Impact of product pricing and timing of investment decisions on supply chain co-opetition

In supply chain co-opetition, firms simultaneously compete and co-operate in order to maximize their profits. We consider the nature of co-opetition between two firms: The product supplier invests in the technology to improve quality, and the purchasing firm (buyer) invests in selling effort to develop the market for the product before uncertainty in demand is resolved. We consider three different decision making structures and discuss the optimal configuration from each firm’s perspective. In case 1, the supplier invests in product quality and sets the wholesale price for the product. The buyer then exerts selling effort to develop the market and following demand potential realization, sets the resale price. In case 2, the supplier invests in product quality followed by the buyer’s investment in selling effort. Then, after demand potential is observed, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. Finally, in case 3, both firms simultaneously invest in product quality and selling effort, respectively. Subsequently, observing the demand potential, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. We compare all configuration options from both the perspective of the supplier and the buyer, and show that the level of investment by the firms depends on the nature of competition between them and the level of uncertainty in demand. Our analysis reveals that although configuration 1 results in the highest profits for the integrated channel, there is no clear dominating preference on system configuration from the perspective of both parties. The incentives of the co-opetition partners and the investment levels are mainly governed by the cost structure and the level of uncertainty in demand. We examine and discuss the relation between system parameters and the incentives in desiging the supply contract structure.     

三级供应链企业间交叉持股时均衡定价及市场绩效研究

本文构建三级供应链企业间纵向交叉持股时的Stackelberg定价博弈模型,采用逆推归纳法推演出供应链各厂商交叉持股时的均衡定价及其利润公式,分析了交叉持股对三级供应链均衡市场价格、厂商利润、消费者剩余和经济福利的影响。研究结果表明,较之无交叉持股,仅下游厂商对上游厂商单向持股,对供应链的绩效没有影响;而适当增大上游厂商对下游厂商持股,限制下游厂商对上游厂商持股,能有效降低市场价格,提高供应链及各厂商的利润,增加消费者剩余,改善经济福利,实现供应链各厂商与消费者的共赢。     

Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities

Does a competitive equilibrium in a matching market provide adequate incentives for investments made before the market when utility is not perfectly transferable? In a one-sided market with a continuum of agents and finite types there is a constrained surplus efficient equilibrium, when a social planner can only affect investments but not payoffs nor matches, if an equal treatment property holds in equilibrium. Sufficient (but not full) utility transferability in a well defined sense implies this property. Ex post efficiency of payoffs (i.e., individual payoffs maximize the surplus in each match) alone is not sufficient to ensure that equilibrium investments maximize aggregate surplus.     

Optimal co-investment in supply chain infrastructure

This paper considers co-investment in a supply chain infrastructure using an inter-temporal model. We assume that firms’ capital is essentially the supply chain’s infrastructure. As a result, firms’ policies consist in selecting an optimal level of employment as well as the level of co-investment in the supply chain infrastructure. Several applications and examples are presented and open-loop, as well as feedback solutions are found for non-cooperating firms, long- and short-run investment cooperation and non-simultaneous moves (Stackelberg) firms. In particular, we show that a solution based on Nash and Stackelberg differential games provides the same level of capital investment. Thus, selecting the leader and the follower in a co-investment program does not matter. We show that in general, co-investments by firms vary both over time and across firms, and thereby render difficult the implementation of co-investment programs for future capital development. To overcome this problem, we derive conditions for firms’ investment share to remain unchanged over time and thus be easily planned.     

利他偏好对双渠道供应链成员企业的策略影响研究

电子商务环境下,创新投入成为企业提升竞争优势的核心手段,而企业的偏好行为对其创新投入决策产生影响。本文探讨基于利他行为的供应链管理,通过在两类典型双渠道供应链研究中引入参与者的利他偏好,得到了供应商和零售商的均衡策略,并分析了利他偏好对均衡策略的影响。研究表明,当产品单位可变成本较低时,供应商和零售商的利他偏好有利于他方而不利于己方;当产品单位可变成本较高时,供应商和零售商的利他偏好只对己方有利而对他方不利。本研究在一定程度上揭示了供应链管理中利他行为存在的必要性和适度性,对促进供应链成员之间的合作具有积极意义。     

Strategic capability investments and competition for supply contracts

Suppliers often make proactive investments to strategically position themselves to win contracts with a large buyer. Such investments reduce the suppliers’ variable costs of serving the buyer’s demand. We show that an auction mechanism does not always benefit the buyer, the supply chain, or the society. We identify scenarios where the buyer can implement the supply chain and socially optimal solution by committing to a bilateral relationship with fair reimbursement, and forgoing the benefits of competition altogether. We explore the role of commitment by the buyer (to a procurement mechanism) and by the suppliers (to an investment level) by analyzing different timing games under symmetric and asymmetric information about suppliers’ types. We show that it never benefits anyone for the suppliers to commit first. Equilibrium investments and cost structures depend upon the buyer’s bargaining power (opportunity cost). However, the winning supplier’s investments are almost always below the supply chain optimal level.     

Managing raw material in supply chains

In this paper, we explore how firms can manage their raw material sourcing better by developing appropriate sourcing relationships with their raw material suppliers. We detail three empirical case studies of firms explaining their different raw material sourcing strategies: (a) firms can adopt a hands-off approach to raw material management, (b) firms can supply raw material directly to their suppliers, and this may be beneficial for some agents in the supply chain, and (c) firms can bring their component suppliers together, and the resulting cooperation between suppliers can be beneficial for supply chain. We then analytically model the three raw material scenarios encountered in our empirical work, examine the resulting profits along the supply chain, and extend the results to a competitive buyer scenario. Overall, our results show that active management of raw material sourcing can add value to supply chains.     

Non-cooperative investment in partnerships and their termination

This paper investigates how partners (firms or husband and wife) should invest into an uncertain stock that provides a common good, when to stop investments and when to end their partnership. The assumption of lumpy investments leads to a real option problem which is solved for the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. Yet despite the analytical solution, numerical means are necessary to investigate economic consequences: strong incentives to free ride under competition even turning one of the options—to stop investment at high stock levels—into one of a negative value; in contrast, divorce remains a positively valued option.     

Renewable energy investments under different support schemes: A real options approach

This paper adopts a real options approach to analyze investment timing and capacity choice for renewable energy projects under different support schemes. The main purpose is to examine investment behavior under the most extensively employed support schemes, namely, feed-in tariffs and renewable energy certificate trading. We consider both multiple sources of uncertainty under each support scheme and uncertainty with respect to any change of support scheme, and we obtain both analytical (when possible) and numerical solutions. In a Nordic case study based on wind power, we find that the feed-in tariff encourages earlier investment. Nevertheless, as investment has been undertaken, renewable energy certificate trading creates incentives for larger projects. In our baseline scenario and taking the fixed feed-in tariff as a base, the revenue required to trigger investments is 61% higher with renewable certificates. At the same time, investment capacity is 61% higher.     

A game-theoretic analysis of information sharing and security investment for complementary firms

This paper investigates information sharing and security investments by two firms provided that their information assets are complementary in the sense that their combined information assets are of significant value, whereas the information asset of a single firm is no value to an attacker. In particular, assuming that each firm chooses its security investment and information sharing individually, we obtain some insights about the optimal choices for the firms and the attacker, which form sharp comparisons with those derived from common (substitutive) firms. We further analyse the effect of a social planner on social total costs by assuming that it can control security investments, information sharing and both of them respectively. We demonstrate that an increase in intervention by the social planner may not necessarily be preferable.     

基于投资投入的销售商对供应商激励研究

降低成本的投资是为了改善单位成本的效率. 它保证了单位成本在以后的每个生产过程中均处于较低的水平. 然而,投资的套牢和补偿问题的存在往往会降低供应链投资的积极性. 为解决这个问题,采用Stackelberg博弈的分析思路,分别研究投资能够被观察时和投资不能够被观察时的激励契约,得到如下结论：若销售商进行生产投资,则投资是不足的;若供应商进行生产投资,供应商对生产投资的水平甚至有可能高于链最优的投资水平.     

Modeling international investment decisions for financial holding companies

This research analyzes the internationalization process model developed by Johanson and Vahlne and derives two integer programming investment decision models that consider the risk attitudes of investment firms. Johanson and Vahlne’s model provides a starting point for building a model that suits the investment approach and decision making process of financial holding companies. In practice, when firms make an international investment decision, there is a need for a model that can generate outputs based on financial measures such as profit, investment returns, and tolerable levels of risk. Thus, in this paper, Johanson and Vahlne’s concepts are studied and financial managers are interviewed to derive models that match the investment decision procedures of the firms. The model helps firms manage the risks of their investments and derive accurate investment strategies based on investment objectives and constraints.     

Timing and eco(nomic) efficiency of climate-friendly investments in supply chains

Emission trading schemes such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS) attempt to reconcile economic efficiency with ecological efficiency by creating financial incentives for companies to invest in climate-friendly innovations. Using real options methodology, we demonstrate that under uncertainty, economic and ecological efficiency continue to be mutually exclusive. This problem is even worse if a climate-friendly project depends on investing in of a whole supply chain. We model a sequential bargaining game in a supply chain where the parties negotiate over implementation of a carbon dioxide (CO₂) saving investment project. We show that the outcome of their bargaining is not economically efficient and even less ecologically efficient. Furthermore, we show that a supply chain becomes less economically efficient and less ecologically efficient with every additional chain link. Finally, we make recommendations for how managers or politicians can improve the situation and thereby increase economic as well as ecological efficiency and thus also the eco-efficiency of supply chains.     

保险人投资策略与破产的关系

本文主要考虑带投资收益的风险模型,在该模型下保险人可以根据盈余投资,投资的数量为时间t的函数,我们得到保险人投资策略与破产概率与t时刻所满足的积分-微分方程.     

风险投资对中小企业经营绩效的影响——基于区分风险投资机构事前效应与事后效应的视角

基于风险投资与企业绩效的内生性关系视角,即是风险投资事前选择了业绩更优的项目,还是其事后监督辅助提升了参与企业的绩效,本文对深圳创业板与中小板上市企业进行PSM配对,并对配对样本在2001至2014年的面板数据进行回归分析,研究发现与同质非风投支持企业相比,风投支持的企业总体上表现出了显著的绩效优势,但这种绩效优势仅仅源自于企业的自身发展能力。风险投资机构在投资前对优质项目具备积极的筛选能力;但在控制了风险投资的筛选效应后,风险投资机构的事后介入对受资企业的绩效甚至起到一定程度的抑制作用。在Heckman两阶段模型结合内生转置回归模型检验中同样证明了风险投资机构具有积极的事前筛选效应;但其事后介入对受资企业的经营绩效产生负向处理效应。此外,风险投资的特征因素对其事后处理效应具有显著的调节作用:相比成熟的风投机构,年轻风投对企业的经营绩效表现出更大的负面事后处理效应;而相比在企业初创阶段介入的风投机构,在企业后期发展阶段介入的风投对参与企业经营绩效表现出更大的负面事后处理效应;相比新兴产业,在传统产业中风投对企业经营绩效表现出更大的负面事后处理效应。     

Sustainability investment under cap-and-trade regulation

Carbon emission abatement is a hot topic in environmental sustainability and cap-and-trade regulation is regarded as an effective way to reduce the carbon emission. According to the real industrial practices, sustainable product implies that its production processes facilitate to reduce the carbon emission and has a positive response in market demand. In this paper, we study the sustainability investment on sustainable product with emission regulation consideration for decentralized and centralized supply chains. We first examine the order quantity of the retailer and sustainability investment of the manufacturer for the decentralized supply chain with one retailer and one manufacturer. After that, we extend our study to the centralized case where we determine the production quantity and sustainability investment for the whole supply chain. We derive the optimal order quantity (or production quantity) and sustainability investment, and find that the sustainability investment efficiency has a significant impact on the optimal solutions. Further, we conduct numerical studies and find surprisingly that the order quantity may be increasing in the wholesale price due to the effects of the sustainability and emission consideration. Moreover, we investigate the achievability of supply chain coordination by various contracts, and find that only revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain whereas the buyback contract and two-part tariff contract cannot. Important insights and managerial implications are discussed.     

Evaluation of cycle-count policies for supply chains with inventory inaccuracy and implications on RFID investments

Inventory record inaccuracy leads to ineffective replenishment decisions and deteriorates supply chain performance. Conducting cycle counts (i.e., periodic inventory auditing) is a common approach to correcting inventory records. It is not clear, however, how inaccuracy at different locations affects supply chain performance and how an effective cycle-count program for a multi-stage supply chain should be designed. This paper aims to answer these questions by considering a serial supply chain that has inventory record inaccuracy and operates under local base-stock policies. A random error, representing a stock loss, such as shrinkage or spoilage, reduces the physical inventory at each location in each period. The errors are cumulative and are not observed until a location performs a cycle count. We provide a simple recursion to evaluate the system cost and propose a heuristic to obtain effective base-stock levels. For a two-stage system with identical error distributions and counting costs, we prove that it is more effective to conduct more frequent cycle counts at the downstream stage. In a numerical study for more general systems, we find that location (proximity to the customer), error rates, and counting costs are primary factors that determine which stages should get a higher priority when allocating cycle counts. However, it is in general not effective to allocate all cycle counts to the priority stages only. One should balance cycle counts between priority stages and non-priority stages by considering secondary factors such as lead times, holding costs, and the supply chain length. In particular, more cycle counts should be allocated to a stage when the ratio of its lead time to the total system lead time is small and the ratio of its holding cost to the total system holding cost is large. In addition, more cycle counts should be allocated to downstream stages when the number of stages in the supply chain is large. The analysis and insights generated from our study can be used to design guidelines or scorecard systems that help managers design better cycle-count policies. Finally, we discuss implications of our study on RFID investments in a supply chain.     

Analysis of supply chains with quantity based fixed incentives

This paper examines the use of quantity based fixed incentives to coordinate inventory decisions in a decentralized supply chain. We consider a two stage supply chain of autonomous supplier and distributor and prove that the optimal ordering policy for the newsvendor distributor under fixed incentives is an (s,S)$(s\text{,}S)$ type policy. We further show that external and internal quantity based incentives can restore channel coordination in single period and channel members can benefit through arbitrary splitting of the resulting additional chain profit. The single period results are extended to multiple periods and the impact of fixed incentives on the distributor’s optimal stocking policy and channel efficiency are examined under three different multi-period supplier strategies. Numerical examples are used to compare the multi-period strategies and to provide additional managerial insights. The results show that contrary to common belief, incentive plans developed and maintained based only on current inventory data perform poorly in long term and that such incentive plans must be periodically updated to enhance their efficiency. Furthermore, we show that high level of incentives designed to push too much inventory downstream of the supply chain can actually reduce the chain’s efficiency.     

Modeling and analysis of the multiperiod effects of social relationship on supply chain networks

In this paper, we analyze the effects of levels of social relationship on a multiperiod supply chain network with multiple decision-makers (suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers) associated at different tiers. The model incorporates the individual attitudes towards disruption and opportunism risks and allows us to investigate the interplay of the heterogeneous decision-makers and to compute the resultant network equilibrium pattern of production, transactions, prices, and levels of social relationship over the multiperiod planning horizon. In our analysis, we focus on the following questions: (1) how do the evolving relationships affect the profitability and risks of supply chain firms as well as the prices and demands of the product in the market? (2) how do the relationships with the upstream supply chain firms affect the relationships with the downstream firms, and how these relationships influence the profitability and risks of the supply chain firms? (3) how do the supply disruption risks interact with the opportunism risks through supply chain relationships, and how these risks influence the profitability of the firms? The results show that high levels of relationship can lead to lower supply chain overall cost, lower risk, lower prices, higher product transaction and therefore higher profit.     

随机需求下有产能约束的技术创新策略研究

在随机需求和技术变革的环境下,基于有产能约束的单供应商-单零售商的供应链结构,研究供应商分销价格决策和技术创新策略以及零售商订货决策。建立了三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,通过逆推方法求得了供应商最优分销价格和技术创新策略以及零售商最优订货量,深入探讨了供应商产能、新技术出现概率以及市场需求期望与波动分别对供应商、零售商和供应链整体利润的影响。结果表明当供应商产能不足时进行技术创新会提高供应商和供应链的利润,但零售商因间接承担供应商技术创新的投资成本而利润下降;当供应商产能过剩时进行技术创新则会降低供应商及供应链的利润,而零售商的利润增加。新技术出现概率增加会提高供应链各成员的利润;提高市场需求期望并减小市场波动对供应商及供应链有利,但可能会降低零售商的利润。