Pricing and volume discounting for a dominant retailer with uncertain manufacturing cost information

A product costs the manufacturer c/unit to produce; the retailer sells it at p/unit to the consumers. The retail-market demand volume V varies with p according to a given demand curve D_p. How would or should the “players” (i.e., the manufacturer and the retailer) set their prices? In contrast to many studies that assume a dominant manufacturer implementing the “manufacturer-Stackelberg” (“[mS]”) game, this paper examines how a dominant retailer should operate when his knowledge of c is imperfect. We first derive optimal decisions (some of them counter-intuitive) for the dominant retailer when he is restricted to choosing between [rS] (retailer-Stackelberg) and [mS]. Second, we propose a “reverse quantity discount” scheme that the dominant retailer (i.e., the downstream player) can offer to the manufacturer (note that the standard discount scheme is offered by the upstream player). We show that this discounting scheme is quite effective compared to the considerably more complicated though nevertheless theoretically optimal “menu of contracts.” We also reveal a largely overlooked function of discounting; i.e., discounting enables an “ignorant” but dominant player to usurp the earnings attributable to the knowledge of the dominated player. Finally, we also show that discounting works well when the demand curve is linear, but becomes ineffective when the demand curve is iso-elastic – a result echoing the conclusions of some earlier related works.     

A comparison of different quantity discount pricing policies in a two-echelon channel with stochastic and asymmetric demand information

In this paper, we study quantity discount pricing policies in a channel of one manufacturer and one retailer. The paper assumes that the channel faces a stochastic price-sensitive demand but the retailer can privately observe the realization of an uncertain demand parameter. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer declares quantity discount pricing schemes to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting the retail price and associated quantity. Proposed in the paper are four quantity-discount pricing policies: “regular quantity discount”; “fixed percentage discount”; “incremental volume discount” and “fixed marginal-profit-rate discount”. Optimal solutions are derived, and numerical examples are presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy.     

Dollar vs. percentage markup pricing schemes under a dominant retailer

We investigate two very common pricing schemes for a Stackelberg-dominant retailer: percentage-markup and dollar-markup. We show that when a dominant retailer switches from dollar to percentage markup, the channel’s “overall pie” and the retailer’s “pie-piece” are both enlarged. In contrast, the manufacturer will be forced to levy a lower wholesale price, thus receiving a smaller pie-piece despite the larger pie. The preceding statements hold regardless of whether the demand is deterministic or stochastic. However, the effects of switching to percentage markup on the retail price and sales volume will depend not only on whether the demand is stochastic, but also on the assumed demand-curve shape and on whether demand stochasticity is “additive” or “multiplicative”. Besides presenting a comprehensive set of answers on the comparative performance of dollar- and percentagemarkups, our results also highlight the often overlooked importance of choosing between: (i) dollar- and percentage-markup; and (ii) the formats of the assumed stochasticity and demand curves.     

How a dominant retailer might design a purchase contract for a newsvendor-type product with price-sensitive demand

A dominant retailer will purchase a newsvendor-type product from a manufacturer, who incurs a unit manufacturing cost k. The expected retail demand is a function of the unit retail price p. How should the retailer design her purchase contract? For this increasingly prevalent but inadequately studied scenario, we propose plausible adaptations of several contract formats that have been widely studied in the dominant-manufacturer context. For both symmetric-k and asymmetric-k-knowledge situations, we present performance results of these contracts. Our results then reveal that the performance of these contract formats under our scenario differs considerably from what one would surmise from the well-known results published for closely related scenarios. For example, the widely studied buyback and revenue-sharing formats turn out to be largely ineffective when implemented by a dominant retailer. In contrast, the two-part tariff format performs well relative to the theoretically optimal “menu of contracts.” Our results highlight the need to study purchase contract formats designed specifically for dominant-retailer newsvendor-product channels.     

Ship-to-order supplies: Contract breachability and the impact of a manufacturer-owned direct channel

We address the issue of contract breachability in a supply chain involving a retailer and a manufacturer operating under ship-to-order contract terms and stochastic demands. The manufacturer is required to fulfill the retailer’s demands on a continuous basis with little or no advance notice. The issue in such an environment is whether the retailer can “naively” assume that she will get a very high fill rate from the manufacturer and therefore has no need for contract penalties in case the manufacturer’s inventory falls short. We suggest a stochastic calculus framework to study the problem and derive a condition when the retailer’s naïve assumption is justified since the probability of stock-outs of the manufacturer is negligible. That is, the ship-to-order contract will not be breached and the fill rate will be more than a predetermined threshold. Furthermore we find that although the manufacturer-owned direct channel generates more revenue and may reduce the volatility of both inventory and production orders, the ratio between expected direct channel and retail sales affects the benefits.     

Profit criteria involving risk in price setting of virtual products

This work deals with pricing of “virtual” products, i.e., products that a retailer can supply after demand has been realized. Such products allow the retailer to avoid holding costs and ensure timely fulfillment of demand with no risk of shortage. Demand is commonly price-dependent and uncertain, and we seek to maximize each of three criteria: expected profit, the likelihood of achieving a profit target, and the profit for a given percentile. Simultaneous multiple criteria are also explored. Two forms of demand uncertainty are considered in the analysis: the multiplicative form, where, due to stochastic dominance, all the investigated profit criteria—and, in fact, any utility function of the profit—can be optimized simultaneously; and the additive form, where stochastic dominance cannot occur. Under the multiplicative form of demand, the property of stochastic dominance is shown to hold in a two-echelon supply chain (comprising both the supplier and the retailer) and in a centralized system.     

Dual role of price and myopia in a marketing channel

In this paper we study a dynamic two-player channel where the manufacturer controls the wholesale price and the investment in quality and the retailer chooses the retail price. We consider that the retail price affects both the demand and the perceived quality of the brand and that its variations contribute to the building of an internal reference price. One of the model’s distinctive features is that it accounts for the two meanings of price, i.e., its classical objective measure of the cost of acquiring a particular quantity of the product, and its subjective roles as an assessment of the quality of the product and an evaluation of gains or losses (deal vs. sacrifice) resulting from buying a “cheap” or an “expensive” product. This dual computation is done with respect to the internal reference price.     

Some properties of buyback and other related schemes in a newsvendor-product supply chain with price-sensitive demand

A manufacturer wholesaling to a retailer a ‘newsvendor-type’ product such as a seasonal/fashion good or a perishable food item is considered here. It is known that such a manufacturer/retailer channel has difficulties in fully realizing the market's profit potential. We study a theoretical construct of such a channel and present practically useful results for a manufacturer trying to design more profitable pricing schemes. Specifically, we consider a ‘dominant’ manufacturer supplying a newsvendor-type product to a retailer. The retail market volume varies with the unit retail price according to a stochastic demand curve. We study the design and performance of ‘price-only’, ‘buyback’ and ‘manufacturer-imposed retail price’ schemes. All these schemes have been considered in earlier works. The first part of this paper studies some important but previously overlooked aspects of price-only and buyback schemes. We show that the performance of these schemes is strongly and somewhat counter-intuitively affected by the specific form of demand curve and of demand randomization. Thus, we identify hitherto neglected factors that must be carefully considered when designing pricing schemes for actual implementation. The second part of this paper demonstrates the practicality and merit of using buyback in conjunction with a manufacturer-imposed retail price—an arrangement overlooked in the literature because it is widely mistaken as illegal. Overall, the paper shows how a manufacturer can better realize the market's potential by: (i) modifying slightly the well-known buyback arrangement; and (ii) carefully modelling certain hitherto neglected aspects of the price/demand relationship—a conclusion quite contrary to what one might surmise from the current theoretical literature.     

Inventory sharing via circular unidirectional chaining

This research studies the performance of circular unidirectional chaining – a “lean” configuration of lateral inventory sharing among retailers or warehouses – and compares its performance to that of no pooling and complete pooling in terms of expected costs and optimal order quantities. Each retailer faces uncertain demand, and we wish to minimize procurement, shortage and transshipment costs. In a circular unidirectional chain all retailers are connected in a closed loop, so that each retailer can cooperate with exactly two others as follows: receive units (if needed?available) from the left “neighbor” and send units (if needed?available) to the right, and a retailer who receives units from one neighbor is not allowed to send any units to its other neighbor. If the chain consists of at least three nodes and demands across nodes are i.i.d., its performance turns out to be independent of the number of nodes. The optimal stocking is therefore solved analytically. Analytical comparative statics with respect to cost parameters and demand distributions are provided. We also examine thoroughly the cases of uniform demand distribution (analytically) and normal demand distribution (numerically). In the uniform case with free transshipment, a unidirectional chain can save up to 1/3 of the expected cost of separate newsvendors caused by uncertainty. For three nodes, the advantage of complete pooling over unidirectional chaining does not exceed 19%.     

Production and availability policies through the Markov Decision Process and myopic methods for contractual and selective orders

In this paper, we consider a supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and some online customers. In addition to supplying the retailer, manufacturers may selectively take orders from individuals online. Through the Markov Decision Process, we explore the optimal production and availability policy for a manufacturer to determine whether to produce one more unit of products and whether to indicate “in stock” or “out of stock” on website. We measure the benefits and influences of adding online customers with and without the retailer’s inventory information sharing. We also simulate the production and availability policy via a myopic method, which can be implemented easily in the real world. Prediction of simple switching functions for the production and availability is proposed. We find the information sharing, production capacity and unit profit from online orders are the primary factors influencing manufacturer profits and optimal policy. The manufacturer might reserve 50% production capacity for contractual orders from the retailer and devote the remaining capacity to selective orders from spontaneous online customers.     

A note on the classification of consumer demand functions with respect to retailer pass-through rates

Tyagi (1999) derived conditions on the curvature of consumer demand functions which make it optimal for a profit-maximizing retailer to pass-through greater (less) than 100% of a manufacturer trade deal amount. Since the pass-through is customarily evaluated at the optimal wholesale price, then additional sufficient conditions are needed to ensure the existence of an optimal wholesale price. The purpose of this note is to derive the additional required conditions on the curvature of the consumer demand functions for the existence of a greater (less) than 100% retailer pass-through rate at the optimal wholesale price.     

存在强势零售商的竞争渠道内生时机

在存在强势零售商的非对称竞争渠道中,首先在三种博弈时机下分析协商机制、市场竞争以及强势零售商讨价还价能力对均衡结果的影响,然后探讨竞争渠道的内生时机,最后分别从销售成本和卖场流量两个角度对基本模型进行拓展。研究表明:协商机制提高强势零售渠道的市场需求和利润;当市场竞争较为激烈时,制造商将从零售商竞争中获得"渔翁之利",强势零售商过于挤压产品批发价格将遭受利润损失;以往研究中关于零售商同步领导的博弈时机假设是有缺陷的,序贯领导才是竞争渠道的内生时机,并且销售成本差异和卖场流量差异将缩小内生时机的双均衡区域。     

Comments on “Solving real car sequencing problems with ant colony optimization”

This note corrects the calculation of the utilization rate in the article “Solving real car sequencing problems with ant colony optimization” by Gagné et al. [Gagné, C., Gravel, M., Price, W.L., 2006. Solving real car sequencing problems with ant colony optimization. European Journal of Operational Research 174, 1427–1448] and provides hints on deriving a fast lower bound for the car sequencing problem. It further adjusts a proposed objective function, so that it becomes a viable alternative to the “sliding window” approach.     

Partial backlogging inventory lot-size models for deteriorating items with fluctuating demand under inflation

In this paper, the traditional inventory lot-size model is extended to allow not only for general partial backlogging rate but also for inflation. The assumptions of equal cycle length and constant shortage length imposed in the model developed by Moon et al. [Moon, I., Giri, B.C., Ko, B., 2005. Economic order quantity models for ameliorating/deteriorating items under inflation and time discounting, European Journal of Operational Research 162(3), 773–785] are also relaxed. For any given number of replenishment cycles the existence of a unique optimal replenishment schedule is proved and further the convexity of the total cost function of the inventory system in the number of replenishments is established. The theoretical results here amend those in Yang et al. [Yang, H.L., Teng, J.T., Chern, M.S., 2001. Deterministic inventory lot-size models under inflation with shortages and deterioration for fluctuating demand, Naval Research Logistics 48(2), 144–158] and provide the solution to those two counterexamples by Skouri and Papachristos [Skouri, K., Papachristos, S., 2002. Note on “deterministic inventory lot-size models under inflation with shortages and deterioration for fluctuating demand” by Yang et al. Naval Research Logistics 49(5), 527–529.]. Finally we propose an algorithm to find the solution, and obtain some managerial results by using sensitivity analyses.     

Channel coordination with manufacturer��s return policies within a newsvendor framework

The saliency of returns in today’s business world is unquestionable, in such items as toys, Christmas decorations, books, seasonal/fashion items and the like. This is largely due to the high economic benefits prevalent in some industries today and to the increasing opportunities for resale in secondary and global markets. This paper attempts to model the profitability of returns policy in presence of a secondary market, to a profit-maximizing manufacturer in a newsvendor framework. The returns policy applies both for the unsold merchandise left at the end of the selling season and the items returned by the unsatisfied customers within the specified time period. With a returns policy, the manufacturer shares the risks of demand uncertainty, in turn assuaged by the availability of secondary market. The manufacturer’s decision is to arrive at an optimal wholesale price and the returns policy, based on the retailer’s reaction on that offer. The retailer in turn optimizes the retail price and the order quantity to meet a price-dependent uncertain demand. This set of optimal policies has then been contrasted to that obtained from maximizing the combined profit of the manufacturer and of the retailer. The key question in the comparison has been clearly answered. The total combined profit that coordinates the policies of both channels exceeds that of the sum of the profits obtained independently.     

A note on channel performance under consignment contract with revenue sharing

Wang et al. [Y. Wang, L. Jiang, Z.J. Shen, Channel performance under consignment contract with revenue sharing. Management Science 50 (2004), 34–47] indicate that a decentralized supply chain cannot be perfectly coordinated. This note provides a cooperative game model that implements profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve their cooperation. When the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to be risk-neutral, under a very mild restriction on the demand distribution function, the cooperative game model can achieve its unique equilibrium solution in iso-price-elastic or linear demand case. Under the revenue sharing agreement attached with the equilibrium payment scheme, the decentralized supply chain can be perfectly coordinated.     

Three revenue-sharing variants: their significant performance differences under system-parameter uncertainties

In the widely studied ‘revenue sharing’ (hereafter [RS]) contract format, the manufacturer of a product not only charges the retailer a unit wholesale price w, but also requires the retailer to share part of the product's revenue (ie, the unit retail price p) with him. For a product with price-dependent demand, it is well known that if a dominant manufacturer knows the system parameters deterministically, then [RS] gives him the perfect power of simultaneously coordinating the channel and allocating profit arbitrarily. Unfortunately, [RS]'s power deteriorates as the manufacturer's knowledge of the system parameters becomes increasingly uncertain. This paper shows that this deterioration can be substantially reduced by using slightly modified versions of [RS]; these modifications roughly amount to sharing a retailer's gross profit instead of revenue. In other words, this paper presents simple modifications to the classical [RS], leading to contract formats that perform substantially better under system-parameter uncertainty.     

On contracts for VMI program with continuous review (r, Q) policy

Based on continuous review (r, Q) policy, this paper deals with contracts for vendor managed inventory (VMI) program in a system comprising a single vendor and a single retailer. Two business scenarios that are popular in VMI program are “vendor with ownership” and “retailer with ownership”. Taking the system performance in centralized control as benchmark, we define a contract “perfect” if the contract can enable the system to be coordinated and can guarantee the program to be trusted. A revenue sharing contract is designed for vendor with ownership, and a franchising contract is designed for retailer with ownership. Without consideration of order policy and related costs at the vendor site, it is shown that one contract can perform satisfactorily and the other one is a perfect contract. With consideration of order policy and related costs at the vendor site, it is shown that one contract can perform satisfactorily and the performance of the other one depends on system parameters.     

A note on: Optimal ordering policy for stock-dependent demand under progressive payment scheme

In a recent paper, Soni and Shah [Soni, H., Shah, N. H. (2008). Optimal ordering policy for stock-dependent demand under progressive payment scheme. European Journal of Operational Research 184(1), 91–100] developed a model to find the optimal ordering policy for a retailer with stock-dependent demand and a supplier offering a progressive payment scheme to the retailer. This note corrects some errors in the formulation of the model of Soni and Shah. It also extends their work by assuming that the credit interest rate of the retailer may exceed the interest rate charged by the supplier. Numerical examples illustrate the benefits of these modifications.     

Coordinating a decentralized supply chain with customer returns and price-dependent stochastic demand using a buyback policy

We investigate a decentralized supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer where the retailer simultaneously determines the retail price and order quantity while experiencing customer returns and price dependent stochastic demand. We propose an agreement between the manufacturer and the retailer that includes two buyback prices, one for unsold inventory and a second for customer returns, and show that this type of easy-to-implement agreement can achieve perfect supply chain coordination and be a win-win for both manufacturer and retailer when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.