A simple insurance model: optimal coverage and deductible

An insurance model, with realistic assumptions about coverage, deductible and premium, is studied. Insurance is shown to decrease the variance of the cost to the insured, but increase the expected cost, a tradeoff that places our model in the Markowitz mean-variance model.     

Optimal insurance in the presence of insurer’s loss limit

In this paper we consider the optimal insurance problem when the insurer has a loss limit constraint. Under the assumptions that the insurance price depends only on the policy’s actuarial value, and the insured seeks to maximize the expected utility of his terminal wealth, we show that coverage above a deductible up to a cap is the optimal contract, and the relaxation of insurer’s loss limit will increase the insured’s expected utility.When the insurance price is given by the expected value principle, we show that a positive loading factor is a sufficient and necessary condition for the deductible to be positive. Moreover, with the expected value principle, we show that the optimal deductible derived in our model is not greater (lower) than that derived in Arrow’s model if the insured’s preference displays increasing (decreasing) absolute risk aversion. Therefore, when the insured has an IARA (DARA) utility function, compared to Arrow model, the insurance policy derived in our model provides more (less) coverage for small losses, and less coverage for large losses.Furthermore, we prove that the optimal insurance derived in our model is an inferior (normal) good for the insured with a DARA (IARA) utility function, consistent with the finding in the previous literature. Being inferior, the insurance can also be a Giffen good. Under the assumption that the insured’s initial wealth is greater than a certain level, we show that the insurance is not a Giffen good if the coefficient of the insured’s relative risk aversion is lower than 1.     

Risk and reward of home equity borrowing for investment in Canada,a stochastic analysis

Computational Management Science - According to Canadian tax law one way of transforming from non-tax deductible (personal mortgage) to tax deductible interest expenses is to borrow against home...     

Optimal multi-period insurance contracts

In multi-period insurance contracts (such as automobile insurance contracts), unlike single-period ones, the premiums that the insured must pay increase whenever he files a claim. Hence, the buyer faces a problem that is absent in one-period models, namely: he must determine for which damages he should file a claim and for which he should not.The optimal claims policy of the buyer is presented for a large class of insurance contracts. It is shown that the buyer will file a claim only if it is larger than some critical value. Based on this it is shown that the buyer prefers a contract that provides full coverage above a deductible for damages that exceed his critical value. In this case the optimal contract is not unique since the buyer is indifferent to the form of the contract for damages below his critical value. It is shown, however, that as in one-period models (Arrow (1963, 1974)) there exists an optimal contract that provides full coverage above a deductible. In multi-period setting, however, the buyer will file a claim only if the damage is sufficiently higher than the deductible.It is also shown that the buyer prefers a strictly positive deductible. Unlike the one-period case (Mossin (1968)), this result holds true even if the premium rates equal the expected payments.     

Production under uncertainty with insurance or hedging

This paper examines the output decision of a risk-averse producer facing profit risk in the presence of insurance or hedging. Conditions under which the producer’s output increases upon the introduction of generic insurance are derived, giving rise to conditions for deductible insurance (commodity call options), coinsurance-type insurance (commodity futures), and restricted deductible insurance, respectively. This paper improves upon the literature by considering general profit risk, possibly revenue risk or cost risk, that may not be multiplicative. Moreover, unlike Machnes and Wong’s [Geneva Pap. Risk Insurance Theory 28 (2003) 73–80] condition on the loading factor that may not lead to an explicit and unique value, the condition derived in this paper gives rise to a unique upper bound for the loading factor. Finally, their assumptions on the utility function, such as quadratic utility and constant absolute risk aversion for the case of restrictive deductible insurance and zero-loading are made substantial less restrictive.     

Budget-constrained optimal insurance without the nonnegativity constraint on indemnities

In a problem of Pareto-efficient insurance contracting (bilateral risk sharing) with expected-utility preferences, Gollier (1987) relaxes the nonnegativity constraint on indemnities and argues that the existence of a deductible is only due to the variability in the cost of insurance, not the nonnegativity constraint itself. In this paper, we find support for a similar statement in problems of budget-constrained optimal insurance (i.e., demand for insurance). Specifically, we consider a setting of ambiguity (unilateral and bilateral) and a setting of belief heterogeneity. We drop the nonnegativity constraint and assume no cost (or a fixed cost) to the insurer, and we derive closed-form solutions to the problems that we formulate. In particular, we show that optimal indemnities no longer include a deductible provision; and they can be negative for small values of the loss, or in case of no loss.     

Effects of insurance premium and deductible on production

We consider a risk-averse firm bearing the revenue risk and fuzzy production cost. Using the quadratic utility function the sufficient conditions for a deductible insurance to increase the output are derived and found to be the functions of insurance premium and deductible. We also show that the optimal production for a firm in the fuzzy environment is less than that in the crisp environment.     

Optimal insurance design with a bonus

This paper investigates an insurance design problem, in which a bonus will be given to the insured if no claim has been made during the whole lifetime of the contract, for an expected utility insured. In this problem, the insured has to consider the so-called optimal action rather than the contracted compensation (or indemnity) due to the existence of the bonus. For any pre-agreed bonus, the optimal insurance contract is given explicitly and shown to be either the full coverage contract when the insured pays high enough premium, or a deductible one otherwise. The optimal contract and bonus are also derived explicitly if the insured is allowed to choose both of them. The contract turns out to be of either zero reward or zero deductible. In all cases, the optimal contracts are universal, that is, they do not depend on the specific form of the utility of the insured. A numerical example is also provided to illustrate the main theoretical results of the paper.     

The utility of deductibles from the insurer's point of view

The relationship between the premiums for deductible cover and for full cover are analyzed with respect to the utility for the insurer. Theorem 1 shows that within natural bounds for the premiums neither form of coverage is generally preferred by all insurers. Theorems 2–4 indicate that in many realistic cases a deductible cover requires a higher risk loading factor by the insurer than a full insurance cover. Theorem 2(b) also contains an exception to this rule.     

Optimal risk sharing under distorted probabilities

We study optimal risk sharing among n agents endowed with distortion risk measures. Our model includes market frictions that can either represent linear transaction costs or risk premia charged by a clearing house for the agents. Risk sharing under third-party constraints is also considered. We obtain an explicit formula for Pareto optimal allocations. In particular, we find that a stop-loss or deductible risk sharing is optimal in the case of two agents and several common distortion functions. This extends recent result of Jouini et al. (Adv Math Econ 9:49–72, 2006) to the problem with unbounded risks and market frictions.      

Deductibles in health insurance

This study is an extension to a simulation study that has been developed to determine ruin probabilities in health insurance. The study concentrates on inpatient and outpatient benefits for customers of varying age bands. Loss distributions are modelled through the Allianz tool pack for different classes of insureds. Premiums at different levels of deductibles are derived in the simulation and ruin probabilities are computed assuming a linear loading on the premium. The increase in the probability of ruin at high levels of the deductible clearly shows the insufficiency of proportional loading in deductible premiums. The PH-transform pricing rule developed by Wang is analyzed as an alternative pricing rule. A simple case, where an insured is assumed to be an exponential utility decision maker while the insurer’s pricing rule is a PH-transform is also treated.     

A game-theoretic model of reinsurance

We define a game between the insured and the insurer by which one can justify the choice of the discount function from the insurance premium payment as a function of the deductible. We find conditions that make it possible to conclude a contract using the deductible amount. We define a game between the insurer and the reinsurer in which the insurer chooses the loss-ratio limit and the reinsurer the price of the reinsurance policy. We seek a Stackelberg equilibrium with the reinsurer in the role of leader. Translated fromMetody Matematicheskogo Modelirovaniya, 1998, pp. 160–164.     

Capacity reservation contracts for high-tech industry

Capacity reservation provides a risk-sharing mechanism that encourages a manufacturer to expand its capacity more. We propose a deductible reservation (DR) contract where customers reserve future capacity with a fee that is deductible from the purchasing price. The manufacturer’s ex ante announcement of the “excess” capacity that she will have in addition to the reservation amount is a unique feature of the DR contract. An individually rational DR contract that provides channel coordination always exists. Since there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the reservation game among multiple customers, the main results of the one-customer case can be extended to the n-customer case. The DR contract is compared with another capacity reservation contract called take-or-pay. While the manufacturer may gain more profit under a take-or-pay contract, there may not be a channel-coordinated contract that is also individually rational for the customer. Finally, the similarities and differences between the capacity reservation contracts and other well-known supply contracts are discussed.     

Solvency II,regulatory capital,and optimal reinsurance: How good are Conditional Value-at-Risk and spectral risk measures?

We study the problem of optimal reinsurance as a means of risk management in the regulatory framework of Solvency II under Conditional Value-at-Risk and, as its natural extension, spectral risk measures. First, we show that stop-loss reinsurance is optimal under both Conditional Value-at-Risk and spectral risk measures. Spectral risk measures thus constitute a more general class of suitable regulatory risk measures than specific Conditional Value-at-Risk. At the same time, the established type of stop-loss reinsurance can be maintained as the optimal risk management strategy that minimizes regulatory capital. Second, we derive the optimal deductibles for stop-loss reinsurance. We show that under Conditional Value-at-Risk, the optimal deductible tends towards restrictive and counter-intuitive corner solutions or “plunging”, which is a serious objection against its use in regulatory risk management. By means of the broader class of spectral risk measures, we are able to overcome this shortcoming as optimal deductibles are now interior solutions. Especially, the recently discussed power spectral risk measures and the Wang risk measure are shown to avoid any plunging. They yield a one-to-one correspondence between the risk parameter and the optimal deductible and, thus, provide economically plausible risk management strategies.     

带有免赔额调整的车险奖惩系统及其最优自留额

考虑了带有免赔额调整的车险奖惩系统.利用无差别原理,将奖惩系统惩罚等级中增收保费的部分或全部用添加免赔额的方式替代,给出了替代后奖惩系统最优自留额的递推计算公式.最后,给出一个例子并分析了免赔额与平均最优自留额的关系.     

Optimal indemnity contracts

Conditions under which policies with deductible provisions, coinsurance provisions, or premium rebates are optimal are given. Results of previous papers on indemnity costs are considered as special cases. For both personal and commercial lines of insurance, further applications consider income taxes, interest income and acquisition costs.     

Optimal risk retention under partial insurance

This paper examines the situation where a risk-averse insured determines the optimal amount of deductible (or stop-loss) insurance. The insurer uses two different premium principles, the expected value principle and the exponential principle. The insured has an exponential utility function. Specific numerical results are obtained for the optimal stop-loss limit in the case of a group life insurance plan. The exact results are contrasted with those obtained by using the normal approximation instead of the exact distribution of aggregate claims.     

免赔额保险公平定价的期权博弈分析

传统保险定价实质上是供给方定价,忽视了保险契约是保险人和投保人双方互动决策的结果.另一方面,保单具有或有权益的性质,这使得近年来金融定价方法得以引入到保险定价中,以反映风险和回报之间的长期均衡关系.借助期权博弈框架引入博弈论和期权定价理论,分析了免赔额保险的公平定价问题,给出了基本模型和扩展模型两种情形下博弈均衡结果,即保单的无套利价值,并发现在扩展模型情形下,投保人的最优投保策略和均衡保险合同均发生变化.     

Optimal insurance under the insurer’s risk constraint

In this paper, we impose the insurer’s risk constraint on Arrow’s optimal insurance model. The insured aims to maximize his/her expected utility of terminal wealth, under the constraint that the insurer wishes to control the expected loss of his/her terminal wealth below some prespecified level. We solve the problem, and it is shown that when the insurer’s risk constraint is binding, the solution to the problem is not linear, but piecewise linear deductible. Moreover, it can be shown that the insured’s optimal expected utility will increase if the insurer increases his/her risk tolerance.