带有网络外部性的动态寡头垄断定价

给出了带有网络外部性的两阶段寡头垄断定价模型,并用博弈论方法求解.通过与带有网络外部性的完全垄断定价模型的比较,得出重要结论:在网络外部性足够大的情况下,①寡头竞争情况下与完全垄断下情况一样,“科斯假设”将得到克服,均衡定价将呈现先低后高的情况.②对于完全垄断厂商来说,网络外部性k的增加能够增加其利润,但对于寡头竞争的企业来说,正好相反,k的增加将导致其利润的下降.     

考虑库存和市场占有率的纵向一体化

本文将传统的双重加价模型扩展到包含库存因素的上下游厂商均为垄断企业、下游厂商为寡头垄断企业而上游厂商为完全垄断企业以及上游厂商为寡头垄断企业而下游厂商为完全垄断企业的一体化模型，着重探讨了库存成本和市场占有率对纵向一体化的影响。研究结果表明，只有在库存成本较低时，传统的结论才得以维持；一体化始终导致消费者福利上升而不受市场占有率的影响，但一体化使厂商的总利润增加要在市场占有率较高时才能实现。     

基于RCE条件下双头垄断的福利分析

应用RCE(RationalConjecturesEquilibrium)条件来分析双头垄断企业(厂商)在成本不对称、需求不对称、产品差异化条件下对社会福利产生的不同影响,并说明了RCE条件下的双头垄断模型与Cournot模型及社会最优模型的关系,提出在“结构—行为—绩效(SCP)”研究中,行为是一个重要的因素,即使在同一结构下,不同的行为将会产生不同的绩效与福利.     

成本内生化的企业产量与厂址选择模型

应用三阶段博弈模型分析了双头垄断企业面对需求非对称、产品成本内生时的选址决策问题,分析了影响企业选址决策的三种因素.研究表明:在市场需求非对称条件下,市场规模相对比值、运输费用以及竞争或保留工资水平三者之间的相互关系决定企业区位选择.进一步,在集聚和分离两种情况下,对工会组织的效用大小分别作了比较.     

考虑跟随企业搭便车行为的创新企业定价策略研究

文章通过构建博弈模型探讨了存在跟随企业搭便车行为时创新企业的定价策略及定价模式(稳定定价或动态定价),并分析了忠实消费者规模及需求溢出效应等特征对创新企业定价决策与利润的影响.结果表明,无论创新企业采用稳定定价或动态定价模式,跟随企业搭便车行为均会降低创新企业利润,需求溢出效应的增强总能使创新企业和跟随企业均获得更高的利润.动态定价模式下,当需求溢出效应较大时,创新企业会采用渗透定价策略;反之会采用撇脂定价策略.无论垄断或竞争市场情形下,均存在消费者规模阈值效应,即创新企业的利润随着忠实消费者规模的增大而先增大后减小.垄断市场下,动态定价模式能让创新企业获得更高利润;竞争市场下,当跟随企业质量处于较中间水平时,稳定定价模式能让创新企业获得更多优势.     

对相关市场条件下贸易竞争的博弈机制及福利效应的研究

在古诺双头模型的框架内分析了市场风险和相关因素对贸易竞争均衡和福利水平的影响.与传统模型不同,假设各国市场具有潜在相关的随机需求,且出口企业具有风险规避的态度,并利用博弈模型研究了市场风险和相关因子对竞争力和成本优势形成的产出效应及定价行为的影响.推论表明国际市场的不确定性和相关性削弱了企业在完全信息条件下参与贸易竞争的动机,而各国的福利水平则取决于企业风险态度、市场风险和相关系数的特定组合.     

垄断情形下的配套产品定价策略研究

本文中,我们建立了一个垄断情形下的配套产品的线性定价模型,分析当整个配套产品只由一个垄断厂商生产时,垄断者的最优定价策略.模型的分析结论表明,垄断者最优定价时,对主件定价较高,对配件定价较低,但两者均小于单独出售时的最优垄断定价.     

存在空箱调运的非对称运输市场定价策略研究

考虑空箱调运成本,本文对垄断和双寡头市场分别研究运输企业在两条相向路径上的定价问题。对于垄断市场,建立了运输企业最优定价策略,并刻画出无空箱调运的潜在需求不平衡区间。对于双寡头市场,考虑同一路径上不同企业潜在运输需求不等的现实情境,求解了非对称企业的伯川德纳什均衡,给出最优定价策略。研究发现,无空箱调运并不意味着较高利润,运输企业没有必要刻意消除空箱调运现象。另外,增加单位载货运输成本和竞争强度会降低企业利润,而提升单位空箱重置成本、价格敏感度和市场不对称程度都会增大企业利润。     

垄断企业垂直兼并前后的产品价格和利润比较

本文在垄断厂商供货周期确定的条件下 ,利用线性需求函数研究了垄断厂商与垄断销售商垂直兼并前后的产品价格和利润问题 .研究结果表明 :垄断企业兼并后的产品市场价格可能高于也可能低于垄断企业兼并前的产品市场价格 ,但是垄断企业兼并后的利润肯定高于垄断企业兼并前的利润 .     

非线性定价的贝叶斯均衡策略研究

本文利用贝叶斯均衡策略研究非线性定价问题,将消费需求类型推广到三种,设计一个非线性价格机制博弈,推导出该博弈的贝叶斯均衡,得出结论:当消费者类型满足不同假设条件时,得到贝叶斯均衡策略也不同.文中还将贝叶斯均衡与纳什均衡进行比较,并从博弈角度为一类企业(如电信公司等)的定价提供理论依据.     

差异Bertrand寡占厂商的技术许可策略

利用消费者效用函数推导出产品市场差异Bertrand价格竞争均衡的一般式;结合技术许可的收入效应与租金耗散效应,分析了差异Bertrand多家对称创新厂商与差异Bertrand双寡头中的唯一创新厂商对竞争对手的固定费用许可策略.结果表明:(1)多家对称创新厂商与唯一创新厂商均选择不向潜在进入者发放许可;(2)只要产品差异程度符合一定条件,差异Bertrand双寡头中的唯一创新厂商将向技术劣势在位竞手许可其各种规模的工艺创新.     

ON THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERCONNECTED WILDLIFE POPULATIONS

Abstract Economic interdependency of wildlife or fish stocks is usually attributed to ecological interdependency, such as predator–prey and competitive relationships, or to density‐dependent migration of species between different areas. This paper provides another channel for economic interdependency of wildlife where density‐independent migration and market price interaction affect the management strategies among different landowners. Management is studied under three market conditions for selling hunting licenses: price taking behavior, monopoly market, and duopoly market. Harvesting of the Scandinavian moose is used as an example. The paper provides several results on how economic interdependency works through the migration pattern. When a duopoly market is introduced, hunting license price interaction among the landowners plays an additional role in determining the optimal harvesting strategy.     

网络效应影响下品牌商与模仿者的竞争策略

近年来,品牌商与模仿者的竞争问题引起了社会的广泛关注。本文构建了包含一个品牌商和一个潜在模仿者的两周期动态博弈模型,且消费者具有策略性行为。品牌商在第一周期是市场的垄断者,若模仿者在第二周期进入市场,那么第二周期会变成双寡头市场。模仿者入侵市场除了会引起竞争效应外,与品牌产品的相似性也会引起网络效应,从而增加品牌产品的市场接受度。因此,面对模仿者入侵,品牌商需要同时权衡竞争效应与网络效应两方面的影响。研究结果表明:(1)网络效应并不总是对品牌商和模仿者的价格和需求等产生积极影响。(2)模仿产品质量不可提升过高,当模仿产品质量和品牌产品质量过分接近时,两个企业的利润都会降低。(3)当网络效应较小或者模仿产品质量过高时,品牌商在双寡头市场的需求可能会高于垄断市场的需求。     

Introduction of a second channel: Implications for pricing and profits

In this paper we study the optimal pricing strategies when a product is sold on two channels such as the Internet and a traditional channel. We assume a stylized deterministic demand model where the demand on a channel depends on prices, degree of substitution across channels and the overall market potential. We first study four prevalent pricing strategies which differ in the degree of autonomy for the Internet channel. For a monopoly, we provide theoretical bounds for these pricing strategies. We also analyze the duopoly case where an incumbent mixed retailer faces competition with a pure retailer and characterize price equilibria. Finally, through a computational study, we explore the behavior (price and profits) under different parameters and consumer preferences for the alternative channels.     

The Hungarian insurance market structure: an empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the market structure of the Hungarian insurance market, which operated as a monopoly market until 1986. After the regime change this sector started to develop rapidly. But the Hungarian insurance market has a strong oligopolistic character, and thus raises an interesting question as to how close the market is to a state of perfect competition. Based on the Panzar and Rosse (J Ind Econ 35:443–456, 1987) methodology we estimate the elasticity of total revenues with respect to changes in input prices, so that we can determine the market structure. The estimation of input price elasticity is made with a static and a dynamic panel model. According to research the structure of the Hungarian insurance market significantly differs from the perfect competition case between 2010 and 2019. The market is in long-run equilibrium, and the hypothesis of the monopoly case cannot be rejected. The market structure of a sector is important for modelling phenomena and new regulations effectively, which is relevant for insurance and competition supervision in the protection of customers.

     

Price and QoS competition in data communication services

Pricing of data communication services has been studied, but primarily in a monopolistic setting. We study the price competition in packet-switching networks with a quality-of-service (QoS) guarantee in terms of an expected per-packet delay. We propose a general framework in which service providers offering multi-class priority-based services compete to maximize their profits, while satisfying the expected delay guarantee in each class. We first examine the price competition with fixed delay guarantees and then extend it to the situation where providers compete in quality of service as well as price. In each case, we compare the duopoly pricing scheme with the case when two service providers merge to become a monopoly provider.     

Organizational strategy and tacit collusion in oligopoly with agency

We study a model that integrates organizational structure and agency withdynamic price competition in oligopoly. Workers in different levels of the organizational structure have asymmetric information and heterogeneous objectives; i.e., there are agency conflicts within the firm. The organizational strategy of the firm is to determinesequentially the decision power relating to price and non-price competition instruments at each level. We examine the equilibrium organizational and competitive strategy of firms in a duopoly, and characterize the extent of noncooperative tacit collusion (with respect to price and non-price competition) that is feasible. We identify two sets of sufficient conditions that guarantee, (i) the monopoly solution is sustainable at any discount factor (rate of impatience of the workers), or (ii) the monopoly solution is not sustainable for any level of the discount factor. Interestingly, tacit collusion may be feasible when either the agency problem is non-existentor very severe; i.e., firm profits in equilibrium may be non-monotone in the extent of the agency conflict. Our analysis indicates that intrafirm learning and agency will have a stronger impact on feasible tacit collusion in markets where non-price competition plays a strong role. Moreover, there is an intimate connection between the firm's organizational strategy and the extent of tacit collusion with the (industry) business cycle.     

顾客选择偏好下的供应链竞争的随机用户均衡模型

本文建立了具有顾客选择偏好的供应链与供应链竞争随机用户网络均衡模型。基于随机用户均衡理论和logit模型,利用变分不等式,得出在竞争均衡态下胜出的供应链,其市场占有率和所提供产品的市场价格等参数。该模型从供应链与供应链竞争的角度,很好刻画了顾客的对具有价格等差异性的同类产品的选择偏好,并给出了研究思路,适用算法和合理的经济解释。     

基于双边市场理论的金融超市竞争定价策略研究

基于双边市场理论,重点分析金融超市在双寡头垄断情形下的竞争定价策略。即在在一般定价模型的基础上,构建起加入金融超市双边用户交易次数为歧视标准的价格歧视竞争模型。并且围绕金融超市追求长期利益和短期利益两种不同动机,对采取该策略均衡时最终用户的均衡进入价格、金融超市利润和市场份额进行比较分析。最后,给出金融超市实施价格歧视策略的对策和建议。