Market selection decisions for inventory models with price-sensitive demand

In the majority of classical inventory theory literature, demand arises from exogenous sources upon which the firm has little or no control. In many practical contexts, however, aggregate demand is comprised of individual demands from a number of distinct customers or markets. This introduces new dimensions to supply chain planning problems involving the selection of markets or customers to include in the demand portfolio. We present a nonlinear, combinatorial optimization model to address planning decisions in both deterministic and stochastic settings, where a firm constructs a demand portfolio from a set of potential markets having price-sensitive demands. We first consider a pricing strategy that dictates a single price throughout all markets and provide an efficient algorithm for maximizing total profit. We also analyze the model under a market-specific pricing policy and describe its optimal solution. An extensive computational study characterizes the effects of key system parameters on the optimal value of expected profit, and provides some interesting insights on how a given market’s characteristics can affect optimal pricing decisions in other markets.     

Single facility location on a network under mill and delivered pricing

^** E-mail: pelegrin{at}um.es Firms normally use either a mill price or a delivered pricepolicy, depending on market conditions (type of good, transportationway, customers location, costs, etc). In this paper, the problemof selecting the best location for an entering firm in competitionwith some pre-existing firms, under each price policy, is studiedon a network for the first time. With mill pricing, an equilibriumin price rarely exists and it is assumed that all competingfirms set a common mill price for all customers. With deliveredpricing, there exists a Nash equilibrium in price and it isassumed that the equilibrium price in each area is offered tothe customers in that area. In both cases, we consider thatcustomers buy from the cheapest facility and the same rulesare used for tie breaking in the lowest cost. While the profitmaximization problem for the entering firm always has optimalsolutions under mill pricing, this problem might not have anoptimal solution under delivered pricing. We show some discretizationresults and give procedures to find the full set of optimal,or -optimal, solutions to the problem under the two price policies.A comparison of results with the two price policies is givenby using an illustrative example.     

Decentralized Business Strategies in a Multi-Unit Firm

In a multi-unit firm, such as a retail chain or a multi-plant manufacturer, we compare the business strategies developed by unit managers with the strategies that maximize corporate profit. The setting is one in which units face different markets and where learning spillovers between two units are enhanced if their strategies are more similar. When there is a small number of units, we find a tendency for managers' strategies to be excessively tailored to their local market. When the firm has many units, unit strategies can be either excessively or insufficiently standardized.     

竞争环境下截流问题的选址-价格模型

研究了竞争环境下考虑产品定价的截流设施选址问题。连锁企业在市场上新建设施时,市场上已有属于竞争对手的设施存在,在连锁企业新建设施位置确定之后,两个企业关于产品定价进行双寡头完全信息非合作博弈。定义了效用函数,引入Huff模型,以企业利润最大为目标,建立双层规划模型,证明了模型纳什均衡价格的存在性,并构造启发式算法对模型进行求解。算例分析表明,该算法求解结果较为理想,可用于大中型网络的规划选址问题。     

When should service firms provide free experience service?

By providing a free experience service, a service firm can attract more uninformed customers. However, it could reversely effect the delay-sensitive, informed customers’ decision. In this paper, we study a priority queueing system with free experience services. We study the customer behavior in equilibrium after we derive the expected customer waiting time. We then construct the service firm’s revenue function and obtain an optimal strategy for the service firm. Our results suggest that when the market size of informed customers is relatively small, the firm should consider providing free experience services for uninformed customers. Conversely, if the demand rate of potential informed customers is quite high, the firm should ignore uninformed customers.     

Selling multiple units to strategic consumers

We consider a monopolist firm selling to strategic customers who may purchase more than one unit of a product in a two-period model. We provide closed-form solutions for the firm’s optimal prices and show that they are non-monotonic in both the value of the second unit and the strategic level of customers. Particularly, the first-period price can increase as customers become more strategic, in contrast to the single-unit setting where it always decreases in the strategic level of customers.     

Competitive facility location problem with attractiveness adjustment of the follower: A bilevel programming model and its solution

We are concerned with a problem in which a firm or franchise enters a market by locating new facilities where there are existing facilities belonging to a competitor. The firm aims at finding the location and attractiveness of each facility to be opened so as to maximize its profit. The competitor, on the other hand, can react by adjusting the attractiveness of its existing facilities with the objective of maximizing its own profit. The demand is assumed to be aggregated at certain points in the plane and the facilities of the firm can be located at predetermined candidate sites. We employ Huff’s gravity-based rule in modeling the behavior of the customers where the fraction of customers at a demand point that visit a certain facility is proportional to the facility attractiveness and inversely proportional to the distance between the facility site and demand point. We formulate a bilevel mixed-integer nonlinear programming model where the firm entering the market is the leader and the competitor is the follower. In order to find the optimal solution of this model, we convert it into an equivalent one-level mixed-integer nonlinear program so that it can be solved by global optimization methods. Apart from reporting computational results obtained on a set of randomly generated instances, we also compute the benefit the leader firm derives from anticipating the competitor’s reaction of adjusting the attractiveness levels of its facilities. The results on the test instances indicate that the benefit is 58.33% on the average.     

A duopoly model with heterogeneous congestion-sensitive customers

This paper analyzes a model with two firms (providers), and two classes of customers. These customers classes are characterized by their attitude towards ‘congestion’ (caused by other customers using the same resources); a firm is selected on the basis of both the prices charged by the firms, and the ‘congestion levels’. The model can be represented by a two-stage game: in the first providers set their prices, whereas in the second the customers choose the provider (or to not use any service at all) for given prices. We explicitly allow the providers to split their resources, in order to serve more than just one market segment. This enables us to further analyze the Paris metro pricing (Pmp) proposal for service differentiation in the Internet.     

Sourcing decisions with capacity reservation contracts

By committing to long-term supply contracts, buyers seek to lower their purchasing costs, and have products delivered without interruption. When a long-term contract is available, suppliers are less pressured to find new customers, and can afford to charge a price lower than the prevailing spot market price. We examine sourcing decisions of a firm in the presence of a capacity reservation contract that this firm makes with its long-term supplier in addition to the spot market alternative. This contract entails delivery of any desired portion of a reserved fixed capacity in exchange for a guaranteed payment by the buyer. We investigate rational actions of the two parties under two different types of periodic review inventory control policies used by the buyer: the two-number policy, and the base stock policy. When typical demand probability distributions are considered, inclusion of the spot market source in the buyer’s procurement plan significantly reduces the capacity commitments from the long-term supplier.     

Pricing policy in dynamic markets and a generalization of the Ramsey rule

Pricing policy in a regulated monopoly industry is usually based on maximizing welfare or some other measure of utility level of return on investment. Previously, the Ramsey pricing policy which states that the percentage deviation of quasi-optimal price from marginal cost for each product must be inversely proportional to its price elasticity of demand, has been developed for a static market. The Ramsey framework assumes instantaneous demand response to price changes; empirical evidence suggests demand changes occur dynamically through time.In this paper an optimum pricing rule for a profit maximizing firm based on a general time varying demand model in a dynamic market is obtained assuming a single price change at the beginning of the planning period. A dynamic market equivalent of the well known inverse elasticity law of the static market is developed. Defining the concept of average price elasticity for dynamic markets we show that the inverse elasticity law of static markets takes an inequality form in dynamic markets. For demand functions which decrease, increase or are constant with time the optimum price markups are greater than, less than, or equal to the inverse of the average price elasticity, respectively.The results are then generalized to the case of a constrained welfare maximizing firm. This leads to the development of a dynamic market generalization of the well known Ramsey pricing rule. A simple rule for making quantitative arguments about the relative size of the optimum price in static and dynamic markets is also derived.This work was completed when the author was with Bell Laboratories, USA.     

Target market selection and marketing effort under uncertainty: The selective newsvendor

We consider a firm that markets, procures, and delivers a good with a single selling season in a number of different markets. The price for the good is market-dependent, and each market has an associated demand distribution, with parameters that depend on the amount of marketing effort applied. Given long procurement lead-times, the firm must decide which markets it will serve prior to procuring the good. We develop a profit maximizing model to address the firm’s integrated market selection, marketing effort, and procurement decisions. The model implicitly accounts for inventory pooling across markets, which reduces safety stock costs but increases model complexity. The resulting model is a nonlinear integer optimization problem, for which we develop specialized solution methods. For the case in which budget constraints exist, we provide a novel solution approach that uses a tailored branch-and-bound algorithm. Our approach solves a broad range of 3000 test instances in an average of less than 2 seconds, significantly outperforming a leading commercial global optimization solver.     

A discrete competitive facility location model with variable attractiveness

We consider the discrete version of the competitive facility location problem in which new facilities have to be located by a new market entrant firm to compete against already existing facilities that may belong to one or more competitors. The demand is assumed to be aggregated at certain points in the plane and the new facilities can be located at predetermined candidate sites. We employ Huff's gravity-based rule in modelling the behaviour of the customers where the probability that customers at a demand point patronize a certain facility is proportional to the facility attractiveness and inversely proportional to the distance between the facility site and demand point. The objective of the firm is to determine the locations of the new facilities and their attractiveness levels so as to maximize the profit, which is calculated as the revenue from the customers less the fixed cost of opening the facilities and variable cost of setting their attractiveness levels. We formulate a mixed-integer nonlinear programming model for this problem and propose three methods for its solution: a Lagrangean heuristic, a branch-and-bound method with Lagrangean relaxation, and another branch-and-bound method with nonlinear programming relaxation. Computational results obtained on a set of randomly generated instances show that the last method outperforms the others in terms of accuracy and efficiency and can provide an optimal solution in a reasonable amount of time.     

A Computational Model of Technological Innovation at the Firm Level

The factors which speed and slow technological innovation have been of interest to policy makers since at least the mid 1960's. Since that time, many theoretical models of innovation at the firm level and at the industry level have been proposed. Due to limitations in computational complexity, nearly all of these models have assumed a single, representative firm type. Very few have systematically investigated the implications of markets with a variety of firm types. With increases in computing power and the advent of agent-based modeling, interactions between agent types can now be explored. In this paper, a computational model of innovative firms in competitive markets is presented. Firms devote resources to R&D which can lead to new, improved products allowing firms to steal market share from their competitors. Two types of firms, differentiated by the strategies they use in pursuing new innovations, are allowed to coexist. One type pursues exclusively radical innovations, while the other pursues exclusively incremental innovations. It will be demonstrated that under certain conditions, a synergy exists between firms of different types which allows heterogeneous populations of firms to earn more than homogeneous ones.     

Production,remanufacturing and waste disposal models for the cases of pure and partial backordering

Production, remanufacture and waste disposal models in the literature assume that produced and recovered (repaired or remanufactured) items are of the same quality. However, a recent study considered a more realistic situation where produced and remanufactured items are incompatible. That is, they are not perceived by customers to have the same quality characteristics. This results in a lost sales situation for produced (remanufactured) items when they are requested by customers during the remanufacturing (production) period. In today’s competitive market, where firms thrive to sustain or increase the market share for their products, a stock-out situation where demand is completely lost seems to go contrary to the objectives of these firms. In reality, a firm may choose to either backorder fully or partially their unsatisfied demand. This paper extends along this line of research by modelling these stock-out situations. Several stock-out cases are considered for which mathematical models are developed and numerical examples are provided with their results discussed.     

存在空箱调运的非对称运输市场定价策略研究

考虑空箱调运成本,本文对垄断和双寡头市场分别研究运输企业在两条相向路径上的定价问题。对于垄断市场,建立了运输企业最优定价策略,并刻画出无空箱调运的潜在需求不平衡区间。对于双寡头市场,考虑同一路径上不同企业潜在运输需求不等的现实情境,求解了非对称企业的伯川德纳什均衡,给出最优定价策略。研究发现,无空箱调运并不意味着较高利润,运输企业没有必要刻意消除空箱调运现象。另外,增加单位载货运输成本和竞争强度会降低企业利润,而提升单位空箱重置成本、价格敏感度和市场不对称程度都会增大企业利润。     

A discrete long-term location–price problem under the assumption of discriminatory pricing: Formulations and parametric analysis

We consider a competitive location problem in which a new firm has to make decisions on the locations of several new facilities as well as on its price setting in order to maximise profit. Under the assumption of discriminatory prices, competing firms set a specific price for each market area. The customers buy one unit of a single homogeneous price-inelastic product from the facility that offers the lowest price in the area the consumers belong to. Three customer choice rules are considered in order to break ties in the offered prices. We prove that, considering long-term competition on price, this problem can be reduced to a problem with decisions on location only. For each one of the choice rules the location problem is formulated as an integer programming model and a parametric analysis of these models is given. To conclude, an application with real data is presented.     

A duopolistic spatial competition model with non-zero conjectural variation

Consider a two-stage non-cooperative Cournot game with location choice involving two firms. There aren spatially separated markets located at the vertices of a network. Each firm, first selects the location of a facility and then selects the quantities to supply to the markets in order to maximize its profit. Non-zero conjectural variation at the second stage is studied. Equilibrium in the quantities offered by each firm in the markets exists. Furthermore, when the demand in each market is sufficiently large, each firm chooses to locate its facility at the vertices. Partially financed by FEDER and Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, grant BFM2002-04525-C02-01, and Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, grant UNI2004/12     

Optimizing pricing and location decisions for competitive service facilities charging uniform price

In this paper, we present the problem of optimizing the location and pricing for a set of new service facilities entering a competitive marketplace. We assume that the new facilities must charge the same (uniform) price and the objective is to optimize the overall profit for the new facilities. Demand for service is assumed to be concentrated at discrete demand points (customer markets); customers in each market patronize the facility providing the highest utility. Customer demand function is assumed to be elastic; the demand is affected by the price, facility attractiveness, and the travel cost for the highest-utility facility. We provide both structural and algorithmic results, as well as some managerial insights for this problem. We show that the optimal price can be selected from a certain finite set of values that can be computed in advance; this fact is used to develop an efficient mathematical programming formulation for our model.     

Mathematical structure of a bilevel strategic pricing model

This paper is concerned with the characterization of optimal strategies for a service firm acting in an oligopolistic environment. The decision problem is formulated as a leader–follower game played on a transportation network, where the leader firm selects a revenue-maximizing price schedule that takes explicitly into account the rational behavior of the customers. In the context of our analysis, the follower’s problem is associated with a competitive network market involving non atomic customer groups. The resulting bilevel model can therefore be viewed as a model of product differentiation subject to structural network constraints.     

On a Profit Maximizing Location Model

In this paper we discuss a locational model with a profit-maximizing objective. The model can be illustrated by the following situation. There is a set of potential customers in a given region. A firm enters the market and wants to sell a certain product to this set of customers. The location and demand of each potential customer are assumed to be known. In order to maximize its total profit, the firm has to decide: (1) where to locate its distribution warehouse to serve the customers; (2) the price for its product. Due to existence of competition, each customer holds a reservation price for the product. This reservation price is a decreasing function in the distance to the warehouse. If the actual price is higher than the reservation price, then the customer will turn to some other supplier and hence is lost from the firm's market. The problem of the firm is to find the best location for its warehouse and the best price for its product at the same time in order to maximize the total profit. We show that under certain assumptions on the complexity counts, a special case of this problem can be solved in polynomial time.