investigate the impacts of supply source diversification and supplier reliability on the firm and on its customers. We show that having source diversification or higher reliability of suppliers not only increases the firm’s expected profit, but also results in a lower optimal selling price, thus they benefit both the firm and its customers.