Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly

We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we characterize the Nash equilibrium when there are N players with heterogeneous costs. In the dynamic game with uncertain market demand, firms of different sizes have different lifetime capacities which deplete over time according to the market demand for their good. We setup the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game and its associated system of HJB partial differential equations in the case of linear demand functions. We characterize certain qualitative features of the game using an asymptotic approximation in the limit of small competition. The equilibrium of the game is further studied using numerical solutions. We find that consumers benefit the most when a market is structured with many firms of the same relative size producing highly substitutable goods. However, a large degree of substitutability does not always lead to large drops in price, for example when two firms have a large difference in their size.     

考虑时滞效应与均值-方差效用的非零和投资与再保险博弈

在考虑时滞效应的影响下研究了非零和随机微分投资与再保险博弈问题。以最大化终端绝对财富和相对财富的均值-方差效用为目标,构建了两个相互竞争的保险公司之间的非零和投资与再保险博弈模型,分别在经典风险模型和近似扩散风险模型下探讨了博弈的Nash均衡策略。借助随机控制理论以及相应的广义Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman（HJB）方程,得到了均衡投资与再保险策略和值函数的显式表达。最后,通过数值例子分析了模型中相关参数变动对均衡策略的影响。     

A new class of problems in the calculus of variations

This paper investigates an infinite-horizon problem in the one-dimensional calculus of variations, arising from the Ramsey model of endogeneous economic growth. Following Chichilnisky, we introduce an additional term, which models concern for the well-being of future generations. We show that there are no optimal solutions, but that there are equilibrium strateges, i.e. Nash equilibria of the leader-follower game between successive generations. To solve the problem, we approximate the Chichilnisky criterion by a biexponential criterion, we characterize its equilibria by a pair of coupled differential equations of HJB type, and we go to the limit. We find all the equilibrium strategies for the Chichilnisky criterion. The mathematical analysis is difficult because one has to solve an implicit differential equation in the sense of Thom. Our analysis extends earlier work by Ekeland and Lazrak.     

Risk minimizing portfolios and HJBI equations for stochastic differential games

In this paper, we consider the problem to find a market portfolio that minimizes the convex risk measure of the terminal wealth in a jump diffusion market. We formulate the problem as a two player (zero-sum) stochastic differential game. To help us find a solution, we prove a theorem giving the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) conditions for a general zero-sum stochastic differential game in a jump diffusion setting. We then use the theorem to study particular risk minimization problems. Finally, we extend our approach to cover general stochastic differential games (not necessarily zero-sum), and we obtain similar HJBI equations for the Nash equilibria of such games.     

Useful New Equilibria for Differential Games with Side Interests of the Participants

For conflict static and dynamic problems (described by differential equations) considered either on a game set common for all participants or on partly intersecting game sets, we propose new notions of conflict equilibria which are efficient for seeking the solutions of coalition-free and cooperative games and for specifying the hierarchy of all known equilibria. Several examples are used to show that, without the proposed new notions of equilibrium, an actually fair sharing may be impossible in cooperative games.     

余模范畴中的余倾斜预包络和余倾斜挠类

众所周知, Assem-Smal定理在倾斜理论中有重要的作用.本文的目的是建立一个在余模范畴中的Assem-Smal定理的版本,并通过利用预包络理论来刻画余模范畴中的余倾斜挠类.     

A regular equilibrium solves the extended HJB system

Control problems not admitting the dynamic programming principle are known as time-inconsistent. The game-theoretic approach is to interpret such problems as intrapersonal dynamic games and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A fundamental result of time-inconsistent stochastic control is a verification theorem saying that solving the extended HJB system is a sufficient condition for equilibrium. We show that solving the extended HJB system is a necessary condition for equilibrium, under regularity assumptions. The controlled process is a general Itô diffusion.     

On risk minimizing portfolios under a Markovian regime-switching Black-Scholes economy

We consider a risk minimization problem in a continuous-time Markovian regime-switching financial model modulated by a continuous-time, observable and finite-state Markov chain whose states represent different market regimes. We adopt a particular form of convex risk measure, which includes the entropic risk measure as a particular case, as a measure of risk. The risk-minimization problem is formulated as a Markovian regime-switching version of a two-player, zero-sum stochastic differential game. One important feature of our model is to allow the flexibility of controlling both the diffusion process representing the financial risk and the Markov chain representing macro-economic risk. This is novel and interesting from both the perspectives of stochastic differential game and stochastic control. A verification theorem for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) solution of the game is provided and some particular cases are discussed.     

New Method to Characterize Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Differential Games

In this paper, we present a method for computing Nash equilibria in feedback strategies. This method gives necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize subgame perfect equilibria by means of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This characterization allows one to know explicitly the solution of the game in some cases. In other cases, this approach makes a qualitative study easier. We apply this method to nonrenewable resource games.     

On the Selection of One Feedback Nash Equilibrium in Discounted Linear-Quadratic Games

We study a selection method for a Nash feedback equilibrium of a one-dimensional linear-quadratic nonzero-sum game over an infinite horizon. By introducing a change in the time variable, one obtains an associated game over a finite horizon T > 0 and with free terminal state. This associated game admits a unique solution which converges to a particular Nash feedback equilibrium of the original problem as the horizon T goes to infinity.     

Heston随机波动率模型下带负债的投资组合博弈

本文研究了Heston随机波动模型下两个投资人之间的随机微分投资组合博弈问题。假设金融市场上存在价格过程服从常微分方程的无风险资产和价格过程服从Heston随机波动率模型的风险资产。该博弈问题被构造成两个效用最大化问题,每个投资者的目标是最大化终止时刻个人财富与竞争对手财富差的效用。首先,我们应用动态规划原理,得出了相应值函数所满足的HJB方程。然后,得到了在幂期望效用框架下非零和博弈的均衡投资策略和值函数的显式表达。最后,借助数值模拟,分析了模型中的参数对均衡投资策略和值函数的影响,从而为资产负债管理提供一定的理论指导。     

伊藤-泊松型随机微分方程的线性二次控制

本文研究伊藤-泊松型随机微分方程的线性二次控制问题,利用动态规划方法、伊藤公式等技巧,通过解HJB方程,我们得到了随机Riccati方程及另外两个微分方程,求出控制变量,解决了线性二次最优控制最优问题.     

Linear–quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential games: Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria

In this paper, we consider a linear–quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential game. Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are introduced. The existence of the former is characterized by the solvability of a system of forward–backward stochastic differential equations, and that of the latter is characterized by the solvability of a system of coupled symmetric Riccati differential equations. Sometimes, open-loop Nash equilibria admit a closed-loop representation, via the solution to a system of non-symmetric Riccati equations, which could be different from the outcome of the closed-loop Nash equilibria in general. However, it is found that for the case of zero-sum differential games, the Riccati equation system for the closed-loop representation of an open-loop saddle point coincides with that for the closed-loop saddle point, which leads to the conclusion that the closed-loop representation of an open-loop saddle point is the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop saddle point as long as both exist. In particular, for linear–quadratic optimal control problem, the closed-loop representation of an open-loop optimal control coincides with the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop optimal strategy, provided both exist.     

Reflected BSDEs with nonpositive jumps,and controller-and-stopper games

We study a class of reflected backward stochastic differential equations with nonpositive jumps and upper barrier. Existence and uniqueness of a minimal solution are proved by a double penalization approach under regularity assumptions on the obstacle. In a suitable regime switching diffusion framework, we show the connection between our class of BSDEs and fully nonlinear variational inequalities. Our BSDE representation provides in particular a Feynman–Kac type formula for PDEs associated to general zero-sum stochastic differential controller-and-stopper games, where control affects both drift and diffusion term, and the diffusion coefficient can be degenerate. Moreover, we state a dual game formula of this BSDE minimal solution involving equivalent change of probability measures, and discount processes. This gives in particular a new representation for zero-sum stochastic differential controller-and-stopper games.     

Conservation laws and asymptotic behavior of a model of social dynamics

A conservative social dynamics model is developed within a discrete kinetic framework for active particles, which has been proposed in [M.L. Bertotti, L. Delitala, From discrete kinetic and stochastic game theory to modelling complex systems in applied sciences, Math. Mod. Meth. Appl. Sci. 14 (2004) 1061–1084]. The model concerns a society in which individuals, distinguished by a scalar variable (the activity) which expresses their social state, undergo competitive and/or cooperative interactions. The evolution of the discrete probability distribution over the social state is described by a system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations. The asymptotic trend of their solutions is investigated both analytically and computationally. Existence, stability and attractivity of certain equilibria are proved.     

Optimal control of stochastic functional differential equations with a bounded memory

This paper treats a finite time horizon optimal control problem in which the controlled state dynamics are governed by a general system of stochastic functional differential equations with a bounded memory. An infinite dimensional Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation is derived using a Bellman-type dynamic programming principle. It is shown that the value function is the unique viscosity solution of the HJB equation.     

奇异Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程粘性解的存在唯一性

研究系数在边界点有奇性的一类Hamilt on- Jacobi- Bellman (HJB)方程的粘性解的存在唯一性问题及解的渐近估计,这类问题包括波动系数振荡或爆破的情况.奇异HJB方程在随机最优控制和金融数学等许多领域都有重要的应用,包括金融数学中的随机利率模型.应用粘性上下解理论建立了一类奇异HJB方程的比较原理,给出了粘性解存在唯一性的条件.     

The Bismut-Elworthy formula for backward SDE's and applications to nonlinear Kolmogorov equations and control in infinite dimensional spaces

We consider a forward-backward system of stochastic evolution equations in a Hilbert space. Under nondegeneracy assumptions on the diffusion coefficient (that may be nonconstant) we prove an analogue of the well-known Bismut-Elworthy formula. Next, we consider a nonlinear version of the Kolmogorov equation, i.e. a deterministic quasilinear equation associated to the system according to Pardoux, E and Peng, S. (1992). "Backward stochastic differential equations and quasilinear parabolic partial differential equations". In: Rozowskii, B.L., Sowers, R.B. (Eds.), Stochastic Partial Differential Equations and Their Applications , Lecture Notes in Control Inf. Sci., Vol. 176, pp. 200-217. Springer: Berlin. The Bismut-Elworthy formula is applied to prove smoothing effect, i.e. to prove existence and uniqueness of a solution which is differentiable with respect to the space variable, even if the initial datum and (some) coefficients of the equation are not. The results are then applied to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of stochastic optimal control. This way we are able to characterize optimal controls by feedback laws for a class of infinite-dimensional control systems, including in particular the stochastic heat equation with state-dependent diffusion coefficient.     

OPTIMAL RECOVERY OF A SHARED RESOURCE STOCK: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL WITH EFFICIENT MEMORY EQUILIBRIA

We consider an optimal two-country management of depleted transboundary renewable resources. The management problem is modelled as a differential game, in which memory strategies are used. The countries negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient harvesting programs. They monitor the evolution of the agreement, and they memorize deviations from the agreement in the past. If the agreement is observed by the countries, they continue cooperation. If one of the countries breaches the contract, then both countries continue in a noncooperative management mode for the rest of the game. This noncooperative option is called a threat policy. The credibility of the threats is guaranteed by their equilibrium property. Transfer or side payments are studied as a particular cooperative management program. Transfer payments allow one country to buy out the other from the fishery for the purpose of eliminating the inefficiency caused by the joint access to the resources. It is shown that efficient equilibria can be reached in a class of resource management games, which allow the use of memory strategies. In particular, continuous time transfer payments (e.g., a share of the harvest) should be used instead of a once-and-for-all transfer payment.     

A Deterministic Approach To Stochastic Optimal Control With Application To Anticipative Control

Using the decomposition of solution of SDE, we consider the stochastic optimal control problem with anticipative controls as a family of deterministic control problems parametrized by the paths of the driving Wiener process and of a newly introduced Lagrange multiplier stochastic process (nonanticipativity equality constraint). It is shown that the value function of these problems is the unique global solution of a robust equation (random partial differential equation) associated to a linear backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman stochastic partial differential equation (HJB SPDE). This appears as limiting SPDE for a sequence of random HJB PDE's when linear interpolation approximation of the Wiener process is used. Our approach extends the Wong-Zakai type results [20] from SDE to the stochastic dynamic programming equation by showing how this arises as average of the limit of a sequence of deterministic dynamic programming equations. The stochastic characteristics method of Kunita [13] is used to represent the value function. By choosing the Lagrange multiplier equal to its nonanticipative constraint value the usual stochastic (nonanticipative) optimal control and optimal cost are recovered. This suggests a method for solving the anticipative control problems by almost sure deterministic optimal control. We obtain a PDE for the “cost of perfect information” the difference between the cost function of the nonanticipative control problem and the cost of the anticipative problem which satisfies a nonlinear backward HJB SPDE. Poisson bracket conditions are found ensuring this has a global solution. The cost of perfect information is shown to be zero when a Lagrangian submanifold is invariant for the stochastic characteristics. The LQG problem and a nonlinear anticipative control problem are considered as examples in this framework