销售努力及双市场化期权下的三级供应链协调

本文针对需求随机且受到零售商销售努力影响的情况,研究了由制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链的协调问题。文章首先用双期权契约对三级供应链进行协调,即在制造商和分销商以及分销商和零售商之间都采用期权契约,发现在零售商独自承担努力成本的情况下仅通过双期权契约无法协调供应链。因此在双期权契约的基础上加入了努力成本共担契约,发现当期权价格满足某种线性关系以及零售商努力成本按特定比例分摊时,联合双期权契约和努力成本共担契约能顺利协调供应链。在此基础上,文章还引入了期权的市场化定价规则,研究了期权采用市场化定价规则对供应链协调产生的影响,研究表明,引入期权市场化定价规则增加了供应链协调需要满足的条件,降低了协调的可能性,且协调状态下的期权价格受到市场因素如利率、价格波动率等的影响。最后,文章给出了期权市场化定价规则下供应链协调的条件以及参数变化对协调的影响。     

Analysis of supply chain coordination under fuzzy demand in a two-stage supply chain

This paper considers a two-stage supply chain coordination problem and focuses on the fuzziness aspect of demand uncertainty. We use fuzzy numbers to depict customer demand, and investigate the optimization of the vertically integrated two-stage supply chain under perfect coordination and contrast with the non-coordination case. As in the traditional probabilistic analysis, we prove that the maximum expected supply chain profit in a coordination situation is greater than the total profit in a non-coordination situation.     

Interpreting supply chain dynamics: A quasi-chaos perspective

Chaotic phenomena, chaos amplification and other interesting nonlinear behaviors have been observed in supply chain systems. Chaos can be defined theoretically if the dynamics under study are produced only by deterministic factors. However, deterministic settings rarely present themselves in reality. In fact, real data are typically unknown. How can the chaos theory and its related methodology be applied in the real world? When the demand is stochastic, the interpretation and distribution of the Lyapunov exponents derived from the effective inventory at different supply chain levels are not similar to those under deterministic demand settings. Are the observed dynamics of the effective inventory random, chaotic, or simply quasi-chaos? In this study, we investigate a situation whereby the chaos analysis is applied to a time series as if its underlying structure, deterministic or stochastic, is unknown. The result shows clear distinction in chaos characterization between the two categories of demand process, deterministic vs. stochastic. It also highlights the complexity of the interplay between stochastic demand processes and nonlinear dynamics. Therefore, caution should be exercised in interpreting system dynamics when applying chaos analysis to a system of unknown underlying structure. By understanding this delicate interplay, decision makers have the better chance to tackle the problem correctly or more effectively at the demand end or the supply end.     

Coordinating a supply chain with effort and price dependent stochastic demand

This paper investigates the issue of channel coordination for a supply chain facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to both sales effort and retail price. In the standard newsvendor setting, the returns policy and the revenue sharing contract have been shown to be able to align incentives of the supply chain’s members so that the decentralized supply chain behaves as well as the integrated one. When the demand is influenced by both retail price and retailer sales effort, none of the above traditional contracts can coordinate the supply chain. To resolve this issue, we explore a variety of other contract types including joint return policy with revenue sharing contract, return policy with sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract, and revenue sharing contract with SRP. We find that only the properly designed returns policy with SRP contract is able to achieve channel coordination and lead to a Pareto improving win–win situation for supply chain members. We then provide analytical method to determine the contract parameters and finally we use a numerical example to illustrate the findings and gain more insights.     

Impact of demand uncertainty on coordinating supply chain inventories through common replenishment epochs

Prior studies have shown that inventories in a one vendor, multi-buyer supply chain with deterministic demands can be coordinated effectively through the use of common replenishment epochs (CRE). In this paper, we study the impact of demand uncertainty on the effectiveness of coordinating such a supply chain. We develop a model to analyse the coordination mechanism using CRE in a one-vendor, multi-buyer supply chain, when the demand faced by the buyers is stochastic. Our numerical study based on the model found that coordination through CRE may not always be beneficial when the demand variance is high. We also investigate a strategy of advance order processing by the vendor to improve the effectiveness of coordination through CRE.     

预付款融资下基于改进收益共享与回购联合契约的双渠道供应链协调研究

随机需求下,考虑了制造商存在资金约束的双渠道供应链在采用预付款融资时,如何实现供应链协调的问题。在制造商为主方的Stackelberg博弈下,研究了制造商和零售商分散决策时的最优库存决策问题,并通过设计改进收益共享与回购联合契约使得供应链达到协调。在此基础上,讨论了供应链的帕累托改进区间。最后,通过算例验证了联合契约对双渠道供应链协调及帕累托改进的有效性,并分析了契约参数和融资参数对供应链的影响。     

Contracting with demand uncertainty under supply chain competition

We examine supply chain contracts for two competing supply chains selling a substitutable product, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders and the retailers are followers. Manufacturers in two competing supply chains may choose different contracts, either a wholesale price contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is not shared, or a revenue-sharing contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is shared. Under supply chain competition and demand uncertainty, we identify which contract is more advantageous for each supply chain, and under what circumstances.     

Understanding supply chain dynamics: A chaos perspective

Variability in orders or inventories in supply chain systems is generally thought to be caused by exogenous random factors such as uncertainties in customer demand or lead time. Studies have shown, however, that orders or inventories may exhibit significant variability even if customer demand and lead time are deterministic. In this paper, we investigate how this class of variability, chaos, may occur in a multi-level supply chain and offer insights into how to manage relevant supply chain factors to eliminate or reduce system chaos. The supply chain is characterized by the classical beer distribution model with some modifications. We observe the supply chain dynamics under the influence of various factors: demand pattern, ordering policy, demand-information sharing, and lead time. Through proper decision-region formation, the effect of various factors on system chaos is investigated using a factorial design. The degree of system chaos is quantified using the Lyapunov exponent across all levels of the supply chain. This study shows that, to reduce the degree of chaos in the supply chain system, the adjustment parameters for both inventory and supply line discrepancies should be more comparable in magnitude. Counter-intuitively, in certain decision regions, sharing demand information can do more harm than good. Similar to the bullwhip effect observed previously in demand, we discover the phenomenon of “chaos-amplification” in inventory across supply chain levels.     

Coordination in a two-stage capacitated supply chain with multiple suppliers

The aim of this paper is to coordinate the inventory policies in a decentralized supply chain with stochastic demand by means of contracts. The system considered is a decentralized two-stage supply chain consisting of multiple independent suppliers and a manufacturer with limited production capacities. The suppliers operate on a make-to-stock basis and apply base stock policy to manage their inventories. On the other hand, the manufacturer employs a make-to-order strategy. Under the necessary assumptions, each supplier is modeled as an M/M/1 make-to-stock queue; and the manufacturer is modeled as a GI/M/1 queue after deriving an approximate distribution for the interarrival times of the manufacturer. Once the supply chain is modeled as a queuing system, centralized and decentralized models are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to these models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Three different transfer payment contracts are examined in this paper. These are the backorder and holding cost subsidy contracts, the transfer payment contract based on Pareto improvement, and the cost sharing contract. Each contract is evaluated according to its coordination ability and whether it is Pareto improving or not. The results indicate that all three contracts can coordinate the supply chain. However, when the Pareto improvement is taken into account, the cost sharing contract seems to be the one that will be preferred by all parties.     

Capacity allocation,ordering, and pricing decisions in a supply chain with demand and supply uncertainties

This paper studies coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), one manufacturer, and one distributor, and possesses uncertainties at both demand and supply sides. These uncertainties emerge, respectively, from random demand the distributor faces and randomness of capacity with which the OEM processes the manufacturer’s outsourced quantity. Sharing supply and demand uncertainty information along the supply chain enables us to develop three models with different coordination efforts—the OEM and manufacturer coordination, the manufacturer and distributor coordination, and the OEM, manufacturer, and distributor coordination—and quantify the coordinated decisions in these three models. Our analysis of these coordination models suggests that coordinating with the OEM improves the manufacturer’s probability of meeting downstream demand and his expected profit, yet coordinating with the manufacturer is not necessarily beneficial to the OEM when downstream coordination is lacking.     

Contract design and supply chain coordination in the electricity industry

In this article we propose a model of the supply chain in electricity markets with multiple generators and retailers and considering several market structures. We analyze how market design interacts with the different types of contract and market structure to affect the coordination between the different firms and the performance of the supply chain as a whole. We compare the implications on supply chain coordination and on the players’ profitability of two different market structures: a pool based market vs. bilateral contracts, taking into consideration the relationship between futures and spot markets. Furthermore, we analyze the use of contracts for differences and two-part-tariffs as tools for supply chain coordination. We have concluded that there are multiple equilibria in the supply chain contracts and structure and that the two-part tariff is the best contract to reduce double marginalization and increase efficiency in the management of the supply chain.     

Coordinating a three-stage supply chain with competing manufacturers

It is common for multiple manufacturers to compete in one common market. This paper considers a three-stage supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers, one distributor, and one retailer. The two manufacturers’ products are substitutable with each other, and both manufacturers sell their products through the common distributor and the common retailer. In this supply chain, three contract mechanisms are discussed. The first one is wholesale-price (WP) contracts. The second one is pairwise revenue-sharing (PRS) contracts indicating that the revenues are shared by all pairs of adjacent entities. The third one is spanning revenue-sharing (SRS) contract indicating that the retailer simultaneously shares his revenues with all supply chain members. First, we discuss the effects of competition between manufacturers on both decentralized and centralized supply chains under the WP contracts. Second, we discuss the coordination mechanisms. The PRS and SRS contracts are used to coordinate the entire supply chain. We present the drawbacks of the PRS contracts in coordinating this competing supply chain and suggest using the SRS contract instead. After an SRS contract is adopted, it is evaluated using the WP contracts as a benchmark. The conditions necessary for an SRS contract to achieve a win–win outcome are then presented. Finally, some numerical examples are provided.     

First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts

We investigate a newsvendor-type retailer sourcing problem under demand uncertainty who has the option to source from multiple suppliers. The suppliers’ manufacturing costs are private information. A widely used mechanism to find the least costly supplier under asymmetric information is to use a sealed-bid reverse auction. We compare the combinations of different simple auction formats (first- and second-price) and risk sharing supply contracts (push and pull) under full contract compliance, both for risk-neutral and risk-averse retailer and suppliers. We show the superiority of a first-price push auction for a risk-neutral retailer. However, only the pull contracts lead to supply chain coordination. If the retailer is sufficiently risk-averse, the pull is preferred over the push contract. If suppliers are risk-averse, the first-price push auction remains the choice for the retailer. Numerical examples illustrate the allocation of benefits between the retailer and the (winning) supplier for different number of bidders, demand uncertainty, cost uncertainty, and degree of risk-aversion.     

Coordinating contracts for supply chains that market with mail-in rebates and retailer promotions

Marketing promotions are pervasive in industry, yet too often they are introduced without regard to their potential impact on the whole supply chain. This paper considers a cooperative business environment where a manufacturer and a retailer work interactively in determining their independent sales promotional actions. We use a newsvendor-modelling framework to study coordinating issues when the manufacturer provides mail-in rebates directly to consumers while the retailer exerts promotional effort to further spur consumer demand. We find that quantity discount contracts in conjunction with buy-back achieve supply chain coordination. Successful coordination can result in significant supply chain improvement, which leads the retailer to order more units and exert higher promotional effort level. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the conditions for the manufacturer to offer rebates.     

基于时间可控和随机损失的生鲜农产品供应链协调

生鲜农产品不仅是易腐的,其寿命还具有随机性,在订货和由产地运往远方销地的过程中,面临随机供给与需求的匹配、变质损失与物流成本的平衡这两重难题。基于现代物流条件下物流时间的可控性,分别建立了分散控制和集中控制供应链的决策模型,分析得到了它们的最优订货量和最优物流时间。在此基础上,设计了一组联合契约,推导出了实现生鲜农产品供应链协调时契约参数取值范围的计算公式。研究结果表明:通过选择合理的契约参数φ,联合契约能够完美协调生鲜农产品供应链、实现供需双方帕累托最优。进一步,对变质率参数和需求价格弹性系数进行了敏感性分析,为生鲜农产品供应链实践提供了一些管理启示。     

Vendor managed inventory contracts – coordinating the supply chain while looking from the vendor’s perspective

The paper studies coordination of a supply chain when the inventory is managed by the vendor (VMI). We also provide a general mathematical framework that can be used to analyze contracts under both retailer managed inventory (RMI) and VMI. Using a simple newsvendor scenario with a single vendor and single retailer, we study five popular coordinating supply chain contracts: buyback, quantity flexibility, quantity discount, sales rebate, and revenue sharing contracts. We analyze the ability of these contracts to coordinate the supply chain under VMI when the vendor freely decides the quantity. We find that even though all of them coordinate under RMI, quantity flexibility and sales rebate contracts do not generally coordinate under VMI. Furthermore, buyback and revenue sharing contracts are equivalent. Hence, we propose two new contracts which coordinate under VMI (one of which coordinates under RMI too, provided a well-known assumption holds). Finally, we extend our analysis to consider multiple independent retailers with the vendor incurring linear or convex production cost, and show that our results are qualitatively unchanged.     

Coordination of supply chains by option contracts: A cooperative game theory approach

Manufacturer–retailer supply chains commonly adopt a wholesale price mechanism. This mechanism, however, has often led manufacturers and retailers to situations of conflicts of interest. For example, due to uncertain market demand, retailers prefer to order flexibly from manufacturers so as to avoid incurring inventory costs and to be able to respond flexibly to market changes. Manufacturers, on the other hand, prefer retailers to place full orders as early as possible so that they can hedge against the risks of over- and under-production. Such conflicts between retailers and manufacturers can result in an inefficient supply chain. Motivated by this problem, we take a cooperative game approach in this paper to consider the coordination issue in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain using option contracts. Using the wholesale price mechanism as a benchmark, we develop an option contract model. Our study demonstrates that, compared with the benchmark based on the wholesale price mechanism, option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto-improvement. We also discuss scenarios in which option contracts are selected according to individual supply chain members’ risk preferences and negotiating powers.     

Pareto quantity flexibility contracts for a supply chain under multiple objectives

We analyse a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The terms of trade between the two agents are specified by a quantity flexibility (QF) contract. We first identify the Pareto QF contracts for the supply chain where each agent adopts a satisficing objective, that is, to maximize the probability of achieving his/her predetermined target profit. It is shown that to coordinate such a supply chain, QF contracts have to degenerate into wholesale price (WP) contracts. This provides an additional justification for the popularity of WP contracts besides their simplicities and lower administration costs. Next, we consider the supply chain where each agent adopts multiple objectives, namely the satisficing objective and the objective of expected profit maximization (EPM). It is shown that there always exist QF contracts that coordinate the supply chain under the objective of EPM and are simultaneously Pareto optimal for the satisficing objective.     

Long-term and penalty contracts in a two-stage supply chain with stochastic demand

Recent applications of game-theoretic analysis to supply chain efficiency have focused on constructs between a buyer (the retailer or manufacturer) and a seller (the supplier) in successive stages of a supply chain. If demand for the final product is stochastic then the supplier has an incentive to keep its capacity relatively low to avoid creating unneeded capacity. The manufacturer, on the other hand, prefers the supplier’s capacity to be high to ensure that the final demand is satisfied. The manufacturer therefore constructs a contract to induce the supplier to increase its production capacity. Most research examines contracting when final demand is realized after the manufacturer places its order to the supplier. However, if final demand is realized before the manufacturer places its order to the supplier, these types of contracts can be ineffective. This paper examines two contracts under the latter timing scenario: long-term contracts in which the business relationship is repeated, and penalty contracts in which the supplier is penalized for too little capacity. Results indicate long-term contracts increase the profit potential of the supply chain. Furthermore, the penalty contracts can ensure that the supplier chooses a capacity level such that the full profit potential is achieved.     

Buyback contracts with price-dependent demands: Effects of demand uncertainty

We explore buyback contracts in a supplier–retailer supply chain where the retailer faces a price-dependent downward-sloping demand curve subject to uncertainty. Differentiated from the existing literature, this work focuses on analytically examining how the uncertainty level embedded in market demand affects the applicability of buyback contracts in supply chain management. To this end, we seek to characterize the buyback model in terms of only the demand uncertainty level (DUL). With this new research perspective, we have obtained some interesting new findings for buyback. For example, we find that (1) even though the supply chain’s efficiency will change over the DUL with a wholesale price-only contract, it will be maintained constantly at that of the corresponding deterministic demand setting with buyback, regardless of the DUL; (2) in the practice of buyback, the buyback issuer should adjust only the buyback price in reaction to different DULs while leave the wholesale price unchanged as that in the corresponding deterministic demand setting; (3) only in the demand setting with an intermediate level of the uncertainty (which is identified quantitatively in Theorem 5), buyback provision is beneficial simultaneously for the supplier, the retailer, and the supply chain system, while this is not the case in the other demand settings. This work reveals that DUL can be a critical factor affecting the applicability of supply chain contracts.