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1.
This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and Owen. In their model, the feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs. Another type of model is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink. In their model, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a so-called permission structure. Faigle proposed another model for cooperative games defined on lattice structures. We introduce a combinatorial structure called augmenting system which is a generalization of the antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. In this framework, the Shapley value of games on augmenting systems is introduced and two axiomatizations of this value are showed. 相似文献
2.
1977年, Myerson建立了以图作为合作结构的可转移效用博弈模型(也称图博弈), 并提出了一个分配规则, 也即"Myerson 值", 它推广了著名的Shapley值. 该模型假定每个连通集合(通过边直接或间接内部相连的参与者集合)才能形成可行的合作联盟而取得相应的收益, 而不考虑连通集合的具体结构. 引入图的局部边密度来度量每个连通集合中各成员之间联系的紧密程度, 即以该连通集合的导出子图的边密度来作为他们的收益系数, 并由此定义了具有边密度的Myerson值, 证明了具有边密度的Myerson值可以由"边密度分支有效性"和"公平性"来唯一确定. 相似文献
3.
Cooperation structures without any a priori assumptions on the combinatorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for marginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic function, which is equivalent to the Lovász extension in the special situation of a classical cooperative game. It is shown that convexity of a cooperation structure is tantamount to the equality of the associated core and Weber set. Extending Myerson’s graph model for game theoretic communication, general communication structures are introduced and it is shown that a notion of supermodularity exists for this class that characterizes convexity and properly extends Shapley’s convexity model for classical cooperative games. 相似文献
4.
A. van den Nouweland S. Tijs J. Potters J. Zarzuelo 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》1995,41(3):289-311
A multi-choice game is a generalization of a cooperative game in which each player has several activity levels. Cooperative games form a subclass of the class of multi-choice games.This paper extends some solution concepts for cooperative games to multi-choice games. In particular, the notions of core, dominance core and Weber set are extended. Relations between cores and dominance cores and between cores and Weber sets are extensively studied. A class of flow games is introduced and relations with non-negative games with non-empty cores are investigated. 相似文献
5.
Michel Grabisch 《4OR: A Quarterly Journal of Operations Research》2009,7(3):207-238
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting
of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In many situations,
this assumption is too strong and one has to deal with some unfeasible coalitions. Defining a game on a subcollection of the
power set of the set of players has many implications on the mathematical structure of the core, depending on the precise
structure of the subcollection of feasible coalitions. Many authors have contributed to this topic, and we give a unified
view of these different results. 相似文献
6.
Michel Grabisch 《Annals of Operations Research》2013,204(1):33-64
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In many situations, this assumption is too strong and one has to deal with some unfeasible coalitions. Defining a game on a subcollection of the power set of the set of players has many implications on the mathematical structure of the core, depending on the precise structure of the subcollection of feasible coalitions. Many authors have contributed to this topic, and we give a unified view of these different results. 相似文献
7.
《Operations Research Letters》2020,48(2):142-146
A directed graph game consists of a cooperative game with transferable utility and a digraph which describes limited cooperation and the dominance relation among the players. Under the assumption that only coalitions of strongly connected players are able to fully cooperate, we introduce the digraph-restricted game in which a non-strongly connected coalition can only realize the sum of the worths of its strong components. The Myerson value for directed graph games is defined as the Shapley value of the digraph-restricted game. We establish axiomatic characterizations of the Myerson value for directed graph games by strong component efficiency and either fairness or bi-fairness. 相似文献
8.
We introduce directed acyclic graph (DAG) games, a generalization of standard tree games, to study cost sharing on networks. This structure has not been previously analyzed from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. Every monotonic and subadditive cost game—including monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games—can be modeled as a DAG-game. We provide an efficiently verifiable condition satisfied by a large class of directed acyclic graphs that is sufficient for the balancedness of the associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of the coalitions that is sufficient to determine the core. This result also guarantees that the nucleolus can be found in polynomial time for a large class of DAG-games. 相似文献
9.
在合作博弈的一般模型中总是假设所有联盟都能形成。不过,在实际中由于受到一些因素的制约,有些联盟是不能形成的。基于此,Myerson提出了具有图通讯结构的合作博弈。Myerson值和Position值是超图博弈上的两个重要分配规则。2005年,Slikker给出了在图博弈上Position值的公理化刻画。但超图博弈上Position值的公理化刻画一直悬而未决。本文通过引入 “赋权平衡超边贡献公理”,并结合经典的“分支有效性”,提出了超图博弈上赋权Position值的公理化刻画。作为推论,解决了超图博弈上Position值的公理化刻画问题。 相似文献
10.
We prove a theorem on the intersection of the Weber sets (Weber, 1988) of two ordered cooperative games. From this theorem several consequences are derived, the inclusion of the core in the Weber set (Weber, 1988), the fact that every convex game has a large core (Sharkey, 1982), and a discrete separation theorem (Frank, 1982). We introduce a definition of general largeness, proving that the Weber set is large for any cooperative game.Institutional support from research grants SGR2001-0029 and BEC 2002-00642 is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
11.
A. S. Belenky 《Mathematical and Computer Modelling》2002,36(11-13)
Two games of interacting between a coalition of players in a marketplace and the residual players acting there are discussed, along with two approaches to fair imputation of gains of coalitions in cooperative games that are based on the concepts of the Shapley vector and core of a cooperative game. In the first game, which is an antagonistic one, the residual players try to minimize the coalition's gain, whereas in the second game, which is a noncooperative one, they try to maximize their own gain as a coalition. A meaningful interpretation of possible relations between gains and Nash equilibrium strategies in both games considered as those played between a coalition of firms and its surrounding in a particular marketplace in the framework of two classes of n-person games is presented. A particular class of games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in which models of firms operating in the marketplace are those with linear constraints and utility functions being sums of linear and bilinear functions of two corresponding vector arguments is analyzed, and a set of maximin problems on polyhedral sets of connected strategies which the problem of choosing a coalition for a particular firm is reducible to are formulated based on the firm models of the considered kind. 相似文献
12.
13.
We introduce the intermediate set as an interpolating solution concept between the core and the Weber set of a coalitional game. The new solution is defined as the limiting superdifferential of the Lovász extension and thus it completes the hierarchy of variational objects used to represent the core (Fréchet superdifferential) and the Weber set (Clarke superdifferential). It is shown that the intermediate set is a non-convex solution containing the Pareto optimal payoff vectors that depend on some chain of coalitions and marginal coalitional contributions with respect to the chain. A detailed comparison between the intermediate set and other set-valued solutions is provided. We compute the exact form of intermediate set for all games and provide its simplified characterization for the simple games and the glove game. 相似文献
14.
J. M. Bilbao J. R. Fernández N. Jiménez J. J. López 《International Journal of Game Theory》2007,36(2):209-222
This paper studies two classical solution concepts for the structure of bicooperative games. First, we define the core and
the Weber set of a bicooperative game and prove that the core is always contained in the Weber set. Next, we introduce a special
class of bicooperative games, the so-called bisupermodular games, and show that these games are the only ones in which the
core and the Weber set coincide.
相似文献
15.
This paper deals with the concepts of core and Weber set with a priori unions à la Owen. As far as we know, the Owen approach to games with a priori unions has never been studied from the coalitional stability point of view. Thus we introduce the coalitional core and coalitional Weber set and characterize the class of convex games with a priori unions by means of the relationships between both solution concepts. 相似文献
16.
在具有联盟结构的合作对策中,针对局中人以某种程度参与到合作中的情况,研究了模糊联盟结构的合作对策的收益分配问题。首先,定义了具有模糊联盟结构的合作对策及相关概念。其次,定义了Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心,提出了该核心与联盟核心之间的关系,对于强凸联盟对策,证明Choquet积分形式的模糊Owen值属于其所对应的模糊联盟核心。最后通过算例,对该分配模型的可行性进行分析。 相似文献
17.
Multichoice games have been introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan as a generalization of classical cooperative games. An important
notion in cooperative game theory is the core of the game, as it contains the rational imputations for players. We propose
two definitions for the core of a multichoice game, the first one is called the precore and is a direct generalization of
the classical definition. We show that the precore coincides with the definition proposed by Faigle, and that the set of imputations
may be unbounded, which makes its application questionable. A second definition is proposed, imposing normalization at each
level, causing the core to be a convex compact set. We study its properties, introducing balancedness and marginal worth vectors,
and defining the Weber set and the pre-Weber set. We show that the classical properties of inclusion of the (pre)core into
the (pre)-Weber set as well as their coincidence in the convex case remain valid. A last section makes a comparison with the
core defined by Van den Nouweland et al.
A preliminary and short version of this paper has been presented at 4th Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice meeting, Caen,
France, June 2005 (Xie and Grabisch 2005). 相似文献
18.
Pillage games (Jordan, 2006a) have two features that make them richer than cooperative games in either characteristic or partition function form: they allow power externalities between coalitions; they allow resources to contribute to coalitions’ power as well as to their utility. Extending von Neumann and Morgenstern’s analysis of three agent games in characteristic function form to anonymous pillage games, we characterise the core for any number of agents; for three agents, all anonymous pillage games with an empty core represent the same dominance relation. When a stable set exists, and the game also satisfies a continuity and a responsiveness axiom, it is unique and contains no more than 15 elements, a tight bound. By contrast, stable sets in three agent games in characteristic or partition function form may not be unique, and may contain continua. Finally, we provide an algorithm for computing the stable set, and can easily decide non-existence. Thus, in addition to offering attractive modelling possibilities, pillage games seem well behaved and analytically tractable, overcoming a difficulty that has long impeded use of cooperative game theory’s flexibility. 相似文献
19.
Daniel Granot 《Mathematical Programming》1986,34(2):212-222
We introduce a generalized linear production model whose attractive feature being that the resources held by any subset of producersS is not restricted to be the vector sum of the resources held by the members ofS. We provide sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of the associated generalized linear production game, and show that if the core of the game is not empty then a solution in it can be produced from a dual optimal solution to the associated linear programming problem. Our generalized linear production model is a proper generalization of the linear production model introduced by Owen, and it can be used to analyze cooperative games which cannot be studied in the ordinary linear production model framework. We use the generalized model to show that the cooperative game induced by a network optimization problem in which players are the nodes of the network has a non-empty core. We further employ our model to prove the non-emptiness of the core of two other classes of cooperative games, which were not previously studied in the literature, and we also use our generalized model to provide an alternative proof for the non-emptiness of the core of the class of minimum cost spanning tree games. Thus, it appears that the generalized linear production model is a unifying model which can be used to explain the non-emptiness of the core of cooperative games generated by various, seemingly different, optimization models.This research was partially done while the author was visiting the Graduate School of Business Administration at Tel-Aviv University. The research was partially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Canada Grant A4181 and by SSHRC leave fellowship 451-83-0030.Dedicated to George B. Dantzig. 相似文献
20.
Imma Curiel Herbert Hamers Stef Tijs Jos Potters 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》1997,45(2):213-220
Curiel, Potters, Prasad, Tijs and Veltman (1993) introduced component additive games which are cooperative TU games that arise by imposing an order on the player set. Further, they introduced the -rule which allocates a core element to each component additive game.In this paper we consider the class of restricted component additive games that arise by restricting the attention to head-tail coalitions. The extreme points of the corresponding restricted core are characterized. Further, it is shown that the -rule is the barycenter of the corresponding restricted core and that the -rule coincides with the nucleolus of this restricted game. 相似文献