社会互动视角下的服务型企业最优运营策略研究

本文主要研究在社会互动的影响下,服务型企业如何制定以价格、服务速率为代表的运营管理策略,从而实现利润最大化。首先,基于M/M/1排队模型对顾客购买决策过程进行建模分析,考虑单个服务型企业在实现利润最大化的目标条件下,社会互动的作用如何影响定价和服务速率决策;其次,研究在竞争市场环境中,社会互动如何影响市场均衡状态下各企业的运营决策和市场份额。结果表明,无论在垄断还是竞争的市场环境中,社会互动对服务型企业的最优运营决策均有不同程度与方向的影响。     

Competitive Price Equilibrium with Consumer Reservation Utility

This paper studies a competitive price equilibrium in the market of a product category where consumers are homogeneous with a reservation utility below which they will not purchase the product. The impact of the reservation utility on the price equilibrium is of particular interest, because the reservation utility may change according to the business cycle and economic environments. Using multinomial logit model to describe market response, we study the comparative statics of the prices, profits and market shares of firms, each of which produces one brand in the product category, with respect to the reservation utility in the Nash equilibrium. It is shown that, as the reservation utility increases, the prices as well as the profits at Nash equilibrium decrease. Also, in the case of duopoly market, the firm with lower cost structure will increase its market share as the reservation utility increases.     

Competitive diffusion process of repurchased products in knowledgeable manufacturing

This paper presents a diffusion model to explain the competitive diffusion of the repurchased products in knowledgeable manufacturing. The acute market competition accelerates the products’ improvement, which requires that the manufacturing enterprises be highly capable of rapid reaction by means of knowledgeable manufacturing. To forecast the diffusion behavior effectively enables the realization of knowledgeable manufacturing system (KMS) which targets T (time), Q (quality), C (cost), S (service), and E (environment). Various diffusion models have emerged since Bass model was firstly proposed in 1969. A nonlinear model of the repurchased competitive products is proposed on the basis of the product diffusion analysis. By taking the frequently purchased products as example, the stability of the model is examined in light of the qualitative theory of differential equations and proved by the approximate linearization method. As the qualitative analysis reveals, between the two frequently purchased products competing in the same market, one undoubtedly occupies a fixed market share while the other may finally be eliminated from the market. A special case of the problem is that both products are one-time-purchased. With the corresponding model given, the qualitative analysis shows that either of the products occupies a market share, the size of which is determined by the product’s competitive strength and the new product’s time-to-market. A system dynamics model is then established and simulated by vensim. The result is consistent with that of the qualitative analysis.     

考虑顾客便利半径和质量阈值的竞争设施选址问题

在竞争设施选址问题中,顾客选择行为是决定设施占领市场份额的重要因素,其描述了需求在设施之间的分配方式。为了贴近顾客真实的光顾行为,本文提出了一种考虑顾客便利半径和质量阈值的顾客选择规则,并研究了在该规则下市场中新进入公司的竞争设施选址问题。提出了一种基于排名的遗传算法(RGA)求解该问题,并将该算法与经典遗传算法(GA)和基于排名的离散优化算法(RDOA)进行了比较,结果说明了算法的有效性以及模型中质量阈值的重要性。     

Equilibrium two-part cost structures

We consider an oligopolistic product market in which two competing firms instead of paying a competitive input price choose a two-part tariff. Costs for the input are divided up into upfront fixed costs independent of the output level and reductions in marginal costs. We explore under which competitive settings will such a two-part cost structure correspond to equilibrium behavior in a two stage game. We find that firms in a static model do have an incentive to choose a two-part cost structure when competition in the product market is not too strong and oligopoly rents can be shifted form the rival to the own firm. In a dynamic market when firms use Markov strategies competition is so intense that there are no rents to be shifted and firms do not benefit from two-part cost structures.     

Competitive facility location with random attractiveness

Customers’ perception of a particular facility’s attractiveness is likely to be heterogeneous. However, existing competitive facility location models assume that facilities’ attractiveness levels are fixed. We extend the gravity model assuming randomly distributed facilities’ attractiveness. We propose two effective solution methods. One is based on discretizing the attractiveness level distribution. The second is based on the concept of an “effective” attractiveness. Effective attractiveness is the level of fixed attractiveness whose calculated optimal market share approximately equals the expected optimal market share under random attractiveness. We show how effective attractiveness is calculated.     

Stochastic competitive entries and dynamic pricing

How should firms price new products when they do not know the timing, nor the nature of the next competitive entry? To guide managers’ pricing decisions in such contexts, we propose a dynamic pricing model with two types of randomly timed entry, i.e. imitative and innovative. The characterization of the equilibrium strategies reveals how optimal prices vary with the manager’s knowledge about the timing of future competitive entries. We show that price skimming is not always optimal when entry dates are unknown to managers. Everything else equal, we demonstrate that the randomness of competitive entries make forward looking managers to choose constant prices, even though the characteristics of the market would have justified skimming the demand in the normal course. Moreover, we show that the constant pricing policy remains optimal even when the incumbent’s optimal pricing strategy influences the probability of facing a competitive entry. Finally, we find that uncertainty does not necessarily hurt firms’ profits.     

Competitive facility location problem with attractiveness adjustment of the follower: A bilevel programming model and its solution

We are concerned with a problem in which a firm or franchise enters a market by locating new facilities where there are existing facilities belonging to a competitor. The firm aims at finding the location and attractiveness of each facility to be opened so as to maximize its profit. The competitor, on the other hand, can react by adjusting the attractiveness of its existing facilities with the objective of maximizing its own profit. The demand is assumed to be aggregated at certain points in the plane and the facilities of the firm can be located at predetermined candidate sites. We employ Huff’s gravity-based rule in modeling the behavior of the customers where the fraction of customers at a demand point that visit a certain facility is proportional to the facility attractiveness and inversely proportional to the distance between the facility site and demand point. We formulate a bilevel mixed-integer nonlinear programming model where the firm entering the market is the leader and the competitor is the follower. In order to find the optimal solution of this model, we convert it into an equivalent one-level mixed-integer nonlinear program so that it can be solved by global optimization methods. Apart from reporting computational results obtained on a set of randomly generated instances, we also compute the benefit the leader firm derives from anticipating the competitor’s reaction of adjusting the attractiveness levels of its facilities. The results on the test instances indicate that the benefit is 58.33% on the average.     

高维市场结构与创新

以往的创新研究局限于一维市场结构：所有企业的创新能力都一样，谁也不占有优势。实际上应根据企业不同的创新能力特征，分成若干种类型，形成高维市场结构，在此结构下研究创新竞争。本首先证明在高维市场结构下均衡点唯一；其次指出何种类型企业具有竞争优势，分析企业合资研究对竞争优势的影响；最后讨论竞争企业数量增加时均衡状态的变化，并将市场的结果与社会最优结果作比较。     

EMISSION PERMITS UNDER MONOPOLY

This paper studies the regulation of pollution emissions when one polluting firm is a monopolist in its output market and other polluting firms are competitive in their output markets. It is shown that an emissions permit system can generally support a second-best allocation when the monopolistic firm has market power in the emission permit market. The second-best permit regulation specifies a permit endowment for the monopolist such that the monopolist is a net supplier of permits in the equilibrium. Extensions to cases of multiple monopoly, monopsony, and oligopoly are discussed.     

A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms

This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers’ loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers’ price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers’ sensitivity as well as lower consumers’ loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms’ equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm’s profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.     

An empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions

This paper presents an empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions. Three issues are evaluated: (i) the specification of the market share response model; (ii) the effect of inflation on the estimation of the response model; and (iii) the performance of competitive strategies. It is shown that (a) the square root function that is used in previous studies is often inappropriate to characterize the market share response model; (b) market share variations are more responsive to current advertising expenditures; (c) closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies are better competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits than open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies; and (d), finally, general perfect equilibria Nash equilibrium strategies developed by Case are usually not good competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits.     

Competitive facility location and design with reactions of competitors already in the market

A new retail facility is to locate and its service quality is to determine where similar facilities of competitors offering the same goods are already present. The market share captured by each facility depends on its distance to customers and its quality, which is described by a probabilistic Huff-like model. In order to maximize the profit of the new facility, a two-stage method is developed, which takes into account the reactions of the competitors. In the quality decision stage, the competitive decision process occurring among facilities is modelled as a game, whose solution is given by its Nash equilibrium. The solution, which can be represented as functions of the location of the new facility, is obtained by analytical resolution of a system of equations in the case of one facility in the market or by polynomial approximation in the case of multiple facilities. In the location decision stage, an interval based global optimization method is used to determine the best location of the new facility. Numerical experiments on randomly generated instances demonstrate the effectiveness of the method.     

Game Options Analysis of the Information Role of Call Policies in Convertible Bonds

Abstract

In debt financing, existence of information asymmetry on the firm quality between the firm management and bond investors may lead to significant adverse selection costs. We develop the two-stage sequential dynamic two-person game option models to analyse the market signalling role of the callable feature in convertible bonds. We show that firms with positive private information on earning potential may signal their type to investors via the callable feature in a convertible bond. We present the variational inequalities formulation with respect to various equilibrium strategies in the two-person game option models via characterization of the optimal stopping rules adopted by the bond issuer and bondholders. The bondholders’ belief system on the firm quality may be revealed with the passage of time when the issuer follows his optimal strategy of declaring call or bankruptcy. Under separating equilibrium, the quality status of the firm is revealed so the information asymmetry game becomes a new game under complete information. To analyse pooling equilibrium, the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint is derived. We manage to deduce the sufficient conditions for the existence of signalling equilibrium of our game option model under information asymmetry. We analyse how the callable feature may lower the adverse selection costs in convertible bond financing. We show how a low-quality firm may benefit from information asymmetry and vice versa, underpricing of the value of debt issued by a high-quality firm.     

Competitive facility location on decentralized supply chains

This paper addresses a novel competitive facility location problem about a firm that intends to enter an existing decentralized supply chain comprised of three tiers of players with competition: manufacturers, retailers and consumers. It first proposes a variational inequality for the supply chain network equilibrium model with production capacity constraints, and then employs the logarithmic-quadratic proximal prediction–correction method as a solution algorithm. Based on this model, this paper develops a generic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints for the competitive facility location problem, which can simultaneously determine facility locations of the entering firm and the production levels of these facilities so as to optimize an objective. Subsequently, a hybrid genetic algorithm that incorporates with the logarithmic-quadratic proximal prediction–correction method is developed for solving the proposed mathematical program with an equilibrium constraint. Finally, this paper carries out some numerical examples to evaluate proposed models and solution algorithms.     

异质预期下双寡头企业碳减排决策的复杂性分析

针对碳减排环境下的政府碳配额分配和企业产量与减排研发决策问题,基于古诺双寡头垄断模型,建立了考虑有限理性和异质性预期的碳排放依赖型企业碳减排决策模型,从市场复杂性演化的内部视角出发,分析市场竞争波动的内在机制;并通过非线性动力学理论探讨企业不同的响应速度对于市场稳定性的影响。结果表明,技术减排成本系数、碳交易价格对低碳产品的偏好系数是影响两企业竞争策略的关键因素,两个因素的取值不同甚至会彻底改变均衡状态下两企业相对的减排投资力度和相对的盈利能力及市场的稳定性。针对市场竞争出现的波动现象,通过时滞反馈控制方法高效、快速的控制动力系统的不稳定行为,使得市场迅速恢复稳定、有序的状态,为决策者有效解决市场不稳定现象提供了科学依据。     

New product introduction and capacity investment by incumbents: Effects of size on strategy

We analyze a duopoly where capacity-constrained firms offer an established product and have the option to offer an additional new and differentiated product. We show that the firm with the smaller capacity on the established market has a higher incentive to innovate and reaches a larger market share on the market for the new product. An increase in capacity of the larger firm can prevent its competitor from innovating, whereas an increase in capacity of the smaller firm cannot prevent innovation of its larger competitor. In equilibrium the firm with smaller capacity on the established market might outperform the larger firm with respect to total payoffs.     

A competitive hub location and pricing problem

We formulate and solve a new hub location and pricing problem, describing a situation in which an existing transportation company operates a hub and spoke network, and a new company wants to enter into the same market, using an incomplete hub and spoke network. The entrant maximizes its profit by choosing the best hub locations and network topology and applying optimal pricing, considering that the existing company applies mill pricing. Customers’ behavior is modeled using a logit discrete choice model. We solve instances derived from the CAB dataset using a genetic algorithm and a closed expression for the optimal pricing. Our model confirms that, in competitive settings, seeking the largest market share is dominated by profit maximization. We also describe some conditions under which it is not convenient for the entrant to enter the market.     

Modeling investment behavior under price cap regulation

Motivated by the frequently observed criticism of the regulatory practice arising from companies in the industries concerned, we investigate the impact of regulation on investment behavior. Therefore, we model the investment timing and volume of a firm acting in a regulated market. When capping prices, the regulatory authority imposes a price ceiling on market prices. Accordingly, we use a real option approach where the price cap that limits possible future firm values enters the firm’s portfolio in form of a short call option position. By comparing this framework to a competitive benchmark model, we derive an optimal price setting rule for regulators. Moreover, it can be shown how deviations from this optimum affect the investment behavior of firms.      

Deregulation in electricity: understanding strategic and regulatory risk

This paper is motivated by our experiences since 1990 with developing system simulation models to help UK companies in the restructured electricity industry understand the radically different market within which they must become competitive. When public utilities such as electricity have been restructured, deregulated and/or privatised, the process has often been associated with a major change in the competitive environment. As a consequence, the strategic and regulatory uncertainties ahead for these companies are unprecedented. In such a market there has been no historical evolution and all the participants including the regulatory institutions have very little understanding of how it will operate in the short term and evolve in the future. In this situation, the use of system dynamic models appears to offer an attractive way of gaining insights into how aspects of the competitive market might evolve. In the absence of real experience and relevant analogies, learning from models assumes a key role. Such models cannot be validated empirically, but can be developed to represent how the system is designed to operate. From such a prototypical basis, sensitivity analysis can generate insights on the strategic opportunities created by failings in the market design, or its potential instability to shocks and market imperfections.