Using mixture‐amount modeling to optimize the advertising media mix and quantify cross‐media synergy for specific target groups

One of the critical decisions in media planning is how to allocate advertising efforts across different media. While studies indicate that marketers can create positive synergy effects by spreading their effort across several media, there is little understanding of how much should be invested in each specific medium to optimize advertising results. In this study, we apply a novel methodology, mixture‐amount modeling, which allows advertisers to determine the optimal allocation of advertising effort across media as a function of the total advertising effort. Moreover, we test how the optimal allocation and the resulting response change for consumers with distinctive media usage patterns and varying degrees of product category experience. Based on these results, we quantify the potential synergy between media and calculate the synergistic capacity for specific target groups. We apply the model to data from 52 beauty care advertising campaigns that ran on TV and in magazines in the Netherlands and Belgium. We determine the optimal allocation of advertising investments (measured through Gross Rating Points) to maximize campaign recognition. Our findings support the existence of positive synergistic effects between magazine and TV advertising and illustrate that these effects depend on consumers' media usage and product category experience.     

Feedback Competitive Advertising Strategies with a General Objective Function

We introduce a general objective function, which incorporates competitive situations, such as conservative, punitive, and predatory advertising. Linking together the particular situations into a two-parameter family of max–min problems, and using the Lanchester model to describe the dynamics of the market, a bilinear-quadratic differential game is obtained. For this game, we find saddle-point feedback time-invariant advertising strategies and show when these strategies are Nash equilibrium strategies. In an empirical application involving duopolistic competition in the cola market, we find evidence of a punitive motivation for the advertising strategies.     

Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter

We provide a stochastic electoral model of the US Presidential election where candidates take differences across states into account when developing their policy platforms and advertising campaigns. Candidates understand the political and economic differences that exist across states and voters care about candidates’ policies relative to their ideals, about the frequency of candidates’ advertising messages relative to their ideal message frequency, their campaign tolerance level, and vote taking into account their perceptions of candidates’ traits and competencies with their vote also depending on their sociodemographic characteristics. In the local Nash equilibrium, candidates give maximal weight to undecided voters and swing states and little weight to committed voters and states. These endogenous weights pin down candidates’ campaign and depend on the probability with which voters choose each candidate which depends on candidates’ policies and advertising campaigns. Weights vary across candidates’ policy and ad campaigns, reflecting the importance voters in each state give to the two dimensions and the variation in voters’ preferences across states.     

Strategic interactions in traditional franchise systems: Are franchisors always better off?

The effects of price competition and advertising spillover on franchisees’ decision to cooperate and on franchisor’s contractual preferences are investigated. We show that the franchisees’ decision to cooperate or not depends on the type of franchise contracts. Under exclusive territory contracts, any mode of play between franchisees give the same profits to the franchisees and franchisor. Contracts that allow price competition and well targeted local advertising offer a good ground for horizontal cooperation, which may or may not benefit the franchisor depending on whether the prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Contracts in which price competition is allowed and the burden of advertising decisions is totally transferred to the franchisor lead to cooperation between franchisees at the expense of the franchisor. Franchisees do not cooperate to the benefit of the franchisor if local advertising is predatory and price competition is not allowed in the contract, but franchisees are given the responsibility to undertake local advertising. Also, the franchisor endorses cooperation between franchisees when local advertising has a public good nature, but such a cooperation may never occur when the impact of local advertising on demand is significant. We finally show that while some contracts always dominate others, the choice of a franchise contract may also depend on local competition and/or the franchise goodwill.     

Optimal control of information epidemics modeled as Maki Thompson rumors

We model the spread of information in a homogeneously mixed population using the Maki Thompson rumor model. We formulate an optimal control problem, from the perspective of single campaigner, to maximize the spread of information when the campaign budget is fixed. Control signals, such as advertising in the mass media, attempt to convert ignorants and stiflers into spreaders. We show the existence of a solution to the optimal control problem when the campaigning incurs non-linear costs under the isoperimetric budget constraint. The solution employs Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle and a modified version of forward backward sweep technique for numerical computation to accommodate the isoperimetric budget constraint. The techniques developed in this paper are general and can be applied to similar optimal control problems in other areas.We have allowed the spreading rate of the information epidemic to vary over the campaign duration to model practical situations when the interest level of the population in the subject of the campaign changes with time. The shape of the optimal control signal is studied for different model parameters and spreading rate profiles. We have also studied the variation of the optimal campaigning costs with respect to various model parameters. Results indicate that, for some model parameters, significant improvements can be achieved by the optimal strategy compared to the static control strategy. The static strategy respects the same budget constraint as the optimal strategy and has a constant value throughout the campaign horizon. This work finds application in election and social awareness campaigns, product advertising, movie promotion and crowdfunding campaigns.     

Consumer Behaviour and Optimal Advertising

Using Nicosia's formulation of consumer behaviour, optimal advertising strategies are derived. Other studies, using empirical data, have shown that advertising should be concentrated at the early part of the product life cycle and the paper discusses what assumptions about consumer behaviour must be made to obtain that results. Specifically, it is shown under what conditions pulsing advertising campaigns are optimal.     

Equilibrium Pricing and Advertising Strategies in a Marketing Channel

This paper is concerned with conflict and coordination in a two-member channel of distribution. We propose a differential game model that includes carryover effects of advertising, expressed by a retailer-specific stock of advertising goodwill. Pricing and advertising strategies for both firms are identified under channel conflict as well as coordination. Dynamic advertising policies are designed as stationary Markov perfect strategies. In a symmetric case, these strategies can be determined in closed form, taking into consideration explicitly nonnegativity constraints on advertising rates. We establish a global result for the relationship between the advertising strategies of the two firms under conflict and coordination.     

Competitive Advertising Under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach

We analyze optimal advertising spending in a duopolistic market where each firm's market share depends on its own and its competitor's advertising decisions, and is also subject to stochastic disturbances. We develop a differential game model of advertising in which the dynamic behavior is based on the Sethi stochastic advertising model and the Lanchester model of combat. Particularly important to note is the morphing of the sales decay term in the Sethi model into decay caused by competitive advertising and noncompetitive churn that acts to equalize market shares in the absence of advertising. We derive closed-loop Nash equilibria for symmetric as well as asymmetric competitors. For all cases, explicit solutions and comparative statics are presented.     

Advertising strategies in a franchise system

The main question of this research is: Who should undertake promotional and brand-image advertising if the franchisor and franchisees act so as to maximize their respective profits? To address this question, we study a two-stage advertising game between a franchisor and two adjacent franchisees. In the first stage of the game, the franchisor chooses between three advertising models – centralizing or delegating the two types of advertising to the franchisees or delegating only promotional advertising. In the second stage, given the franchisor’s choice of an advertising model, the two franchisees decide whether or not to cooperate. Our main findings are that (1) the franchisees should cooperate if the franchisor delegates either both brand-image and promotional advertising or promotional advertising, although cooperation between franchisees does not necessary improve the franchisor’s profits. (2) The choice of an advertising arrangement critically depends on the margins as well as the costs of performing both promotional and brand-image advertising. We also discuss the conditions under which the three advertising models should be implemented.     

Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer channel

Cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales. Cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members. Nevertheless, most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price. This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. We establish and compare two models: a non-cooperative, leader–follower game and a cooperative game. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. The cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel-wide profits than the non-cooperative model with these features: (a) the retailer price is lower to consumers; and (b) the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members. We identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.     

Mathematical modelling of social obesity epidemic in the region of Valencia,Spain

In this article, we analyse the incidence of excess weight in 24- to 65-year-old residents in the region of Valencia, Spain, and predict its behaviour in the coming years. In addition, we present some possible strategies to prevent the spread of the obesity epidemic.

We use classical logistic regression analysis to find out that a sedentary lifestyle and unhealthy nutritional habits are the most important causes of obesity in the 24- to 65-year-old population in Valencia. We propose a new mathematical model of epidemiological type to predict the incidence of excess weight in this population in the coming years. Based on the mathematical model sensitivity analysis, some possible general strategies to reverse the increasing trend of obesity are suggested.

The obese population in the region of Valencia is increasing (11.6% in 2000 and 13.48% in 2005) and the future is worrisome. Our model predicts that 15.52% of the population in Valencia will be obese by 2011. Model sensitivity analysis suggests that obesity prevention strategies (healthy advertising campaigns) are more effective than obesity treatment strategies (physical activity) involving the obese and overweight subpopulation in controlling the increase of adulthood obesity in the region of Valencia.     

Multistage multiproduct advertising budgeting

We propose and analyze an effective model for the Multistage Multiproduct Advertising Budgeting problem. This model optimizes the advertising investment for several products, by considering cross elasticities, different sales drivers and the whole planning horizon. We derive a simple procedure to compute the optimal advertising budget and its optimal allocation. The model was tested to plan a realistic advertising campaign. We observed that the multistage approach may significantly increase the advertising profit, compared to the successive application of the single stage approach.     

The effects of advertising,prices and distribution on market share volatility

Although the influence of marketing decision variables on market share has received ample attention in the literature, less is known about their effects on volatility. This study attempts to shed light on this issue by empirically examining the effects of advertising, pricing and distribution, not only on market share but also on its volatility, using an EGARCH model. We argue that establishing a link between management-controlled actions, such as advertising, pricing and distribution, and market share volatility may benefit firms seeking to reduce uncertainty in their market share performance. Application of the proposed model to data on two markets (SUVs and Minivans), suggested that advertising, pricing and distribution significantly influence market share volatility.     

National and store brand advertising strategies

As the propensity of premium store brands (SBs) increases, retailers must consider different ways to drive sales besides promotional strategies. With this in mind, we consider a national brand (NB) and a (premium) SB co-existing in a market. Each brand has to decide the amount to invest in advertising its product and the prices to charge its customers, which can be determined separately or in unison. When either advertising expenditures or pricing decisions are set, each brand must keep in mind that the advertising efforts and revenue may spillover between the two brands, customers who intend to purchase the NB may end up purchasing the SB and vice versa. We derive an analytical model of the situations described and characterize equilibrium advertising decisions. We find that the characteristics of a premium SB may depend on which marketing/promoting instrument (advertising or pricing) is the primary method for driving demand; and in some situations an NB may be better off to not advertise at all and instead let the premium SB carry out all of the advertising.     

Dynamic Advertising Under Vertical Product Differentiation

We investigate a dynamic advertising model where product quality is endogenous. In the differential game between single-product firms, there exists a parameter range where the low-quality firm uses a more efficient advertising technology and earns higher profits than the rival. Moreover, we show that equilibrium qualities are the same under duopoly, multiproduct monopoly, and social planning, the only distortion being concerned with the output levels.     

Dynamical analysis of a nonlinear competitive model with generic and brand advertising efforts

In this paper, a new four-dimensional map is proposed to model the dynamical advertising efforts, where both the generic and brand effects for advertisement are taken into account in the model. The marginal profit adapting strategy is used to reflect the interaction among the firms that strive for the optimal profit. When the generic advertising bears a large effectiveness coefficient, the generic advertising efforts will exhibit chaos, which leads to a chaotic dynamics for brand advertising efforts. In this case, we analyze the some properties of steady trajectories that imply rough profiles of the advertising strategies evolution. Furthermore, by rigorous dynamical analysis and numerical simulations, we obtain the feasible set outlining the influence of initial conditions on the global dynamic properties. We first deal with the symmetric system, and then extend the obtained results to more general case, namely, the asymmetric model. For the symmetric model, two firms’ brand advertising expenditures behave synchronization, but the dynamics of generic advertising efforts are dependent upon initial conditions. Meanwhile, for the heterogeneous case, the domain firm in the market needs to contribute all generic advertising expenditures. Our results can have a practical impact on the market evolution, and are therefore beneficial to decision maker.     

关键词广告支付模式的研究

关键词广告是主要用于搜索引擎的一种广告销售机制.所谓关键词既指搜索用户在搜索框内输入的检索词,也指机器程序从用户浏览的网页内容中抓取的词.广告主的广告依据关键词触发而展现在相应网页上.对搜索引擎来说,选择广告的支付模式是销售机制的核心命题.在互联网发展的实践中出现了许多支付模式,比如按展现付费(Pay-Per-Impression),接点击付费(Pay-Per-Click),按呼叫付费(Pay-Per-Call)和按销量付费(Pay-Per-Sale)等.如果实现这些支付模式的条件都具备,那么哪一种付费方式对搜索引擎是最有利的?试图回答这个问题.主要结论是对搜索引擎来讲,按点击付费是最优或近似最优的支付模式.     

A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands

We study the relationship between the pricing and advertising decisions in a channel where a national brand is competing with a private label. We consider a differential game that incorporates the carryover effects of brand advertising over time for both the manufacturer and the retailer and we account for the complementary and competitive roles of advertising. Analysis of the obtained equilibrium Markov strategies shows that the relationship between advertising and pricing decisions in the channel depends mainly on the nature of the advertising effects. In particular, the manufacturer reacts to higher competitive retailer’s advertising levels by offering price concessions and limiting his advertising expenditures. The retailer’s optimal reaction to competitive advertising effects in the channel depends on two factors: (1) the price competition level between the store and the national brands and (2) the strength of the competitive advertising effects. For example, in case of intense price competition between the two brands combined with a strong manufacturer’s competitive advertising effect, the retailer should lower both the store and the national brands’ prices as a reaction to higher manufacturer’s advertising levels. For the retailer, the main advantage from boosting his competitive advertising investments seems to be driven by increased revenues from the private label. The retailer should however limit his investments in advertising if the latter generates considerable competitive effects on the national brand’s sales.     

Controlled predatory pricing in a multiperiod Stackelberg game: an MPEC approach

We analyze a multiperiod oligopolistic market where each period is a Stackelberg game between a leader firm and multiple follower firms. The leader chooses his production level first, taking into account the reaction of the followers. Then, the follower firms decide their production levels after observing the leader’s decision. The difference between the proposed model and other models discussed in literature is that the leader firm has the power to force the follower firms out of business by preventing them from achieving a target sales level in a given time period. The leader firm has an incentive to lower the market prices possibly lower than the Stackelberg equilibrium in order to push the followers to sell less and eventually go out of business. Intentionally lowering the market prices to force competitors to fail is known as predatory pricing, and is illegal under antitrust laws since it negatively affects consumer welfare. In this work, we show that there exists a predatory pricing strategy where the market price is above the average cost and consumer welfare is preserved. We develop a mixed integer nonlinear problem (MINLP) that models the multiperiod Stackelberg game. The MINLP problem is transformed to a mixed integer linear problem (MILP) by using binary variables and piecewise linearization. A cutting plane algorithm is used to solve the resulting MILP. The results show that firms can engage in predatory pricing even if the average market price is forced to remain higher than the average cost. Furthermore, we show that in order to protect the consumers, antitrust laws can control predatory pricing by setting rules on consumer welfare.     

Assessing the effect of advertising expenditures upon sales: A Bayesian structural time series model

We propose a robust implementation of the Nerlove‐Arrow model using a Bayesian structural time series model to explain the relationship between advertising expenditures of a countrywide fast‐food franchise network with its weekly sales. Due to the flexibility and modularity of the model, it is well suited to generalization to other markets or situations. Its Bayesian nature facilitates incorporating a priori information reflecting the manager's views, which can be updated with relevant data. This aspect of the model will be used to support the decision of the manager on the budget scheduling of the advertising firm across time and channels.