On differential games with a feedback nash equilibrium

This note provides a lemma on differential games which possess a feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE). In particular, it shows that (i) a class of games with a degenerate FNE can be constructucted from every game which has a nondegenerate FNE and (ii) a class of games with a nondegenerate FNE can be constructed from every game which has a degenerate FNE.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for invaluable comments and suggestions.     

Hybrid subgames and copycat games in a pulsing model of advertising competition

Two recent papers,^6,7 introduced the game of pulsing competition (PC) in advertising together with its related subgames of alternating pulsing competition (APC) and matching pulsing competition (MPC) for a duopoly. Following a game theoretic approach in conjunction with a continuous Lanchester model, the above authors basically concluded that when at least one of the response functions is convex, generalising monopolistic advertising pulsation results to a competitive setting might not be adequate. This paper expands the scope of the PC game by incorporating in its structure for the first time in the literature, two versions of a hybrid pulsing competition (HPC) subgame. The article compares the payoffs of the four alternative subgames and provides an analytical solution of a special case of the PC game. In addition, the article also introduces for the first time a variant of the PC game designated by ‘the copycat advertising game’ and shows analytically that for such a game the policy of constant advertising spending over time is optimal for both firms irrespective of the shape of their advertising response functions. The paper illustrates at its end how to solve numerically the expanded PC game in its general form using linear programming and how to derive a solution for a copycat advertising game.     

Layers of noncooperative games

We model and analyze classes of antagonistic stochastic games of two players. The actions of the players are formalized by marked point processes recording the cumulative damage to the players at any moment of time. The processes evolve until one of the processes crosses its fixed preassigned threshold of tolerance. Once the threshold is reached or exceeded at some point of the time (exit time), the associated player is ruined. Both stochastic processes are being “observed” by a third party point stochastic process, over which the information regarding the status of both players is obtained. We succeed in these goals by arriving at closed form joint functionals of the named elements and processes. Furthermore, we also look into the game more closely by introducing an intermediate threshold (see a layer), which a losing player is to cross prior to his ruin, in order to analyze the game more scrupulously and see what makes the player lose the game.     

Layers of noncooperative games

We model and analyze classes of antagonistic stochastic games of two players. The actions of the players are formalized by marked point processes recording the cumulative damage to the players at any moment of time. The processes evolve until one of the processes crosses its fixed preassigned threshold of tolerance. Once the threshold is reached or exceeded at some point of the time (exit time), the associated player is ruined. Both stochastic processes are being “observed” by a third party point stochastic process, over which the information regarding the status of both players is obtained. We succeed in these goals by arriving at closed form joint functionals of the named elements and processes. Furthermore, we also look into the game more closely by introducing an intermediate threshold (see a layer), which a losing player is to cross prior to his ruin, in order to analyze the game more scrupulously and see what makes the player lose the game.     

A differential game with jump process observations

We introduce a stochastic differential game with jump process observations. Both players obtain common, noisy information of the state of the system only at random time instants. The solutions to this game and its continuous observations in noise counterpart are obtained. Some earlier results dealing with the effect of changes in system parameters on the optimal cost for the continuous observations case are extended to the game with jump process observations.This work was supported by a 1978 Summer Faculty Fellowship from the University of Maryland, Baltimore County.     

保险风险分配的随机合作博弈模型

本文对Suijs和Borm等所建立的模型稍作引伸,并将之应用于保险交易过程中有关各方面的风险分担,在所建立的带有随机支付的保险合作博弈模型框架下,讨论了保险博弈问题可能的结盟方式及其解的概念,并给出了保险风险分配、可行保险风险分配和帕累托最优保险风险分配的定义与形式,最后以实例说明其合理性,研究表明,带有随机支付的保险合作博弈模型能够较好的刻画保险机制的本质。     

On finite tetraprimary groups

A three-player game is considered in which the first and second players have dynamic superiority over the third player. Two fixed time points are specified. The game ends if either the first player captures the third player at the first time point, or the second player captures the third player at the second time point. We analyze a situation when the initial positions in the game are such that neither the first nor the second player alone can capture the third player at the specified points of time. We propose sufficient conditions on the parameters of the game under which, for given initial states of the players, the first and second players by applying some controls can guarantee that one of them will meet the third player at the prescribed moment. Simulation results for a model example are also presented.     

A cutting-plane algorithm for solving a weighted influence interdiction problem

We consider a two-stage defender-attacker game that takes place on a network, in which the attacker seeks to take control over (or “influence”) as many nodes as possible. The defender acts first in this game by protecting a subset of nodes that cannot be influenced by the attacker. With full knowledge of the defender’s action, the attacker can then influence an initial subset of unprotected nodes. The influence then spreads over a finite number of time stages, where an uninfluenced node becomes influenced at time t if a threshold number of its neighbors are influenced at time t?1. The attacker’s objective is to maximize the weighted number of nodes that are influenced over the time horizon, where the weights depend both on the node and on the time at which that is influenced. This defender-attacker game is especially difficult to optimize, because the attacker’s problem itself is NP-hard, which precludes a standard inner-dualization approach that is common in many interdiction studies. We provide three models for solving the attacker’s problem, and develop a tailored cutting-plane algorithm for solving the defender’s problem. We then demonstrate the computational efficacy of our proposed algorithms on a set of randomly generated instances.     

Robust pursuit of a hybrid evader

A pursuit-evasion differential game with bounded controls and prescribed duration is considered. The evader has two possible dynamics, while the pursuer dynamics is fixed. The evader can change the dynamics once during the game. The pursuer knows the possible dynamics of the evader, but not the actual one. The optimal pursuer strategy in this game is obtained. It is robust with respect to the control of the evader, the order of its dynamics and the time of the mode change. The capture conditions of the game are established and the pursuer capture zone is constructed. An illustrative example of the game is also presented.     

Platform modelling and scheduling game with multiple intelligent cloud-computing pools for big data

We develop a generic game platform that can be used to model various real-world systems with multiple intelligent cloud-computing pools and parallel-queues for resources-competing users. Inside the platform, the software structure is modelled as Blockchain. All the users are associated with Big Data arrival streams whose random dynamics is modelled by triply stochastic renewal reward processes (TSRRPs). Each user may be served simultaneously by multiple pools while each pool with parallel-servers may also serve multi-users at the same time via smart policies in the Blockchain, e.g. a Nash equilibrium point myopically at each fixed time to a game-theoretic scheduling problem. To illustrate the effectiveness of our game platform, we model the performance measures of its internal data flow dynamics (queue length and workload processes) as reflecting diffusion with regime-switchings (RDRSs) under our scheduling policies. By RDRS models, we can prove our myopic game-theoretic policy to be an asymptotic Pareto minimal-dual-cost Nash equilibrium one globally over the whole time horizon to a randomly evolving dynamic game problem. Iterative schemes for simulating our multi-dimensional RDRS models are also developed with the support of numerical comparisons.     

A single-shot game of multi-period inspection

This paper deals with an inspection game of Customs and a smuggler during some days. Customs has two options of patrolling or not. The smuggler can take two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take an action during a limited number of days but they may discard some of the opportunities. When the smuggling coincides with the patrol, there occurs one of three events: the capture of the smuggler by Customs, a success of the smuggling and nothing new. If the smuggler is captured or no time remains to complete the game, the game ends. There have been many studies on the inspection game so far by the multi-stage game model, where both players at a stage know players’ strategies taken at the previous stage. In this paper, we consider a two-person zero-sum single-shot game, where the game proceeds through multiple periods but both players do not know any strategies taken by their opponents on the process of the game. We apply dynamic programming to the game to exhaust all equilibrium points on a strategy space of player. We also clarify the characteristics of optimal strategies of players by some numerical examples.     

基于微分博弈的数据开放策略及合作收益分配机制研究

数据作为数字经济时代一种重要的生产要素,在国民经济运行中的作用越来越重要。然而,现阶段我国社会数据开放仍处于起步阶段,急需加快推进数据开放共享。为准确分析数据开放主体政府和企业的数据开放策略,运用微分博弈分别构建Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈和协同合作博弈模型,得到三种情形下政府和企业最优开放数据努力程度、社会数据开放水平最优轨迹以及最优收益函数;其次,在协同合作博弈情景下,将时间因素引入Nash谈判模型,进一步分析政府和企业合作时具有时间一致性的动态收益分配机制;最后,结合数值仿真对影响社会数据开放水平的相关参数进行灵敏性分析。研究结果发现,当政府获得收益分配比例大于1/3时,Stackelberg主从博弈下的政府和企业双方收益以及社会数据开放水平均高于Nash非合作情形;协同合作情形下,双方总收益和社会数据开放水平均能达到帕累托最优状态。     

A game of optimal pursuit of one object by several

A differential game in which m dynamical objects pursue a single one is investigated. All the players perform simple motions. The termination time of the game is fixed. The controls of the first k (k ⩽ m) pursuers are subject to integral constraints and the controls of the other pursuers and the evader are subject to geometric constraints. The payoff of the game is the distance between the evader and the closest pursuer at the instant the game is over. Optimal strategies for the players are constructed and the value of the game is found.     

Multilayers in a modulated stochastic game

We are concerned with an antagonistic stochastic game between two players A and B which finds applications in economics and warfare. The actions of the players are manifested by a series of strikes of random magnitudes at random times exerted by each player against his opponent. Each of the assaults inflicts a random damage to enemy's vital areas. In contrast with traditional games, in our setting, each player can endure multiple strikes before perishing. Predicting the ruin time (exit) of player A, along with the total amount of casualties to both players at the exit is a main objective of this work. In contrast to the time sensitive analysis (earlier developed to refine the information on the game) we insert auxiliary control levels, which both players will cross in due game before the ruin of A. This gives A (and also B) an additional opportunity to reevaluate his strategy and change the course of the game. We formalize such a game and also allow the real time information about the game to be randomly delayed. The delayed exit time, cumulative casualties to both players, and prior crossings are all obtained in a closed-form joint functional.     

A Dynkin game with asymmetric information

We study a Dynkin game with asymmetric information. The game has a random expiry time, which is exponentially distributed and independent of the underlying process. The players have asymmetric information on the expiry time, namely only one of the players is able to observe its occurrence. We propose a set of conditions under which we solve the saddle point equilibrium and study the implications of the information asymmetry. Results are illustrated with an explicit example.     

On-line version of Rabinovitch theorem for proper intervals

We analyze the on-line dimension of semi-orders as a two-person game between Algorithm and Spoiler, in a customary way. The game is played in rounds. Spoiler presents a collection of intervals representing a semi-order, one interval at a time. Algorithm maintains its realizer, i.e., the set of linear extensions intersecting the semi-order presented so far. Each time a new interval is presented, Algorithm inserts it into all maintained linear extensions and is not allowed to change the ordering of the previously introduced elements. Reading carefully the theorem of Rabinovitch on dimension of semi-orders one can prove that Algorithm needs only 3 linear extensions when Spoiler presents intervals of unit length. With the introduction of proper intervals, however, Algorithm can be forced to use one more extension. We prove that the value of the game on proper intervals is exactly 4.     

Games of timing with resources of mixed type

The paper considers a game of timing which is closely related to the so-called duels. This is a game connected with the distribution of resources by two players. Each of the players is in possession of some amount of resource to be distributed by him in the time interval [0, 1]. In his behavior, Player 1 is restricted by the necessity of taking all of his resources at a single point, while Player 2 has no restrictions. For the payoff function, defined as for duels, the game is solved; explicit formulas on the value of the game and the optimal strategies for the players are found.     

Construction of the value function in a pursuit-evasion game with three pursuers and one evader

A differential pursuit-evasion game is considered with three pursuers and one evader. It is assumed that all objects (players) have simple motions and that the game takes place in a plane. The control vectors satisfy geometrical constraints and the evader has a superiority in control resources. The game time is fixed. The value functional is the distance between the evader and the nearest pursuer at the end of the game. The problem of determining the value function of the game for any possible position is solved.

Three possible cases for the relative arrangement of the players at an arbitrary time are studied: “one-after-one”, “two-after-one”, “three-after-one-in-the-middle” and “three-after-one”. For each of the relative arrangements of the players a guaranteed result function is constructed. In the first three cases the function is expressed analytically. In the fourth case a piecewise-programmed construction is presented with one switchover, on the basis of which the value of the function is determined numerically. The guaranteed result function is shown to be identical with the game value function. When the initial pursuer positions are fixed in an arbitrary manner there are four game domains depending on their relative positions. The boundary between the “three-after-one-in-the-middle” domain and the “three-after-one” domain is found numerically, and the remaining boundaries are interior Nicomedean conchoids, lines and circles. Programs are written that construct singular manifolds and the value function level lines.     

Modeling and solution of COA development based on timed influence net and game theory

The development of a course of action (COA) is one of key steps in operation planning. Considering the conflict game, resource restriction, and the influence of execution time, this paper establishes a COA development model based on the timed influence net and game theory. The given problem is solved by transforming it into a standard matrix game model. An example is provided to illustrate this model and its solution.     

A deterministic‐control‐based approach motion by curvature

The level‐set formulation of motion by mean curvature is a degenerate parabolic equation. We show that its solution can be interpreted as the value function of a deterministic two‐person game. More precisely, we give a family of discrete‐time, two‐person games whose value functions converge in the continuous‐time limit to the solution of the motion‐by‐curvature PDE. For a convex domain, the boundary's “first arrival time” solves a degenerate elliptic equation; this corresponds, in our game‐theoretic setting, to a minimum‐exit‐time problem. For a nonconvex domain the two‐person game still makes sense; we draw a connection between its minimum exit time and the evolution of curves with velocity equal to the “positive part of the curvature.” These results are unexpected, because the value function of a deterministic control problem is normally the solution of a first‐order Hamilton‐Jacobi equation. Our situation is different because the usual first‐order calculation is singular. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.