基于投资投入的销售商对供应商激励研究

降低成本的投资是为了改善单位成本的效率. 它保证了单位成本在以后的每个生产过程中均处于较低的水平. 然而，投资的套牢和补偿问题的存在往往会降低供应链投资的积极性. 为解决这个问题，采用Stackelberg博弈的分析思路，分别研究投资能够被观察时和投资不能够被观察时的激励契约，得到如下结论：若销售商进行生产投资，则投资是不足的；若供应商进行生产投资，供应商对生产投资的水平甚至有可能高于链最优的投资水平.

Incentive policy of retailer to supplier based on investment input

The investment for cost saving is to improve the efficiency of unit cost. It guarantees that unit cost in each subsequent production process is in the lower level. However, the problems of hold-up and compensation tend to reduce supply chain investment enthusiasm. In order to solve this problem, this paper adopts the Stackelberg game analysis, and researches the incentive contract, respectively, when investments can be observed or not be observed. It can be concluded that the investment is not enough if the retailer invests, and that suppliers to the production investment levels even higher chain optimal investment level if the supplier invests.