The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games

This note extends the solution concept of the core for traditional transferable-utility (TU) games to multi-choice TU games, which we name the unit-level-core. It turns out that the unit-level-core of a multi-choice TU game is a “replicated subset” of the core of a corresponding “replicated” TU game. We propose an extension of the theorem of Bondareva (Probl Kybern 10:119–139, 1963) and Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 14:453–460, 1967) to multi-choice games. Also, we introduce the reduced games for multi-choice TU games and provide an axiomatization of the unit-level-core on multi-choice TU games by means of consistency and its converse.     

Remarks on a surplus-sharing rule from the Mishneh Torah

Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (1135–1204), known as Moses Maimonides, ranks among the most distinguished philosophers of the Middle Ages. He is the renowned author of the Mishneh Torah, a comprehensive code of Jewish law. Book 12 (“Book of Acquisition”), Treatise 4 (“Agents and Partners”), of the Code of Maimonides is devoted in Chapter 4 to the allocation of the surplus from funds which a partnership invests in an indivisible input. The Rabbi’s case translates into a cooperative game where all intermediate coalitions are inessential. Standard axioms for cooperative-game solutions then suggest that the surplus be shared equally by the players, which is precisely the Maimonidean ruling. We show that this outcome can be preserved in spirit under much weaker assumptions on the worth of a game’s intermediate coalitions. We present results both for the nucleolus and the Shapley value of the underlying class of games.     

Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games

We define multilinear extensions for multichoice games and relate them to probabilistic values and semivalues. We apply multilinear extensions to show that the Banzhaf value for a compound multichoice game is not the product of the Banzhaf values of the component games, in contrast to the behavior in simple games. Following Owen (Manag Sci 18:64–79, 1972), we integrate the multilinear extension over a simplex to construct a version of the Shapley value for multichoice games. We compare this new Shapley value to other extensions of the Shapley value to multichoice games. We also show how the probabilistic value (resp. semivalue, Banzhaf value, Shapley value) of a multichoice game is equal to the probabilistic value (resp. semivalue, Banzhaf value, Shapley value) of an appropriately defined TU decomposition game. Finally, we explain how semivalues, probabilistic values, the Banzhaf value, and this Shapley value may be viewed as the probability that a player makes a difference to the outcome of a simple multichoice game.     

On the role of chance moves and information in two-person games

The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context. The central question in these studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players. Generally speaking, only the extra possibilities that are beneficial for the players have been considered so far. In this note we study the value of information for a special class of two-person games. For these games we also investigate how “badly” the players can do, both with and without knowing the result of the chance move. In this way one can determine to what extent the players are restricted in their possibilities by the fact that some information is hidden in the chance moves of the games. This allows for a comparison of the influence of the chance move to the control that the players have over the game result.     

On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players

We demonstrate that, if there are sufficiently many players, any Bayesian equilibrium of an incomplete information game can be “ε-purified” . That is, close to any Bayesian equilibrium there is an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Our main contribution is obtaining this result for games with a countable set of pure strategies. In order to do so we derive a mathematical result, in the spirit of the Shapley–Folkman Theorem, permitting countable strategy sets. Our main assumption is a “large game property,” dictating that the actions of relatively small subsets of players cannot have large affects on the payoffs of other players. E. Cartwright and M. Wooders are indebted to Phillip Reny, Frank Page and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Values of games with a continuum of players

A definition of the “Shapley value” of games with a continuum of players and a formula for this value are given for a certain class of games, regarding them as limits of games with a finite number of players. The research described in this paper was partially supported by the U.S. Office of Naval Research, Logistics and Mathematical Statistics Branch, under Contract Number N 62558-3586.     

Population monotonic solutions on convex games

The Dutta-Ray solution and the Shapley value are two well-known examples of population-monotonic solutions on the domain of convex games. We provide a new formula for the Dutta-Ray solution from which population-monotonicity immediately follows. Then we define a new family of population-monotonic solutions, which we refer to as “sequential Dutta-Ray solutions.” We also show that it is possible to construct several symmetric and population-monotonic solutions by using the solutions in this family. Received September 1998/Revised version: December 1999     

Equivalence theorem,consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value

This paper is devoted to the study of solutions for multi-choice games which admit a potential, such as the potential associated with the extended Shapley value proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (Int J Game Theory 21:301–302, 1992; Games Econ Behav 5:240–256, 1993). Several axiomatizations of the family of all solutions that admit a potential are offered and, as a main result, it is shown that each of these solutions can be obtained by applying the extended Shapley value to an appropriately modified game. In the framework of multi-choice games, we also provide an extension of the reduced game introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 57:589–614, 1989). Different from the works of Hsiao and Raghavan (1992, 1993), we provide two types of axiomatizations, one is the analogue of Myerson’s (Int J Game Theory 9:169–182, 1980) axiomatization of the Shapley value based on the property of balanced contributions. The other axiomatization is obtained by means of the property of consistency.     

On the existence of a minimum integer representation for?weighted voting systems

A basic problem in the theory of simple games and other fields is to study whether a simple game (Boolean function) is weighted (linearly separable). A second related problem consists in studying whether a weighted game has a minimum integer realization. In this paper we simultaneously analyze both problems by using linear programming. For less than 9 voters, we find that there are 154 weighted games without minimum integer realization, but all of them have minimum normalized realization. Isbell in 1958 was the first to find a weighted game without a minimum normalized realization, he needed to consider 12 voters to construct a game with such a property. The main result of this work proves the existence of weighted games with this property with less than 12 voters. This research was partially supported by Grant MTM 2006-06064 of “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional” and SGRC 2005-00651 of “Generalitat de Catalunya”, and by the Spanish “Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología” programmes ALINEX (TIN2005-05446 and TIN2006-11345).     

A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives

In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player’s “a priori” value in such a game. In this paper, we show that the value has a consistency property similar to the “consistency” for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value.  The games considered in this paper differ from the multi-choice games considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [1993]. They consider games in which the actions of the players are ordered in the sense that, if i >j, then action i carries more “weight” than action j.  These games also differ from partition function games in that the worth of a coalition depends not only on the partitioning of the players but also on the action chosen by each subset of the partition. Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999     

Probabilistic interpretation for systems of Isaacs equations with two reflecting barriers

In this paper we investigate zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are given by doubly controlled reflected backward stochastic differential equations (RBSDEs) with two barriers. For admissible controls which can depend on the whole past and so include, in particular, information occurring before the beginning of the game, the games are interpreted as games of the type “admissible strategy” against “admissible control”, and the associated lower and upper value functions are studied. A priori random, they are shown to be deterministic, and it is proved that they are the unique viscosity solutions of the associated upper and the lower Bellman–Isaacs equations with two barriers, respectively. For the proofs we make full use of the penalization method for RBSDEs with one barrier and RBSDEs with two barriers. For this end we also prove new estimates for RBSDEs with two barriers, which are sharper than those in Hamadène, Hassani (Probab Theory Relat Fields 132:237–264, 2005). Furthermore, we show that the viscosity solution of the Isaacs equation with two reflecting barriers not only can be approximated by the viscosity solutions of penalized Isaacs equations with one barrier, but also directly by the viscosity solutions of penalized Isaacs equations without barrier. Partially supported by the NSF of P.R.China (No. 10701050; 10671112), Shandong Province (No. Q2007A04), and National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program) (No. 2007CB814904).     

Choice of solution in one-step bimatrix games

A new approach to the solution of one-step games is constructed, without using the concept of mixed strategy. The notion of a “set” solution of a bimatrix game is defined. It is shown that this solution always exists and may be found by a finite procedure. Examples are given illustrating the form of the “set” solution and the structure of the set of best responses for various levels of information availability to the players regarding the opponent’s behavior. __________ Translated from Nelineinaya Dinamika i Upravlenie, No. 4, pp. 341–356, 2004.     

Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information

A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is applied for two-person finite games in extensive form with perfect information. Randomization by an umpire takes place over the leaves of the game tree. At every decision point players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of the umpire blindly or freely choose any other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-improved outcomes of other correlated equilibria. Computational issues of maximizing a linear function over the set of soft correlated equilibria are considered and a linear-time algorithm in terms of the number of edges in the game tree is given for a special procedure called “subgame perfect optimization”.     

Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning

Samet introduced a notion of hypothetical knowledge and showed how it could be used to capture the type of counterfactual reasoning necessary to force the backwards induction solution in a game of perfect information. He argued that while hypothetical knowledge and the extended information structures used to model it bear some resemblance to the way philosophers have used conditional logic to model counterfactuals, hypothetical knowledge cannot be reduced to conditional logic together with epistemic logic. Here it is shown that in fact hypothetical knowledge can be captured using the standard counterfactual operator “>” and the knowledge operator “K”, provided that some assumptions are made regarding the interaction between the two. It is argued, however, that these assumptions are unreasonable in general, as are the axioms that follow from them. Some implications for game theory are discussed.     

Game Theory applied to gene expression analysis

This is a summary of the author’s Ph.D. thesis supervised by Fioravante Patrone and Stefano Bonassi and defended on 25 May 2006 at the Università degli Studi di Genova. The thesis in written in English and a copy is available from the author upon request. This work deals with the discussion and the application of a methodology based on Game Theory for the analysis of gene expression data. Nowadays, microarray technology is available for taking “pictures” of gene expressions. Within a single experiment of this sophisticated technology, the level of expression of thousands of genes can be estimated in a sample of cells under given conditions. Roughly speaking, the starting point is the observation of a “picture” of gene expressions in a sample of cells under a biological condition of interest, for example a tumor. Then, Game Theory plays a primary role to quantitatively evaluate the relevance of each gene in regulating or provoking the condition of interest, taking into account the observed relationships in all subgroups of genes.      

The Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point in an m-player Game “Shoot Later, Shoot First!”

We consider the following “silent duel” of m players with a possible economic interpretation. Each player has one “bullet”, which she can shoot at any time during the time interval [0,1]. The probability that the i-th player hits the “target” at moment t is given by an increasing accuracy function f _i (t). The winner is the player who hits the target first. Under natural assumptions on the functions f _i (t) we prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium point in this game, and we provide an explicit construction of this equilibrium. This construction allows us to obtain exact solutions for many specific examples. Some of them are presented.This work was partly supported by RBRF grants 03-01-00479.     

Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the core of the game. These games will be called buyer-seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed-pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyer-seller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer-seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed-pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a “45^o-lattice” by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered. Received: March 2002/Revised version: January 2003 RID="*" ID="*"  Institutional support from research grants BEC 2002-00642 and SGR2001-0029 is gratefully acknowledged RID="**" ID="**"  The authors thank the referees for their comments     

On the serial cost sharing rule

In this paper we study a solution for discrete cost allocation problems, namely, the serial cost sharing method. We show that this solution can be computed by applying the Shapley value to an appropriate TU game and we present a probabilistic formula. We also define for cost allocation problems a multilinear function in order to obtain the serial cost sharing method as Owen (1972) did for the Shapley value in the cooperative TU context. Moreover we show that the pseudo average cost method is equivalent to an extended Shapley value. Received April 2000/Revised January 2003 RID="*" ID="*"  Authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for especially careful and useful comments. This research has been partially supported by the University of the Basque Country (projects UPV 036.321-HA197/98, UPV 036.321-HA042/99) and DGES Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (project PB96-0247).