有限理性下征地拆迁补偿组合性博弈均衡评价

征地拆迁补偿策略选择是多主体、多策略、多偏好的组合性博弈均衡结果,引入决策理论方法构建组合性博弈均衡评价模型将组合性博弈均衡求解问题转化为均衡评价问题.有助于降低复杂的组合性博弈均衡求解难度.有限理性下,自利动机的基础性寻利偏好常常需与其他行为偏好集合才能完整充分表现,构建寻利、损失规避和互动公平偏好下地方政府、村集体经济组织和被征地农民的三主体多策略博弈模型,并进行均衡评价和算例分析.研究表明组合性均衡评价方法对求解多主体、多策略、多偏好的组合性博弈均衡是有效的;集合考虑主体寻利、损失规避和互动公平偏好能有效实现征地拆迁补偿(公平价格征收,接受,接受)的合意均衡,要推动和谐征收,征地拆迁补偿一定要考虑多重行为偏好对主体得益的影响,征收人要强化互动公平偏好,发挥"公平价格征收"的积极强化作用.     

“自我融资”的数学表达和Black-Scholes方程的推导

对L aw rence C.Evans提出的B lack-Scho les偏微分方程的一种基于“自我融资(self-financing)”的概念的推导方法进行改进和补充.我们采用离散时间模型对“自我融资”进行系统的分析,并给出直观的金融阐释和一个新的数学推导方法.我们的推导方法与L aw rence C.Evans的论述相辅相成,二者结合在一起,为“自我融资”的概念提供了一个完整的数学刻划.     

基于多重自我假设的人质困境问题

囚徒困境及其变形模型,揭示了个体理性与群体理性选择之间的矛盾,从个体利益出发的行为往往不能实现团体的最大利益.本文以多重自我替代传统经济学中理性人的假设,将双曲贴现应用到人质困境中,解决短期利益与长期利益的不一致性给决策带来的困扰,从而实现个人利益与社会利益的统筹协调.     

医疗服务市场质量竞争博弈模型

以社会福利最大化为目标,建立双寡头垄断下医疗机构质量价格序贯博弈模型,以及在医疗服务价格和财政补偿双重规制下的政府和医疗机构之间的两阶段博弈模型.研究发现:由于医疗服务市场价格竞争削弱了质量竞争效应,序贯博弈的纳什均衡质量低于以社会福利最大化为目标的社会均衡质量.当医疗机构的固定成本控制在某个范围时,政府双重规制下的均衡质量优于医疗机构质量价格序贯博弈下的均衡质量,从而从理论上证明了政府双重规制的有效性.     

贵阳市中学生性别角色自我期望的因子分析与比较研究

应用因子分析方法对贵阳市中学生进行性别角色自我期望的调查与比较研究.研究显示:传统的性别角色并不被现代中学生完全接受,无论是男中学生还是女中学生都在力图探求一种新的性别角色模式,但两性对新的性别角色的自我期望和把握是有一定差异的.     

化工产业群体性事件演化博弈分析及仿真

化工产业事故对环境、居民等带来的损害日益增加,并由此引发了一系列群体性事件.运用演化博弈理论,构建地方政府和周边居民策略互动得益矩阵,利用复制动态方程,对参与方策略互动进行分析,揭示政府与居民行为策略选择的演化规律,最后在Netlogo软件平台上对演化结果进行多情景仿真分析.理论研究和仿真分析结果表明:地方政府和周边居民之间的博弈存在四种策略组合,其中三个是演化稳定策略组合(公开处理,接受)、(暗箱操作,接受)和(暗箱操作,抗议),一个是不稳定策略组合(公开处理,抗议).     

多主从群体博弈中合作均衡的存在性

基于Scarf,Kajii关于n-人非合作博弈中的合作均衡存在性定理,越来越多的研究表明,对非合作博弈的合作均衡研究是有必要的.本文综合Sandholm的群体博弈模型以及Yang和Ju证明的多主从博弈的合作均衡存在性定理,旨在详细研究多主从群体博弈的合作均衡.首先,在多主从群体博弈中引入合作均衡的概念,并通过Kajii...     

提升本科生“统计计算”课程学习的自我效能感的教学探索

通过对数学与应用数学专业的本科生课程"统计计算"的教学实践与探索,认为教师在课堂对教学的关键知识点借助R语言进行直观化演示,对内容难点采用一体化上机实验教学,对实际案例组织研讨式互动教学,并重视一题多解的课堂训练,有助于提升学生的学习兴趣、夯实其学习基础、增强其学习的自我效能感,从而全面提升本课程的教学效果.     

航空客票销售渠道的博弈研究

为研究航空公司和机票代理人之间的博弈过程,在分析航空公司和代理人在不同策略下各自的得益基础上,建立了静态博弈模型,并运用演化博弈理论对航空公司的机票直销策略选择与代理人策略选择的互动机制进行了分析.博弈分析结果显示,航空公司和代理商在以下情况时存在进化稳定策略:当代理销售成本高于直销成本时,航空公司会加大直销力度;而航空公司的直销策略比较强势时,当代理商抵制策略的概率会大大增加;航空公司缓和推进直销时,代理会也会采取缓和策略.     

从自我评价到自我反思

有一位老师,在给学生讲完"地球是圆的"后,问学生"懂了吗?"学生齐答"懂了!"老师当即请学生画一幅地球草图,并要求每个人把自己画进去.结果,所有同学都把自己画在地球的上部.问他们"为什么?"又是齐答:"因为画在其他地方会掉下去".这就是学生的自我评价("懂了")与实际知识达     

Evolutionary dynamics of knowledge

This study discusses the evolutionary nature of knowledge acquisition at micro and macro levels, and in particular when the process involves an artificial agent's interpretative devices. In order to accomplish this, we propose using an individual learning model (or inner‐world reconstruction model) that in our view overcomes neoclassic epistemological holdups and may increase the predictive power of computational economics, by letting an artificial agent's knowledge evolve by itself, irrespective of globally specified goals or individual motives of behavior; using simultaneous (or parallel) genetic algorithms (GA) to evolve a single agent's learning strategy, each GA with different general specifications, in a multiagent setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 11: 12–19, 2006     

Bayesian Ising Graphical Model for Variable Selection

In this article, we propose a new Bayesian variable selection (BVS) approach via the graphical model and the Ising model, which we refer to as the “Bayesian Ising graphical model” (BIGM). The BIGM is developed by showing that the BVS problem based on the linear regression model can be considered as a complete graph and described by an Ising model with random interactions. There are several advantages of our BIGM: it is easy to (i) employ the single-site updating and cluster updating algorithm, both of which are suitable for problems with small sample sizes and a larger number of variables, (ii) extend this approach to nonparametric regression models, and (iii) incorporate graphical prior information. In our BIGM, the interactions are determined by the linear model coefficients, so we systematically study the performance of different scale normal mixture priors for the model coefficients by adopting the global-local shrinkage strategy. Our results indicate that the best prior for the model coefficients in terms of variable selection should place substantial weight on small, nonzero shrinkage. The methods are illustrated with simulated and real data. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.     

A preconditioner for generalized saddle point problems: Application to 3D stationary Navier‐Stokes equations

In this article we consider the stationary Navier‐Stokes system discretized by finite element methods which do not satisfy the inf‐sup condition. These discretizations typically take the form of a variational problem with stabilization terms. Such a problem may be transformed by iteration methods into a sequence of linear, Oseen‐type variational problems. On the algebraic level, these problems belong to a certain class of linear systems with nonsymmetric system matrices (“generalized saddle point problems”). We show that if the underlying finite element spaces satisfy a generalized inf‐sup condition, these problems have a unique solution. Moreover, we introduce a block triangular preconditioner and we show how the eigenvalue bounds of the preconditioned system matrix depend on the coercivity constant and continuity bounds of the bilinear forms arising in the variational problem. Finally we prove that the stabilized P1‐P1 finite element method proposed by Rebollo is covered by our theory and we show that the condition number of the preconditioned system matrix is independent of the mesh size. Numerical tests with 3D stationary Navier‐Stokes flows confirm our results. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Numer Methods Partial Differential Eq 2006     

Minimizing maximum risk for fair network connection with interval data

In this paper we introduce a minimax model for network connection problems with interval parameters. We consider how to connect given nodes in a network with a path or a spanning tree under a given budget, where each link is associated with an interval and can be established at a cost of any value in the interval. The quality of an individual link （or the risk of link failure, etc.） depends on its construction cost and associated interval. To achieve fairness of the network connection, our model aims at the minimization of the maximum risk over all links used. We propose two algorithms that find optimal paths and spanning trees in polynomial time, respectively. The polynomial solvability indicates salient difference between our minimax model and the model of robust deviation criterion for network connection with interval data, which gives rise to NP-hard optimization problems.     

Structure and emergence in a nested logit model with social and spatial interactions

Suppose you have the possibility to choose to adopt one of a number of different behaviors or to choose to buy one of a number of different products, and suppose your choice is influenced by your individual perception of the average choices made by others. Economists Brock and Durlauf (in Am. Econ. Rev. 92(2):298, 2002; The Economy as an Evolving Complex System III. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) have derived seminal theoretical results for the equilibrium behavior of the multinomial discrete choice model with social interactions, assuming homogeneous decision-makers, global interactions and laws of large of numbers. The research presented in this paper extends Brock and Durlauf’s model to allow for unobserved preference heterogeneity between choice alternatives by studying the nested logit model. Next, by drawing on the computational possibilities permitted through social simulation of multi-agent systems (MAS), this paper relaxes the assumption of global interactions and considers instead local interactions within several hypothesized social and spatial network structures. Additional heterogeneity is thus hereby induced by the influence on a given decision-maker’s choice by the particular network connections he or she has and the particular perceived percentages, for example, of the agent’s neighbors or socio-economic peers making each choice. Discrete choice estimation results controlling these heterogeneous individual preferences are embedded in a multi-agent based simulation model in order to observe the evolution of choice behavior over time with socio-dynamic feedback due to the network effects. The MAS approach also gives us an additional advantage in the possibility to test size effects, and thus relax the assumption of large numbers, as well as test the effect of different initial conditions. Finally an extra benefit is gained via the MAS approach in that we are not confined to study only the equilibrium behavior, and have the possibility here to observe the time-varying trajectories of the choice behavior. This is important since smaller network sizes are revealed to be associated with higher volatility of the choice behavior in this model, and consequently stochastic cycling between equilibria. Averaged over time, the emergent behavior in such case yields a quite different picture than the theoretical results predicted by Brock and Durlauf. Furthermore being able to observe the emergent behavior allows us to see the subtle role of the unobserved heterogeneity in the nested logit model in breaking the symmetry of the multinomial logit model. We can see the temporal patterns by which theoretically predicted dominant equilibria emerge or not according to different social and spatial network scenarios. With an eye towards application in the context of transportation mode choice, we conclude highlighting limitations of our present study and recommendations for future work.     

A time-integrated Richardson model

Richardson equations are widely studied models of simplified multi-player arms races. In this paper, we derive a novel and more theoretically-consistent formulation, which implicitly includes a mapping from observed economic data to the model variables. We define new variables which are time-integrated versions of scaled `defense' expenditures, and show that they may be robustly estimated from historical data. We illustrate the model's usefulness with historical examples and a simplified risk analysis of simulated data.     

A New Proof for the Convergence of an Individual Based Model to the Trait Substitution Sequence

We consider a continuous time stochastic individual based model for a population structured only by an inherited vector trait and with logistic interactions. We consider its limit in a context from adaptive dynamics: the population is large, the mutations are rare and the process is viewed in the timescale of mutations. Using averaging techniques due to Kurtz (in Lecture Notes in Control and Inform. Sci., vol. 177, pp. 186–209, 1992), we give a new proof of the convergence of the individual based model to the trait substitution sequence of Metz et al. (in Trends in Ecology and Evolution 7(6), 198–202, 1992), first worked out by Dieckman and Law (in Journal of Mathematical Biology 34(5–6), 579–612, 1996) and rigorously proved by Champagnat (in Theoretical Population Biology 69, 297–321, 2006): rigging the model such that “invasion implies substitution”, we obtain in the limit a process that jumps from one population equilibrium to another when mutations occur and invade the population.     

Weighted nucleoli

Cooperative games in characteristic function form (TU games) are considered. We allow for variable populations or carriers. Weighted nucleoli are defined via weighted excesses for coalitions. A solution satisfies the Null Player Out (NPO) property, if elimination of a null player does not affect the payoffs of the other players. For any single-valued and efficient solution, the NPO property implies the null player property. We show that a weighted nucleolus has the null player property if and only if the weights of multi-player coalitions are weakly decreasing with respect to coalition inclusion. Weighted nucleoli possessing the NPO-property can be characterized by means of a multiplicative formula for the weights of the multi-player coalitions and a restrictive condition on the weights of one-player coalitions. Received: March 1997/Final version: November 1998     

Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.Received October 2001/Revised May 2003