Inhabitation of polymorphic and existential types

This paper shows that the inhabitation problem in the lambda calculus with negation, product, polymorphic, and existential types is decidable, where the inhabitation problem asks whether there exists some term that belongs to a given type. In order to do that, this paper proves the decidability of the provability in the logical system defined from the second-order natural deduction by removing implication and disjunction. This is proved by showing the quantifier elimination theorem and reducing the problem to the provability in propositional logic. The magic formulas are used for quantifier elimination such that they replace quantifiers. As a byproduct, this paper also shows the second-order witness theorem which states that a quantifier followed by negation can be replaced by a witness obtained only from the formula. As a corollary of the main results, this paper also shows Glivenko’s theorem, Double Negation Shift, and conservativity for antecedent-empty sequents between the logical system and its classical version.     

Cut-free formulations for a quantified logic of here and there

A predicate extension SQHT⁼ of the logic of here-and-there was introduced by V. Lifschitz, D. Pearce, and A. Valverde to characterize strong equivalence of logic programs with variables and equality with respect to stable models. The semantics for this logic is determined by intuitionistic Kripke models with two worlds (here and there) with constant individual domain and decidable equality. Our sequent formulation has special rules for implication and for pushing negation inside formulas. The soundness proof allows us to establish that SQHT⁼ is a conservative extension of the logic of weak excluded middle with respect to sequents without positive occurrences of implication. The completeness proof uses a non-closed branch of a proof search tree. The interplay between rules for pushing negation inside and truth in the “there” (non-root) world of the resulting Kripke model can be of independent interest. We prove that existence is definable in terms of remaining connectives.     

A game semantics for disjunctive logic programming

Denotational semantics of logic programming and its extensions (by allowing negation, disjunctions, or both) have been studied thoroughly for many years. In 1998, a game semantics was given to definite logic programs by Di Cosmo, Loddo, and Nicolet, and a few years later it was extended to deal with negation by Rondogiannis and Wadge. Both approaches were proven equivalent to the traditional semantics. In this paper we define a game semantics for disjunctive logic programs and prove soundness and completeness with respect to the minimal model semantics of Minker. The overall development has been influenced by the games studied for PCF and functional programming in general, in the styles of Abramsky–Jagadeesan–Malacaria and Hyland–Ong–Nickau.     

The Square of Opposition and the Paradoxes

Can an appeal to the difference between contrary and contradictory statements, generated by a non-uniform behaviour of negation, deal adequately with paradoxical cases like the sorites or the liar? This paper offers a negative answer to the question. This is done by considering alternative ways of trying to construe and justify in a useful way (in this context) the distinction between contraries and contradictories by appealing to the behaviour of negation only. There are mainly two ways to try to do so: i) by considering differences in the scope of negation, ii) by considering the possibility that negation is semantically ambiguous. Both alternatives are shown to be inapt to handle the problematic cases. In each case, it is shown that the available alternatives for motivating or grounding the distinction, in a way useful to deal with the paradoxes, are either inapplicable, or produce new versions of the paradoxes, or both. Work supported by SFRH/BPD/16678/2004 (FCT), project “On Content” POCI/FIL/55562/2004 (FCT) and project “LOGOS grupo de logica, lenguage y cognicion” HUM 2006-08236 (MEC).     

Residuated fuzzy logics with an involutive negation

Residuated fuzzy logic calculi are related to continuous t-norms, which are used as truth functions for conjunction, and their residua as truth functions for implication. In these logics, a negation is also definable from the implication and the truth constant , namely is $\varphi \to \overline{0}$. However, this negation behaves quite differently depending on the t-norm. For a nilpotent t-norm (a t-norm which is isomorphic to Łukasiewicz t-norm), it turns out that is an involutive negation. However, for t-norms without non-trivial zero divisors, is G?del negation. In this paper we investigate the residuated fuzzy logics arising from continuous t-norms without non-trivial zero divisors and extended with an involutive negation. Received: 14 April 1998     

Logical Extensions of Aristotle’s Square

We start from the geometrical-logical extension of Aristotle’s square in [6,15] and [14], and study them from both syntactic and semantic points of view. Recall that Aristotle’s square under its modal form has the following four vertices: A is □α, E is , I is and O is , where α is a logical formula and □ is a modality which can be defined axiomatically within a particular logic known as S5 (classical or intuitionistic, depending on whether is involutive or not) modal logic. [3] has proposed extensions which can be interpreted respectively within paraconsistent and paracomplete logical frameworks. [15] has shown that these extensions are subfigures of a tetraicosahedron whose vertices are actually obtained by closure of by the logical operations , under the assumption of classical S5 modal logic. We pursue these researches on the geometrical-logical extensions of Aristotle’s square: first we list all modal squares of opposition. We show that if the vertices of that geometrical figure are logical formulae and if the sub-alternation edges are interpreted as logical implication relations, then the underlying logic is none other than classical logic. Then we consider a higher-order extension introduced by [14], and we show that the same tetraicosahedron plays a key role when additional modal operators are introduced. Finally we discuss the relation between the logic underlying these extensions and the resulting geometrical-logical figures.      

The Geometry of Standard Deontic Logic

Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic has appeared, that is “n-opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m” (m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper, by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”, “deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra), whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional very regular solid).      

Two results in negation-free logic

Negation-free propositional logic (or first-order logic) is clearly less expressive than the corresponding full system with negation. However, we present two complexity results for logic without negation that are no different from those for the original system. First, the problem of determining logical implication between sentences composed solely of conjunctions and disjunctions is shown to be as difficult as that between arbitrary sentences. Second, we show that the problem of determining a minimum satisfying assignment for a propositional formula in negation-free conjunctive normal form, even with no more than two disjuncts per clause, is NP-complete. We also show that unless P = NP, no polynomial time approximation scheme can exist for this problem.     

Effectiveness in RPL, with applications to continuous logic

In this paper, we introduce a foundation for computable model theory of rational Pavelka logic (an extension of ?ukasiewicz logic) and continuous logic, and prove effective versions of some related theorems in model theory. We show how to reduce continuous logic to rational Pavelka logic. We also define notions of computability and decidability of a model for logics with computable, but uncountable, set of truth values; we show that provability degree of a formula with respect to a linear theory is computable, and use this to carry out an effective Henkin construction. Therefore, for any effectively given consistent linear theory in continuous logic, we effectively produce its decidable model. This is the best possible, since we show that the computable model theory of continuous logic is an extension of computable model theory of classical logic. We conclude with noting that the unique separable model of a separably categorical and computably axiomatizable theory (such as that of a probability space or an L^p Banach lattice) is decidable.     

Possible world semantics for first-order logic of proofs

In the tech report Artemov and Yavorskaya (Sidon) (2011) [4] an elegant formulation of the first-order logic of proofs was given, FOLP. This logic plays a fundamental role in providing an arithmetic semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic, as was shown. In particular, the tech report proved an arithmetic completeness theorem, and a realization theorem for FOLP. In this paper we provide a possible-world semantics for FOLP, based on the propositional semantics of Fitting (2005) [5]. We also give an Mkrtychev semantics. Motivation and intuition for FOLP can be found in Artemov and Yavorskaya (Sidon) (2011) [4], and are not fully discussed here.     

Ockham’s Calculus of Strict Implication

In his main work Summa Logicae written around 1323, William of Ockham developed a system of propositional modal logic which contains almost all theorems of a modern calculus of strict implication. This calculus is formally reconstructed here with the help of modern symbols for the operators of conjunction, disjunction, implication, negation, possibility, and necessity.     

Models of linear logic

We engage a study of nonmodal linear logic which takes times ⊗ and the linear conditional ⊸ to be the basic connectives instead of times and linear negation ()^⊥ as in Girard's approach. This difference enables us to obtain a very large subsystem of linear logic (called positive linear logic) without an involutionary negation (if the law of double negation is removed from linear logic in Girard's formulation, the resulting subsystem is extremely limited). Our approach enables us to obtain several natural models for various subsystems of linear logic, including a generic model for the so-called minimal linear logic. In particular, it is seen that these models arise spontaneously in the transition from set theory to multiset theory. We also construct a model of full (nonmodal) linear logic that is generic relative to any model of positive linear logic. However, the problem of constructing a generic model for positive linear logic remains open. Bibliography: 2 titles. Published inZapiski Nauchnykh Seminarov POMI, Vol. 220, 1995, pp. 23–35. Original     

A relative interpolation theorem for infinitary universal Horn logic and its applications

In this paper we deal with infinitary universal Horn logic both with and without equality. First, we obtain a relative Lyndon-style interpolation theorem. Using this result, we prove a non-standard preservation theorem which contains, as a particular case, a Lyndon-style theorem on surjective homomorphisms in its Makkai-style formulation. Another consequence of the preservation theorem is a theorem on bimorphisms, which, in particular, provides a tool for immediate obtaining characterizations of infinitary universal Horn classes without equality from those with equality. From the theorem on surjective homomorphisms we also derive a non-standard Beth-style preservation theorem that yields a non-standard Beth-style definability theorem, according to which implicit definability of a relation symbol in an infinitary universal Horn theory implies its explicit definability by a conjunction of atomic formulas. We also apply our theorem on surjective homomorphisms, theorem on bimorphisms and definability theorem to algebraic logic for general propositional logic.     

A double arity hierarchy theorem for transitive closure logic

In this paper we prove that thek-ary fragment of transitive closure logic is not contained in the extension of the (k–1)-ary fragment of partial fixed point logic by all (2k–1)-ary generalized quantifiers. As a consequence, the arity hierarchies of all the familiar forms of fixed point logic are strict simultaneously with respect to the arity of the induction predicates and the arity of generalized quantifiers.Although it is known that our theorem cannot be extended to the sublogic deterministic transitive closure logic, we show that an extension is possible when we close this logic under congruence.Supported by a grant from the University of Helsinki. This research was initiated while he was a Junior Researcher at the Academy of FinlandThis article was processed by the author using the LATEX style filepljourlm from Springer-Verlag.     

Uniform interpolation and the existence of sequent calculi

This paper presents a uniform and modular method to prove uniform interpolation for several intermediate and intuitionistic modal logics. The proof-theoretic method uses sequent calculi that are extensions of the terminating sequent calculus $\mathsf{G4ip}$ for intuitionistic propositional logic. It is shown that whenever the rules in a calculus satisfy certain structural properties, the corresponding logic has uniform interpolation. It follows that the intuitionistic versions of $\mathsf{K}$ and $\mathsf{KD}$ (without the diamond operator) have uniform interpolation. It also follows that no intermediate or intuitionistic modal logic without uniform interpolation has a sequent calculus satisfying those structural properties, thereby establishing that except for the seven intermediate logics that have uniform interpolation, no intermediate logic has such a sequent calculus.     

Which two-sorted algebras of booleans and naturals have a finite basis?

We show that the two-sorted algebra of Booleans and naturals with conjunction, addition and inequality is not finitely based. If addition is removed, or negation is included, then the resulting algebra is finitely based.Received November 16, 2001; accepted in final form August 4, 2004.     

The simplest protoalgebraic logic

The logic is the sentential logic defined in the language with just implication → by the axiom of reflexivity or identity “” and the rule of Modus Ponens “from φ and to infer ψ”. The theorems of this logic are exactly all formulas of the form . We argue that this is the simplest protoalgebraic logic, and that in it every set of assumptions encodes in itself not only all its consequences but also their proofs. In this paper we study this logic from the point of view of abstract algebraic logic, and in particular we use it as a relatively natural counterexample to settle some open problems in this theory. It appears that this logic has almost no properties: it is neither equivalential nor weakly algebraizable; it does not have an algebraic semantics; it does not satisfy any form of the Deduction Theorem, other than the most general parameterized and local one that all protoalgebraic logics satisfy; it is not filter‐distributive; and so on. It satisfies some forms of the interpolation property but in a rather trivial way. Very few things are known about its algebraic counterpart, save that its intrinsic variety is the class of all algebras of the similarity type.     

Disturbing Fuzzy Propositional Logic and its Operators

In this paper, the concept of disturbing fuzzy propositional logic is introduced, and the operators of disturbing fuzzy propositions is defined. Then the 1-dimensional truth value of fuzzy logic operators is extended to be two-dimensional operators, which include disturbing fuzzy negation operators, implication operators, “and” and “or” operators and continuous operators. The properties of these logic operators are studied.     

Ploucquet’s “Refutation” of the Traditional Square of Opposition

In the 18th century, Gottfried Ploucquet developed a new syllogistic logic where the categorical forms are interpreted as set-theoretical identities, or diversities, between the full extension, or a non-empty part of the extension, of the subject and the predicate. With the help of two operators ‘O’ (for “Omne”) and ‘Q’ (for “Quoddam”), the UA and PA are represented as ‘O(S) – Q(P)’ and ‘Q(S) – Q(P)’, respectively, while UN and PN take the form ‘O(S) > O(P)’ and ‘Q(S) > O(P)’, where ‘>’ denotes set-theoretical disjointness. The use of the symmetric operators ‘–’ and ‘>’ gave rise to a new conception of conversion which in turn lead Ploucquet to consider also the unorthodox propositions O(S) – O(P), Q(S) – O(P), O(S) > Q(P), and Q(S) > Q(P). Although Ploucquet’s critique of the traditional theory of opposition turns out to be mistaken, his theory of the “Quantification of the Predicate” is basically sound and involves an interesting “Double Square of Opposition”. My thanks are due to Hanno von Wulfen for helpful discussions and for transforming the word-document into a Latex-file.     

A modal logic framework for reasoning about comparative distances and topology

We propose and investigate a uniform modal logic framework for reasoning about topology and relative distance in metric and more general distance spaces, thus enabling the comparison and combination of logics from distinct research traditions such as Tarski’s S4 for topological closure and interior, conditional logics, and logics of comparative similarity. This framework is obtained by decomposing the underlying modal-like operators into first-order quantifier patterns. We then show that quite a powerful and natural fragment of the resulting first-order logic can be captured by one binary operator comparing distances between sets and one unary operator distinguishing between realised and limit distances (i.e., between minimum and infimum). Due to its greater expressive power, this logic turns out to behave quite differently from both S4 and conditional logics. We provide finite (Hilbert-style) axiomatisations and ExpTime-completeness proofs for the logics of various classes of distance spaces, in particular metric spaces. But we also show that the logic of the real line (and various other important metric spaces) is not recursively enumerable. This result is proved by an encoding of Diophantine equations.