Optimization techniques for Available Transfer Capability (ATC) and market calculations

The recent movement towards an open, competitive market environmentintroduced new optimization problems such as market clearingmechanism, bidding decision and Available Transfer Capability(ATC) calculation. These optimization problems are characterizedby the complexity of power systems and the uncertainties inthe electricity market. Accurate evaluation of the transfercapability of a transmission system is required to maximizethe utilization of the existing transmission systems in a competitivemarket environment. The transfer capability of the transmissionnetworks can be limited by various system constraints such asthermal, voltage and stability limits. The ability to incorporatesuch limits into the optimization problem is a challenge inthe ATC calculation from an engineering point of view. In thecompetitive market environment, a power supplier needs to findan optimal strategy that maximizes its own profits under variousuncertainties such as electricity prices and load. On the otherhand, an efficient market clearing mechanism is needed to increasethe social welfare, i.e. the sum of the consumers’ andproducers’ surplus. The need to maximize the social welfaresubject to system operational constraints is also a major challengefrom a societal point of view. This paper presents new optimizationtechniques motivated by the competitive electricity market environment.Numerical simulation results are presented to demonstrate theperformance of the proposed optimization techniques.     

Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms

We compare two alternative mechanisms for capping prices in two-settlement electricity markets. With sufficient lead time, forward market prices are implicitly capped by competitive pressure of potential entry that will occur when forward prices rise above some backstop price. Another more direct approach is to cap spot prices through a regulatory intervention. In this paper we explore the implications of these two alternative mechanisms in a two-settlement Cournot equilibrium framework. We formulate the market equilibrium as a stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) capturing congestion effects, probabilistic contingencies and horizontal market power. As an illustrative test case, we use the 53-bus Belgian electricity network with representative generator costs but hypothetical demand and ownership structure. Compared to a price-uncapped two-settlement system, a forward cap increases firms’ incentives for forward contracting, whereas a spot cap reduces such incentives. Moreover, in both cases, more forward contracts are committed as the generation resource ownership structure becomes more diversified.     

Stochastic models for bidding strategies on oligopoly electricity market

In this paper we consider the forward/futures contracts and Asian-type call options for power delivery as important components of the bidding strategies of the players’ profits on the electricity market. We show how these derivatives can affect their profit. We use linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium (SFE) and Cournot models to develop firms’ optimal bidding strategies by including forward/futures contracts and Asian-type options. We extend the methodology proposed by Niu et al. (IEEE Trans Power Syst 20(4):1859–1867, 2005), where only forward contracts for power delivery were considered in the SFE model.     

Bilevel optimization applied to strategic pricing in competitive electricity markets

In this paper, we present a bilevel programming formulation for the problem of strategic bidding under uncertainty in a wholesale energy market (WEM), where the economic remuneration of each generator depends on the ability of its own management to submit price and quantity bids. The leader of the bilevel problem consists of one among a group of competing generators and the follower is the electric system operator. The capability of the agent represented by the leader to affect the market price is considered by the model. We propose two solution approaches for this non-convex problem. The first one is a heuristic procedure whose efficiency is confirmed through comparisons with the optimal solutions for some instances of the problem. These optimal solutions are obtained by the second approach proposed, which consists of a mixed integer reformulation of the bilevel model. The heuristic proposed is also compared to standard solvers for nonlinearly constrained optimization problems. The application of the procedures is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the Brazilian power system.     

完全信息下发电机组间竞价上网的非合作博弈行为分析

本文利用博弈论方法对电力市场中 ,电力总需求缺乏弹性时各发电机组间非合作关系下竞价上网的报价行为进行了分析、研究 .并通过多目标规划方法 ,求出了纳什均衡的近似解 .该解可以指导机组制定竞价上网的报价曲线 ,避免机组盲目报价 .     

Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market

In this paper we introduce an asymmetric model of continuous electricity auctions with limited production capacity and bounded supply functions. The strategic bidding is studied with this model by means of an electricity market game. We prove that for every electricity market game with continuous cost functions a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, we focus on the behavior of producers in the Spanish electricity market. We consider a very simple form for the Spanish electricity market: an oligopoly consisting just of independent hydro-electric power production units in a single wet period. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the Spanish electricity market game always exists.     

一般均衡下基于产品市场和资本市场的单名CDS定价

次贷危机呼吁新的信用衍生品定价模型, 因此为存在产品市场和资本市场的经济结构建立一般均衡的单名CDS定价模型, 使用最优化求解一般均衡下的商品价格和CDS价格. 可以发现一般均衡的CDS定价具有资本市场和产品市场的因素, 这表示CDS的价格不再是由单纯的资本市场因素决定的, 而是由无风险利率、资本产出弹性、违约率、回收率同时决定的. 通过数量约束用模拟的方式研究多个均衡的动态变化, 发现违约风险的增加使得价格剧烈波动且市场交易萎缩. 在为以中国工商银行为参考资产的CDS定价过程中, 发现各种因素在不同的时期都可能成为定价的主要影响因素. 可以发现, 次贷危机的定价体系存在着信用调整问题和定价与实体经济脱节的问题. 可以认为, 一般均衡下基于产品市场和资本市场的单名CDS定价可以囊括多个市场的交叉影响, 为衍生品定价提供一个新的方向.     

Hybrid pricing in a coupled European power market with more wind power

In the European electricity market, the promotion of wind power leads to more network congestion. Zonal pricing (market coupling), which does not take the physical characteristics of transmission into account, is the most commonly used method to relieve network congestion in Europe. However, zonal pricing fails to provide adequate locational price signals regarding scarcity of energy and thus creates a large amount of unscheduled cross-border flows originating from wind-generated power. In this paper, we investigate the effects of applying a hybrid congestion management model, i.e., a nodal pricing model for one country embedded in a zonal pricing system for the rest of the market. We find that, compared to full nodal pricing, hybrid pricing fails to fully utilize all the resources in the network and some wrong price signals might be given. However, hybrid pricing still outperforms zonal pricing. The results from the study cases show that, within the area applying nodal pricing, better price signals are given; the need for re-dispatching is reduced; more congestion rent is collected domestically and the unit cost of power is reduced.     

Analysis of a Duopoly Supply Chain and its Application in Electricity Spot Markets

This paper studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer in a spot market, where the retailer uses the newsvendor solution as its purchase policy, and suppliers compete for the retailer’s purchase. Since each supplier’s bidding strategy affects the other’s profit, a game theory approach is used to identify optimal bidding strategies. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash solution. It is also shown that the competition between the supplier leads to a lower market clearing price, and as a result, the retailer benefits from it. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the obtained results by deriving optimal bidding strategies for power generator plants in the deregulated California energy market. Supported in part by RGC (Hong Kong) Competitive Earmarked Research Grants (CUHK4167/04E and CUHK4239/03E), a Distinguished Young Investigator Grant from the National Natural Sciences Foundation of China, and a grant from Hundred Talents Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.     

基于做市商过度自信行为的市场均衡分析

针对做市商的过度自信行为对金融市场的影响,通过建立的数学模型对市场均衡时的价格波动、市场交易量、价格质量、市场深度以及市场参与者的利润做了相应的分析。结果表明:做市商的过度自信行为对市场的影响不同于以往研究中过度自信的信息交易者。在市场均衡时,做市商的过度自信行为使得市场交易量增大、市场深度增大、价格质量改善,同时价格波动降低,即做市商的过度自信行为提高了市场的流动性、稳定性与有效性。另外,市场中的信息交易者与噪音交易者都能从做市商的过度自信行为中获利,但同时过度自信行为会损害做市商的利益,影响其在市场中的地位。较小程度的过度自信不会使做市商退出市场,其对市场的影响得以维持;但当这种过度自信达到一定程度后,做市商就会退出市场。     

Bidding under price uncertainty in multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auctions for power systems reserve

In this paper a methodology for profit maximized bidding under price uncertainty in a day-ahead, multi-unit and pay-as-bid procurement auction for power systems reserve is proposed. Within this novel methodology a bidder is considered to follow a Bayes-strategy. Thereby, one bidder is assumed to behave strategically and the behavior of the remaining is summarized in a probability distribution of the market price and a reaction function to price dumping by the strategic bidder. With this approach two problems arise: First, as a pay-as-bid auction is considered, no uniform price and therefore no single probability distribution of the market price is readily available. Second, if historic bidding data of all participants are used to estimate such a distribution and market power is a relevant factor, the bid of the strategically behaving bidder is likely to influence the distribution. Within this paper for both of the problems solutions are presented. It is shown that by estimating a probability of acceptance the optimal bidding price with respect to a given capacity can be calculated by maximizing a stochastic non-linear objective function of expected profit. Taking the characteristics of recently established markets in Germany into account, the methodology is applied using exemplary data. It is shown that the methodology helps to manage existing price uncertainties and hence supports the trading decisions of a bidder. It is inferred that the developed methodology may also be used for bidding on other auction markets with a similar market design.     

On price competition in location-price models with spatially separated markets

In this paper we study price competition for two types of location-price models in which facility locations are set up and price decisions have to be made in order to maximise profit. We discuss the existence and determination of equilibrium prices in a general location space when facilities have different production costs. It is assumed that each price is bounded from below and demand for a single homogeneous product is price-inelastic. When facilities set mill prices, a price equilibrium rarely exists and necessary conditions for existence are obtained. In particular, when the location space is a tree network, we give a characterisation of the locations for which a unique equilibrium exists for two competitors. With spatial price discrimination, though equilibrium prices might not exist, it is shown that ε-equilibrium prices always exist for any locations of the facilities. A characterisation of ε-equilibrium is also given. Then the location-price problem is reduced to a location problem. A comparison of results with the two types of price determination is also presented. This work has been supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Spain under the research project BEC2002-01026, in part financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).     

房地产市场供求均衡与房地产价格研究——以北京商品房市场为例

中国房价上涨幅度较大,研究房地产供求市场及其价格,能把握房地产市场规律,促进房地产市场的平稳健康发展.研究从供求均衡理论角度分析了房地产市场的供求规律及其价格,通过建立商品房市场的供需动态均衡模型,以1990~2010年北京市商品房市场为例,对房地产市场的供求弹性、与长期均衡之间的关系及其对房地产价格的影响进行了实证研究与分析.研究表明房地产供给市场长期略具弹性,而需求市场长期弹性较大,价格对商品房市场的调节作用并不明显,实现房地产市场的供求均衡,需要政府力量的介入并对市场进行宏观调控.     

On the uniqueness of Bertrand equilibrium

We introduce product differentiation in the model of price competition with strictly convex costs in which firms have to supply all of the forthcoming demand. We find that although a continuum of equilibria exists in a homogeneous product market, the competitive price equilibrium is the only robust one. Specifically, as long as the equilibrium correspondence is nonempty, the equilibrium price converges to the competitive price when the degree of product differentiation shrinks to zero.     

Privacy impact on generalized Nash equilibrium in peer-to-peer electricity market

We consider a peer-to-peer electricity market, where agents hold private information that they might not want to share. The problem is modeled as a noncooperative communication game, which takes the form of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, where the agents determine their randomized reports to share with the other market players, while anticipating the form of the peer-to-peer market equilibrium. In the noncooperative game, each agent decides on the deterministic and random parts of the report, such that (a) the distance between the deterministic part of the report and the truthful private information is bounded and (b) the expectation of the privacy loss random variable is bounded. This allows each agent to change her privacy level. We characterize the equilibrium of the game, prove the uniqueness of the Variational Equilibria and provide a closed form expression of the privacy price. Numerical illustrations are presented on the 14-bus IEEE network.     

允许卖空的资本市场中存在非负均衡价格向量的充要条件

For the capital market satisfying standard assumptions that are widely adopted in the equilibrium analysis,a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a nonnegative equilibrium price vector that clears the mean-variance capital market with short sale allowed is derived. Moreover, the given explicit formula for the equilibrium price shows clearly the relationship between prices of assets and statistical properties of the rate of return on assets, the desired rates of return of individual investors as well as other economic quantities.The economic implication of the derived condition is briefly discussed. These results improve the available results about the equilibrium analysis of the mean-variance market.     

电网输电分配与阻塞管理的数学模型

研究发电机组供电与电网各线路的有功潮流之间的输电分配和阻塞管理的优化问题.用多元线性回归理论拟合各线路上的有功潮流关于各发电机组出力的近似表达式,建立关于电力市场输电阻塞管理的二次规划数学模型.分别以预报电荷982.4MW和1052.8MW为例进行实证分析.     

Leader-Follower Equilibria for Electric Power and NO x Allowances Markets

This paper investigates the ability of the largest producer in an electricity market to manipulate both the electricity and emission allowances markets to its advantage. A Stackelberg game to analyze this situation is constructed in which the largest firm plays the role of the leader, while the medium-sized firms are treated as Cournot followers with price-taking fringes that behave competitively in both markets. Since there is no explicit representation of the best-reply function for each follower, this Stackelberg game is formulated as a large-scale mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. The best-reply functions are implicitly represented by a set of nonlinear complementarity conditions. Analysis of the computed solution for the Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland electricity market shows that the leader can gain substantial profits by withholding allowances and driving up NO _x allowance costs for rival producers. The allowances price is higher than the corresponding price in the Nash–Cournot case, although the electricity prices are essentially the same.We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their insightful comments that helped us improve the paper. This work is partially supported by NSF grants CS 0080577 and 0224817, by USEPA STAR grant R82873101-0, and by the Mathematical, Information, and Computational Sciences Division subprogram of the Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research, Office of Science, U.S. Department of Energy, under Contract W-31-109-Eng-38. Any opinions or errors are the responsibility of the authors and not the sponsoring agencies.     

Equilibria of a two-stage market with chance outcome in the spot market

We address the problem of how to improve the efficiency of markets of similar goods (electric power, gas, and other resources). One way to undermine the market dominance of some companies is the possibility of forward contracts. Here a model of the spot and forward markets functioning as Curnout auctions is studied using the example of symmetrical oligopoly. Suppliers try to maximize their profit by this two-stage game’s strategies of traded subgame equilibrium (TSE). The conditions for equilibrium achieved by correlated mixed strategies are elucidated: either a “bull” or “bear” market is established according to a chance factor. The optimum strategies of rational bidders are found to depend on the reserve price and a risk-avoiding parameter. TSE is compared to the Nash equilibria for one-stage models.     

Bayesian estimation of nonlinear equilibrium models with random coefficients

In this paper, we develop a conditional likelihood based approach for estimating the equilibrium price and shares in markets with differentiated products and oligopoly supply. We model market demand using a discrete choice model with random coefficients and random utility. For most applications, the likelihood function of equilibrium prices and shares is intractable and cannot be directly analyzed. To overcome this, we develop a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation strategy to estimate parameters and distributions. To illustrate our methodology, we generate a dataset of prices and quantities simulated from a differentiated goods oligopoly across a number of markets. We apply our methodology to this dataset to demonstrate its attractive features as well as its accuracy and validity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.