Optimal reinsurance with a rescuing procedure

We consider a large insurance company whose reserve is modeled by a diffusion process. The management of the insurance company makes a decision on reinsurance in order to reduce the insurance risk. An optimal decision is the one which minimizes the expected time to reach a goal before the reserve reaches a ruin level. We introduce a rescuing procedure to deal with the case that the company is “too big to fail”. We disclose that the optimal decision of the management heavily depends on how much time the company needs to wait for rescuing when it gets in trouble.     

A mathematical model of market competition

We consider a mathematical model of decision making by a company attempting to win a market share. We assume that the company releases its products to the market under the competitive conditions that another company is making similar products. Both companies can vary the kinds of their products on the market as well as the prices in accordance with consumer preferences. Each company aims to maximize its profit. A mathematical statement of the decision-making problem for the market players is a bilevel mathematical programming problem that reduces to a competitive facility location problem. As regards the latter, we propose a method for finding an upper bound for the optimal value of the objective function and an algorithm for constructing an approximate solution. The algorithm amounts to local ascent search in a neighborhood of a particular form, which starts with an initial approximate solution obtained simultaneously with an upper bound. We give a computational example of the problem under study which demonstrates the output of the algorithm.     

A competitive hub location and pricing problem

We formulate and solve a new hub location and pricing problem, describing a situation in which an existing transportation company operates a hub and spoke network, and a new company wants to enter into the same market, using an incomplete hub and spoke network. The entrant maximizes its profit by choosing the best hub locations and network topology and applying optimal pricing, considering that the existing company applies mill pricing. Customers’ behavior is modeled using a logit discrete choice model. We solve instances derived from the CAB dataset using a genetic algorithm and a closed expression for the optimal pricing. Our model confirms that, in competitive settings, seeking the largest market share is dominated by profit maximization. We also describe some conditions under which it is not convenient for the entrant to enter the market.     

The optimal strategy for insurance company under the influence of terminal value

This paper considers a model of an insurance company which is allowed to invest a risky asset and to purchase proportional reinsurance. The objective is to find the policy which maximizes the expected total discounted dividend pay-out until the time of bankruptcy and the terminal value of the company under liquidity constraint. We find the solution of this problem via solving the problem with zero terminal value. We also analyze the influence of terminal value on the optimal policy.     

资金约束下订单农业供应链内外部融资策略研究

考虑一个农户和一个公司组成的二级订单农业供应链,农户面临资金约束及农产品产出随机性,分别研究了银行贷款融资和带有价格折扣的预付款两种融资模式下,农户的生产决策和公司的收购价格决策,进而探讨了供应链内外部融资方式的比较与选择。研究结果表明,农产品产出随机性风险导致农户减少种植规模,公司降低农产品的收购价格,不利于农户增加收入,对公司利润产生不利影响;由于农户的弱势地位,相比银行贷款融资模式,预付款融资无法实现农户与公司双方的帕累托改进。     

Optimal dividend-financing strategies in a dual risk model with time-inconsistent preferences

In this paper, we consider an optimal dividend-financing problem for a company whose capital reserve is described by the dual of classical risk model. We assume that the manager of the company has time-inconsistent preferences, which are described by a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, and that financing is permitted to prevent the company from going bankrupt. The manager’s objective is to maximize the expected cumulative dividend payments minus financing costs. We solve the optimization problems for a naive manager and a sophisticated manager, and obtain explicit solutions for both managers. Our results show that the manager with time-inconsistent preferences tends to pay out dividends earlier. We also present some economic implications and sensitivity analysis for our results.     

A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate

We introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the value of the estate is endogenous and depends on agents’ investment decisions. There are two investment alternatives: investing in a company (risky asset) and depositing money into a savings account (risk-free asset). Bankruptcy is possible only for the risky asset. We define a game between agents each of which aims to maximize his expected payoff by choosing an investment alternative and a company management which aims to maximize profits by choosing a bankruptcy rule. Our agents are differentiated by their incomes. We consider three most prominent bankruptcy rules in our base model: the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. We show that only the proportional rule is a part of any pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This result is robust to changes in income distribution in the economy and can be extended to a larger set of bankruptcy rules and multiple types. However, extension to multiple company framework with competition leads to equilibria where the noncooperative support for the proportional rule disappears.     

需求不确定的多周期的容量决策问题

研究每个周期的需求随机增加的情形下的容量扩充问题,建立起切合实际的有限周期随机动态规划模型及在期现值准则下的无限周期随机动态规划模型,进而探索生产单一产品的公司在面对随机增加的市场需求时,风险中立的管理者该如何扩充其生产容量,才能使得其公司在折扣意义下的总期望利润最大.研究无限阶段的容量扩充问题,得出某种约束条件下的优化策略解,给公司管理者提供了其长期可持续发展的优化策略和依据.     

Optimal investment for insurers when the stock price follows an exponential Lévy process

We consider a stochastic model for the wealth of an insurance company which has the possibility to invest into a risky and a riskless asset under a constant mix strategy. The total claim amount is modeled by a compound Poisson process and the price of the risky asset follows a general exponential Lévy process. We investigate the resulting reserve process and the corresponding discounted net loss process. This opens up a way to measure the risk of a negative outcome of the reserve process in a stationary way. We provide an approximation of the optimal investment strategy which maximizes the expected wealth of the insurance company under a risk constraint on the Value-at-Risk. We conclude with some examples.     

Service outsourcing under co-opetition and information asymmetry

Co-opetition refers to the phenomenon that firms simultaneously cooperate and compete in order to maximize their profits. This paper studies the contracting for an outsourcing supply chain (a user company vs. a service provider) in the presence of co-opetition and information asymmetry. The user company outsources part of his service capacity at a discount price to the service provider for sale. The service provider charges a commission for doing outsourcing work and competes with the user company for the service capacity to satisfy their respective demands. We solve for the service provider’s optimal commission decision and the user company’s optimal outsourcing decisions (outsourcing volume and price discount) when the user company has private information about his service capacity. Specifically, we highlight the following observations. For the service provider, a menu of two-part tariffs that consist of a fixed commission and a per-volume commission can reveal the true type of the user company’s capacity; the user company’s optimal outsourcing proportion is quasi-convex and the optimal price discount is non-decreasing in his capacity volume, which is counterintuitive.