Measure-Theoretic Properties of Level Sets of Distance Functions

We consider the level sets of distance functions from the point of view of geometric measure theory. This lays the foundation for further research that can be applied, among other uses, to the derivation of a shape calculus based on the level-set method. Particular focus is put on the \((n-1)\)-dimensional Hausdorff measure of these level sets. We show that, starting from a bounded set, all sub-level sets of its distance function have finite perimeter. Furthermore, if a uniform-density condition is satisfied for the initial set, one can even show an upper bound for the perimeter that is uniform for all level sets. Our results are similar to existing results in the literature, with the important distinction that they hold for all level sets and not just almost all. We also present an example demonstrating that our results are sharp in the sense that no uniform upper bound can exist if our uniform-density condition is not satisfied. This is even true if the initial set is otherwise very regular (i.e., a bounded Caccioppoli set with smooth boundary).     

Algebras Defined from Ordered Sets and the Varieties they Generate

We investigate ways of representing ordered sets as algebras and how the order relation is reflected in the algebraic properties of the variety (equational class) generated by these algebras. In particular we consider two different but related methods for constructing an algebra with one binary operation from an arbitrary ordered set with a top element. The two varieties generated by all these algebras are shown to be well-behaved in that they are locally finite, finitely based, and have an equationally definable order relation. We exhibit a bijection between the subdirectly irreducible algebras in each variety and the class of all ordered sets with top element. We determine the structure and cardinality of the free algebra on n-free generators and provide sharp bounds on the number of n-generated algebras in each variety. These enumeration results involve the number of quasi-orders on an n-element set.     

Nowhere monotone functions and microscopic sets

We investigate how large a set can be on which a continuous nowhere monotone function is one-to-one. We consider the σ-ideal of microscopic sets, which is situated between the countable sets and the sets of Hausdorff dimension zero and prove that the typical function in C[0, 1] (in the sense of Baire) is nowhere monotone and one-to-one except on some microscopic set. We also give an example of a continuous nowhere monotone function of bounded variation on [0, 1], which is one-to-one except on some microscopic set, so it is not a typical function.      

Resource Dynamics under Partial Cooperation in an Oligopoly

We study the long-run evolution of a renewable resource which is subject to harvest by partially cooperating players who sell the harvested quantities on distinct markets. We derive explicit expressions for the total harvesting quantity of all players in this general framework and investigate the dependence of the total and relative harvest rates on the level of cooperation, available fish stock, and fishing costs. Combining the biological growth model with oligopoly leads to a nonlinear dynamic law for the evolution of the fish stock in the presence of commercial fishing. We provide also existence results for its equilibrium and examine the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium. We are grateful for the critical comments and suggestions of three anonymous referees.     

Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games

We consider cost sharing for a class of facility location games, where the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a player-specific matroid defined on the set of resources. We assume that resources have nondecreasing load-dependent costs and player-specific delays. Our model includes the important special case of capacitated facility location problems, where players have to jointly pay for opened facilities. The goal is to design cost sharing protocols so as to minimize the resulting price of anarchy and price of stability. We investigate two classes of protocols: basic protocols guarantee the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium and separable protocols additionally require that the resulting cost shares only depend on the set of players on a resource. We find optimal basic and separable protocols that guarantee the price of stability/price of anarchy to grow logarithmically/linearly in the number of players. These results extend our previous results (cf. von Falkenhausen & Harks, 2013), where optimal basic and separable protocols were given for the case of symmetric matroid games without delays.     

Robust Equilibria in Indefinite Linear-Quadratic Differential Games

Equilibria in dynamic games are formulated often under the assumption that the players have full knowledge of the dynamics to which they are subject. Here, we formulate equilibria in which players are looking for robustness and take model uncertainty explicitly into account in their decisions. Specifically, we consider feedback Nash equilibria in indefinite linear-quadratic differential games on an infinite time horizon. Model uncertainty is represented by a malevolent input which is subject to a cost penalty or to a direct bound. We derive conditions for the existence of robust equilibria in terms of solutions of sets of algebraic Riccati equations.     

Dynamic linear programming games with risk-averse players

Motivated by situations in which independent agents wish to cooperate in some uncertain endeavor over time, we study dynamic linear programming games, which generalize classical linear production games to multi-period settings under uncertainty. We specifically consider that players may have risk-averse attitudes towards uncertainty, and model this risk aversion using coherent conditional risk measures. For this setting, we study the strong sequential core, a natural extension of the core to dynamic settings. We characterize the strong sequential core as the set of allocations that satisfy a particular finite set of inequalities that depend on an auxiliary optimization model, and then leverage this characterization to establish sufficient conditions for emptiness and non-emptiness. Qualitatively, whereas the strong sequential core is always non-empty when players are risk-neutral, our results indicate that cooperation in the presence of risk aversion is much more difficult. We illustrate this with an application to cooperative newsvendor games, where we find that cooperation is possible when it least benefits players, and may be impossible when it offers more benefit.     

On intersections of abelian and nilpotent subgroups in finite groups. I

We consider Pontryagin’s generalized nonstationary example with identical dynamic and inertial capabilities of the players under phase constraints on the evader’s states. The boundary of the phase constraints is not a “death line” for the evader. The set of admissible controls is a ball centered at the origin, and the terminal sets are the origin. We obtain sufficient conditions for a multiple capture of one evader by a group of pursuers in the case when some functions corresponding to the initial data and to the parameters of the game are recurrent.     

Cumbersome coordination in repeated games

This paper examines the role communication between players might serve in enabling them to reach an agreement on the future play of a repeated game. The property of the communication process that we focus on is the amount of time it takes to complete. We characterize the effects of such communication processes indirectly by determining the set of agreements they may yield. A weak and a strong criterion are introduced to describe sets of agreements that are “stable” in the sense that players would follow the current agreement and not seek to reach a new agreement. We show that as players become extremely patient, strongly stable sets converge to Pareto efficient singletons. We apply the stability criteria to Prisoner’s Dilemmas and show how the unique strongly stable set reflects asymmetries in the players’ stage-game payoffs. Finally, we model the communication process as a Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining game and demonstrate that the resulting agreements help characterize the strongly stable set for a general class of communication mechanisms. Received January 1998/final version June 1999     

On a class of control problems with incomplete information

For a class of nonlinear control systems with constrained control, we consider a terminal control problem of reaching a target point in which the initial point of the process and the vector of parameters of the system belong to known sets and there is no information on which point from the set of initial states is true and which parameter of the system from the set of parameters is true. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution to the problem in the class of guaranteeing program packages of Yu.S. Osipov and A.V. Kryazhimskiy. We also present the results of calculation of a model example.     

Existence of solutions for linear hyperbolic initial-boundary value problems in a rectangle

In a recent article, we achieved the well-posedness of linear hyperbolic initial and boundary value problems (IBVP) in a rectangle via semigroup method, and we found that there are only two elementary modes called hyperbolic and elliptic modes in the system. It seems that, there is only one set of boundary conditions for the hyperbolic mode, while there are infinitely many sets of boundary conditions for the elliptic mode, which can lead to well-posedness. In this article, we continue to consider linear hyperbolic IBVP in a rectangle in the constant coefficients case and we show that there are also infinitely many sets of boundary conditions for hyperbolic mode which will lead to the existence of a solution. We also have uniqueness in some special cases. The boundary conditions satisfy the reflection conditions introduced in Section 3, which turn out to be equivalent to the strictly dissipative conditions.     

Outer approximation methods for solving variational inequalities in Hilbert space

In this paper, we study variational inequalities in a real Hilbert space, which are governed by a strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous operator F over a closed and convex set C. We assume that the set C can be outerly approximated by the fixed point sets of a sequence of certain quasi-nonexpansive operators called cutters. We propose an iterative method, the main idea of which is to project at each step onto a particular half-space constructed using the input data. Our approach is based on a method presented by Fukushima in 1986, which has recently been extended by several authors. In the present paper, we establish strong convergence in Hilbert space. We emphasize that to the best of our knowledge, Fukushima’s method has so far been considered only in the Euclidean setting with different conditions on F. We provide several examples for the case where C is the common fixed point set of a finite number of cutters with numerical illustrations of our theoretical results.     

Chebyshev Centers in Hyperplanes of c 0

We give a full characterization of the closed one-codimensional subspaces of c ₀, in which every bounded set has a Chebyshev center. It turns out that one can consider equivalently only finite sets (even only three-point sets) in our case, but not in general. Such hyperplanes are exactly those which are either proximinal or norm-one complemented.     

Resource pricing games on graphs: existence of Nash equilibria

In this letter, we consider a non-cooperative resource pricing game on a graph where sellers (i.e., players) set the prices for their own resources to maximize the payoffs and buyers migrate to seek the least expensive resources. We present a model for the resource pricing game and prove the existence of Nash equilibria on regular and hierarchical graphs. The results obtained are applicable to the study of market economies, social networks and computer networks where individuals trade resources in a spatially extended environment.     

Common pool resources with support

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players. Recommendations for Resource Managers

• Coalitions may be able to effectively manage common pool resources such as fisheries but such coalitions are often not stable due to free-rider incentives.
• We explore the impact of a transfer scheme that can improve this coalition stability which would lead to larger and more effective coalitions.
• Our results show that this new transfer scheme works only for cases where the number of players is small.

     

Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games

In this paper we consider standard fixed tree games, for which each vertex unequal to the root is inhabited by exactly one player. We present two weighted allocation rules, the weighted down-home allocation and the weighted neighbour-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals both the set of weighted down-home allocations and the set of weighted neighbour allocations. Since every weighted down-home allocation specifies a weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet (1988)) in a natural way, and vice versa, our results provide an alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of weighted neighbour allocations is a generalization of the nucleolus, in the sense that the latter is in this class as the special member where players have all equal weights.     

Condorcet winner configurations of linear networks

We consider the problem of locating a fixed number of facilities along a line to serve n players. We model this problem as a cooperative game and assume that any locational configuration can be eventually disrupted through a strict majority of players voting for an alternative configuration. A solution of such a voting location problem is called a Condorcet winner configuration. In this article, we state three necessary and one sufficient condition for a configuration to be a Condorcet winner. Consequently, we propose a fast algorithm which enables us to verify whether a given configuration is a Condorcet winner, and can be efficiently used also for computing the (potentially empty) set of all Condorcet winner configurations.     

Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. Solutions for such graph games can be obtained by applying standard solutions to a modified or restricted game that takes account of the cooperation restrictions. We discuss Harsanyi solutions which distribute dividends such that the dividend shares of players in a coalition are based on power measures for nodes in corresponding communication graphs. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions on the class of cycle-free graph games and on the class of all graph games. Special attention is given to the Harsanyi degree solution which equals the Shapley value on the class of complete graph games and equals the position value on the class of cycle-free graph games. The Myerson value is the Harsanyi power solution that is based on the equal power measure. Finally, various applications are discussed.     

The almost chebyshev property in linear semi-infinite programming

We consider a linear semi-infinite programming problem where the index set of the constraints is compact and the constraint functions are continuous on it. The set of all continuous functions on this index set as right hand sides are the parameter set. We investigate how large various unicity sets are.We state a condition on the objective function vector and the “matrix” of the problem which characterizes when the set of a parameters with a non-unique optimal point is a set of the first Baire category in the solvability set. This is the case if and only if the unicity set is a dense subset of the solvability set. Under the same assumptions it is even true that the interior of the strong unicity set is I also dense. If the index set of the constraints contains a dense subset with the property that each point1 is a G ₈-set, then the parameters of the strong unicity set, such that the optimal point satisfies the linear independence constraint qualification, are also dense.

We apply our results to a characterization of a unique continuous selection for the optimal set I mapping and to a one-sided L ₁-approximation problem