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René van den Brink 《TOP》2017,25(1):1-33
In the field of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, various restrictions on coalition formation are studied. The most studied restrictions are those that arise from restricted communication and hierarchies. This survey discusses several models of hierarchy restrictions and their relation with communication restrictions. In the literature, there are results on game properties, Harsanyi dividends, core stability, and various solutions that generalize existing solutions for TU-games. In this survey, we mainly focus on axiomatizations of the Shapley value in different models of games with a hierarchically structured player set, and their applications. Not only do these axiomatizations provide insight in the Shapley value for these models, but also by considering the types of axioms that characterize the Shapley value, we learn more about different network structures. A central model of games with hierarchies is that of games with a permission structure where players in a cooperative transferable utility game are part of a permission structure in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. This permission structure is represented by a directed graph. Generalizations of this model are, for example, games on antimatroids, and games with a local permission structure. Besides discussing these generalizations, we briefly discuss some applications, in particular auction games and hierarchically structured firms. 相似文献
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René van den Brink 《International Journal of Game Theory》2010,39(3):445-466
In games with a permission structure it is assumed that players in a cooperative transferable utility game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there
are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. We provide axiomatic characterizations
of Banzhaf permission values being solutions that are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to modified TU-games. In these characterizations we use power-
and player split neutrality properties. These properties state that splitting a player’s authority and/or contribution over two players does not change
the sum of their payoffs. 相似文献
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Josep Freixas 《International Journal of Game Theory》2010,39(4):513-527
In this paper I consider the ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for TU cooperative games, i.e., cooperative games for which the preorderings on the set
of players induced by these two values coincide. To this end I consider several solution concepts within semivalues and introduce
three subclasses of games which are called, respectively, weakly complete, semicoherent and coherent cooperative games. A
characterization theorem in terms of the ordinal equivalence of some semivalues is given for each of these three classes of
cooperative games. In particular, the Shapley and Banzhaf values as well as the segment of semivalues they limit are ordinally
equivalent for weakly complete, semicoherent and coherent cooperative games. 相似文献
5.
René van den Brink Ilya Katsev Gerard van der Laan 《International Journal of Game Theory》2011,40(3):591-616
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation
problems there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we consider a class of games with a permission structure describing situations in which players in a cooperative TU-game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players
that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. The corresponding restricted game takes account
of the limited cooperation possibilities by assigning to every coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset. In this
paper we provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with a permission structure which economic applications include
auction games, dual airport games, dual polluted river games and information market games. 相似文献
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Jesús-Mario Bilbao 《International Journal of Game Theory》1998,27(1):131-145
Games with cooperation structure are cooperative games with a family offeasible coalitions, that describes which coalitions can negotiate in the game. We study a model ofcooperation structure and the corresponding restricted game, in which the feasible coalitions are those belonging to apartition system. First, we study a recursive procedure for computing the Hart and Mas-Colell potential of these games and we develop the relation between the dividends of Harsanyi in the restricted game and the worths in the original game. The properties ofpartition convex geometries are used to obtain formulas for theShapley andBanzhaf values of the players in the restricted game in terms of the original gamev. Finally, we consider the Owen multilinear extension for the restricted game.The author is grateful to Paul Edelman, Ulrich Faigle and the referees for their comments and suggestions. The proof of Theorem 1 was proposed by the associate editor's referee. 相似文献
8.
讨论一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策,其中局中人通过优先联盟整体参与大联盟的合作,同时优先联盟内部有合取权限结构限制,利用两阶段Shapley值的分配思想并考虑到权限结构对优先联盟内合作的限制,给出了此类合作对策的解。 该解可看做具有联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值的推广。 证明了该解满足的公理化条件,并验证了这些条件的独立性。 相似文献
9.
This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and Owen. In their model, the feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs. Another type of model is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink. In their model, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a so-called permission structure. Faigle proposed a general model for cooperative games defined on lattice structures. In this paper, the restrictions to the cooperation are given by a combinatorial structure called augmenting system which generalizes antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. In this framework, the core and the Weber set of games on augmenting systems are introduced and it is proved that monotone convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we obtain a characterization of the convexity of these games in terms of the core of the game and the Weber set of the extended game. 相似文献
10.
A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a situation in which players in a cooperative TU-game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. In this paper we consider non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure. For such a game we provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the induced restricted game. The algorithm is applied to a market situation where sellers can sell objects to buyers through a directed network of intermediaries. 相似文献
11.
The aim of this paper is to study a new class of cooperative games called interior operator games. These games are additive
games restricted by antimatroids. We consider several types of cooperative games as peer group games, big boss games, clan
games and information market games and show that all of them are interior operator games. Next, we analyze the properties
of these games and compute the Shapley, Banzhaf and Tijs values. 相似文献
12.
《Mathematical Social Sciences》1988,15(1):1-10
It is shown that the restriction of the Shapley value to the lattice of all monotonic games whose range is contained in an arbitrary set of non-negative real numbers (which contains 0) can be uniquely characterized by the axioms that were given by Dubey (in order to characterize the Shapley value on the class of monotonic simple games). We also derive formulas for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices in terms of the minimal winning coalitions of the game. 相似文献
13.
This study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one-point solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency, the balanced cycle contributions property (BCC), and the axioms related to invariance under a player deletion is characterized as a corollary of our general result. BCC is a weaker requirement than the well-known balanced contributions property. Any one-point solution that is both symmetric and linear satisfies BCC. The invariance axioms necessitate that the deletion of a specific player from games does not affect the other players’ payoffs, and this deletion is different with respect to solutions. As corollaries of the above characterization result, we are able to characterize the well-known one-point solutions, the Shapley, egalitarian, and solidarity values, in a unified manner. We also studied characterizations of an inefficient one-point solution, the Banzhaf value that is a well-known alternative to the Shapley value. 相似文献
14.
本文结合文[1,2]中关于拟阵上静态结构和动态结构合作对策Shapley函数的描述,探讨了两类拟阵上的Banzhaf函数.通过给出相应的公理体系,论述了两类拟阵上Banzhaf函数的存在性和唯一性,拓展了拟阵上分配指标的研究范围.同时讨论了两类合作对策上Banzhaf函数的有关性质.最后通过算例来说明局中人在此类合作对策中的Banzhaf指标. 相似文献
15.
Cooperative games are considered where only those coalitions of players are feasible that respect a given precedence structure on the set of players. Strengthening the classical symmetry axiom, we obtain three axioms that give rise to a unique Shapley value in this model. The Shapley value is seen to reflect the expected marginal contribution of a player to a feasible random coalition, which allows us to evaluate the Shapley value nondeterministically. We show that every exact algorithm for the Shapley value requires an exponential number of operations already in the classical case and that even restriction to simple games is #P-hard in general. Furthermore, we outline how the multi-choice cooperative games of Hsiao and Raghavan can be treated in our context, which leads to a Shapley value that does not depend on pre-assigned weights. Finally, the relationship between the Shapley value and the permission value of Gilles, Owen and van den Brink is discussed. Both refer to formally similar models of cooperative games but reflect complementary interpretations of the precedence constraints and thus give rise to fundamentally different solution concepts. 相似文献
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P. Dubey 《International Journal of Game Theory》1975,4(3):131-139
L.S. Shapley [1953] showed that there is a unique value defined on the classD of all superadditive cooperative games in characteristic function form (over a finite player setN) which satisfies certain intuitively plausible axioms. Moreover, he raised the question whether an axiomatic foundation could be obtained for a value (not necessarily theShapley value) in the context of the subclassC (respectivelyC′, C″) of simple (respectively simple monotonic, simple superadditive) gamesalone. This paper shows that it is possible to do this. Theorem I gives a new simple proof ofShapley's theorem for the classG ofall games (not necessarily superadditive) overN. The proof contains a procedure for showing that the axioms also uniquely specify theShapley value when they are restricted to certain subclasses ofG, e.g.,C. In addition it provides insight intoShapley's theorem forD itself. Restricted toC′ orC″, Shapley's axioms donot specify a unique value. However it is shown in theorem II that, with a reasonable variant of one of his axioms, a unique value is obtained and, fortunately, it is just theShapley value again. 相似文献
17.
We introduce and compare several coalition values for multichoice games. Albizuri defined coalition structures and an extension of the Owen coalition value for multichoice games using the average marginal contribution of a player over a set of orderings of the player’s representatives. Following an approach used for cooperative games, we introduce a set of nested or two-step coalition values on multichoice games which measure the value of each coalition and then divide this among the players in the coalition using either a Shapley or Banzhaf value at each step. We show that when a Shapley value is used in both steps, the resulting coalition value coincides with that of Albizuri. We axiomatize the three new coalition values and show that each set of axioms, including that of Albizuri, is independent. Further we show how the multilinear extension can be used to compute the coalition values. We conclude with a brief discussion about the applicability of the different values. 相似文献
18.
An axiomatic characterization of ‘a Banzhaf score’ notion is provided for a class of games called (j,k) simple games with a numeric measure associated to the output set, i.e., games with n players, j ordered qualitative alternatives in the input level and k possible ordered quantitative alternatives in the output. Three Banzhaf measures are also introduced which can be used to
determine a player's ‘a priori’ value in such a game. We illustrate by means of several real world examples how to compute
these measures.
Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional
Development Fund. 相似文献
19.
This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and Owen. In their model, the feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs. Another type of model is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink. In their model, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a so-called permission structure. Faigle proposed another model for cooperative games defined on lattice structures. We introduce a combinatorial structure called augmenting system which is a generalization of the antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. In this framework, the Shapley value of games on augmenting systems is introduced and two axiomatizations of this value are showed. 相似文献
20.
N. I. Naumova 《International Journal of Game Theory》2005,33(4):523-534
Let f be a single valued solution for cooperative TU games that satisfies inessential game property, efficiency, Hart Mas-Colell
consistency and for two person games is strictly monotonic and individually unbounded. Then there exists a family of strictly
increasing functions associated with players that completely determines f. For two person games, both players have equal differences between their functions at the solution point and at the values
of characteristic function of their singletons. This solution for two person games is uniquely extended to n person games due to consistency and efficiency. The extension uses the potential with respect to the family of functions
and generalizes potentials introduced by Hart and Mas Colell [6]. The weighted Shapley values, the proportional value described
by Ortmann [11], and new values generated by power functions are among these solutions.
The author is grateful to anonymous referee and Associate Editor for their comments and suggestions. 相似文献