客源充足情境下的customer-intensive服务策略研究

在customer-intensive服务中服务速度越慢,顾客的效用就越高,然而等待时间也随之变长;而服务商则需对服务速度和价格进行决策,以求获得最优收益。本文基于客源丰富的服务垄断商对此问题采用M/M/1排队模型进行了研究,将顾客成本细分为时间成本和焦虑成本,给出了最优服务速度和价格。研究发现,单位焦虑成本的增加造成了服务商收益的减少,但对收益的影响要小于单位时间成本。最后,提出了服务商投入一定的服务成本来减少焦虑成本的策略,以达到获取更高收益的目的,并证明了策略的有效性。     

Customer equilibrium and optimal pricing in an M/G/1 queue with heterogeneous rewards and waiting cost rates

We consider an unobservable M/G/1 queue in which customers are allowed to join or balk upon arrival. The service provider charges the same admission fee to all joining customers. All joining customers receive a reward from completion of service and incur a waiting cost. The reward and waiting cost rate are random, however the customers know their own values upon arrival. We characterize the customer’s equilibrium strategy and the optimal prices associated with profit and social welfare maximization.     

Introducing competition in healthcare services: The role of private care and increased patient mobility

We study the operational implications from competition in the provision of healthcare services, in the context of national public healthcare systems in Europe. Specifically, we study the potential impact of two alternative ways through which policy makers have introduced such competition: (i) via the introduction of private hospitals to operate alongside public hospitals and (ii) via the introduction of increased patient choice to grant European patients the freedom to choose the country they receive treatment at. We use a game-theoretic framework with a queueing component to capture the interactions among the patients, the hospitals and the healthcare funders. Specifically, we analyze two different sequential games and obtain closed form expressions for the patients’ waiting time and the funders’ reimbursement cost in equilibrium. We show that the presence of a private provider can be beneficial to the public system: the patients’ waiting time will decrease and the funders’ cost can decrease under certain conditions. Also, we show that the cross-border healthcare policy, which increases patient mobility, can also be beneficial to the public systems: when welfare requirements across countries are sufficiently close, all funders can reduce their costs without increasing the patients’ waiting time. Our analysis implies that in border regions, where the cost of crossing the border is low, “outsourcing” the high-cost country’s elective care services to the low-cost country is a viable strategy from which both countries’ systems can benefit.     

Uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism in a two-tier healthcare system under a co-payment policy

Recently, the lengthy waiting time in public hospitals (called the public system) under the free healthcare policy has become a serious problem. To address this issue, motivated by the Japanese healthcare system, this paper investigates a two-tier co-payment healthcare system under a uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism. In such a setting, the public system and the private system (i.e., the private hospitals) compete for market share with different objectives, whereas the government uniformly sets the service price and the subsidy rate to maximize social welfare under a total budget constraint. Compared with two free healthcare policy cases implemented in the Canadian and Australian healthcare systems respectively in terms of social welfare, the results show that when the market demand (or the patient service quality sensitivity) is sufficiently high (sufficiently low), the uniform pricing and subsidy coordination mechanism is better and worse otherwise; and when the patient's waiting sensitivity (or the total government budget) is in an appropriate middle range (sufficiently low or high), the mechanism can outperform than the free policy cases.     

Comparison of socially optimal and profit maximizing prices in an unobservable queue with heterogeneous waiting costs

We consider a general unobservable queueing model in which customers are allowed to join or balk upon arrival. The service provider charges the same admission fee to all joining customers. All joining customers receive the same reward and incur heterogeneous waiting cost rates. We show that the socially optimal arrival rate is greater than or equal to the profit maximizing arrival rate. Equivalently, the socially optimal admission fee is smaller than or equal to the profit maximizing admission fee.     

Optimal Operating Policy for a Random Additional Service Facility

This paper studies the steady state behaviour of a Markovian queue wherein there is a regular service facility serving the units one by one. A search for an additional service facility for the service of a group of units is started when the queue length increases to K (0 < K < L), where L is the maximum waiting space. The search is dropped when the queue length reduces to some tolerable fixed size L - N. The availability time of an additional service facility is a random variable. The model is directed towards finding the optimal operating policy (N,K) for a queueing system with a linear cost structure.     

Make waiting not to seem like waiting: Capacity management of waiting-area entertainment

To operationalize the psychological principle that “occupied time feels shorter than unoccupied time”, it is common for service providers to offer entertainment options in the waiting areas. Typical examples that put in practice this mechanism include amusement parks, car dealers, airports, hospitals, restaurants, etc. In this paper, we study a queueing system where the server provides entertainment services to waiting customers. Assuming customers are strategic and delay-sensitive, we formulate a game-theoretical model and study customers' equilibrium behavior in response to this mechanism. Because offering waiting-area entertainment incurs extra operational costs, we discuss whether and when this option will benefit the service provider and obtain the optimal entertainment capacity that maximizes the system's profit. Our analysis reveals that this option is appealing if and only if the market size is intermediate and that the optimal capacity of the entertainment is a unimodal function in the market size. Our insights continue to remain valid when the service fee becomes endogenous.     

Analysis of a two-phase queueing system with a fixed-size batch policy

We consider a single-server, two-phase queueing system with a fixed-size batch policy. Customers arrive at the system according to a Poisson process and receive batch service in the first-phase followed by individual services in the second-phase. The batch service in the first-phase is applied for a fixed number (k) of customers. If the number of customers waiting for the first-phase service is less than k when the server completes individual services, the system stays idle until the queue length reaches k. We derive the steady state distribution for the system’s queue length. We also show that the stochastic decomposition property can be applied to our model. Finally, we illustrate the process of finding the optimal batch size that minimizes the long-run average cost under a linear cost structure.     

Dynamic load balancing in parallel queueing systems: Stability and optimal control

We consider a system of parallel queues with dedicated arrival streams. At each decision epoch a decision-maker can move customers from one queue to another. The cost for moving customers consists of a fixed cost and a linear, variable cost dependent on the number of customers moved. There are also linear holding costs that may depend on the queue in which customers are stored. Under very mild assumptions, we develop stability (and instability) conditions for this system via a fluid model. Under the assumption of stability, we consider minimizing the long-run average cost. In the case of two-servers the optimal control policy is shown to prefer to store customers in the lowest cost queue. When the inter-arrival and service times are assumed to be exponential, we use a Markov decision process formulation to show that for a fixed number of customers in the system, there exists a level S such that whenever customers are moved from the high cost queue to the low cost queue, the number of customers moved brings the number of customers in the low cost queue to S. These results lead to the development of a heuristic for the model with more than two servers.     

Revenue-maximizing pricing and scheduling strategies in service systems with flexible customers

We propose a model of service operations systems in which customers are heterogeneous both in terms of their private delay sensitivity and flexibility. A service provider maximizes revenue through jointly optimal pricing and steady-state scheduling strategies. We provide a complete analysis for this generally intractable problem. Interestingly, when one queue accommodates a large population of impatient customers, it may be desirable to strategically idle the server in the other queue, which is a phenomenon new to the literature.     

To wait or not to wait: Strategic behaviors in an observable batch-service queueing system

This paper deals with an observable batch service queueing system in which customers rationally choose whether to form a batch with another customer or not, in addition to deciding whether or not to join the queue. When choosing whether to form a batch, a customer in an incomplete batch decides on an optimal waiting time for the next customer to arrive and share the service fee. When choosing whether to join the queue, customers follow a threshold strategy, which depends on the strategy identified in the former game.     

A server backup model with Markovian arrivals and phase type services

We consider a finite capacity queueing system with one main server who is supported by a backup server. We assume Markovian arrivals, phase type services, and a threshold-type server backup policy with two pre-determined lower and upper thresholds. A request for a backup server is made whenever the buffer size (number of customers in the queue) hits the upper threshold and the backup server is released from the system when the buffer size drops to the lower threshold or fewer at a service completion of the backup server. The request time for the backup server is assumed to be exponentially distributed. For this queuing model we perform the steady state analysis and derive a number of performance measures. We show that the busy periods of the main and backup servers, the waiting times in the queue and in the system, are of phase type. We develop a cost model to obtain the optimal threshold values and study the impact of fixed and variable costs for the backup server on the optimal server backup decisions. We show that the impact of standard deviations of the interarrival and service time distributions on the server backup decisions is quite different for small and large values of the arrival rates. In addition, the pattern of use of the backup server is very different when the arrivals are positively correlated compared to mutually independent arrivals.     

A Markovian queueing model for ambulance offload delays

Ambulance offload delays are a growing concern for health care providers in many countries. Offload delays occur when ambulance paramedics arriving at a hospital Emergency Department (ED) cannot transfer patient care to staff in the ED immediately. This is typically caused by overcrowding in the ED. Using queueing theory, we model the interface between a regional Emergency Medical Services (EMS) provider and multiple EDs that serve both ambulance and walk-in patients. We introduce Markov chain models for the system and solve for the steady state probability distributions of queue lengths and waiting times using matrix-analytic methods. We develop several algorithms for computing performance measures for the system, particularly the offload delays for ambulance patients. Using these algorithms, we analyze several three-hospital systems and assess the impact of system resources on offload delays. In addition, simulation is used to validate model assumptions.     

The Economics of the Hiring of Private Wires in Great Britain—A Simulation Study

The economics of hiring private telephone wires is considered in terms of the required grade of service, and the cost of the alternative public service. A maximum waiting time limitation is imposed and a simulation to determine the relationship between traffic offered to the private wire system and that accepted, is described.     

The Downs-Thomson Paradox: Existence, Uniqueness and Stability of User Equilibria

Consider a network where two routes are available for users wishing to travel from a source to a destination. On one route (which could be viewed as private transport) service slows as traffic increases. On the other (which could be viewed as public transport) the service frequency increases with demand. The Downs-Thomson paradox occurs when improvements in service produce an overall decline in performance as user equilibria adjust. Using the model proposed by Calvert [10], with a ⋅|M|1 queue corresponding to the private transport route, and a bulk-service infinite server queue modelling the public transport route, we give a complete analysis of this system in the setting of probabilistic routing. We obtain the user equilibria (which are not always unique), and determine their stability.AMS subject classification: 60K30, 90B15, 90B20, 91A10, 91A13This revised version was published online in June 2005 with corrected coverdate     

Analysis of a multi-level time-sharing model

The multi-level time sharing algorithm is studied. Each new job joins the bottom level queue. After each quantum of service it goes to the next higher level until it has completed service. The server always selects the job at the head of the lowest level nonempty queue. A constant overhead is incurred for each quantum of service. Mean waiting time and mean system delay cost are better than those of the round robin model.     

Naor’s model with heterogeneous customers and arrival rate uncertainty

This paper examines an extension of Naor’s observable queueing model in which the arrival rate is not known with certainty by either customers or the system manager. Further, customers are heterogeneous in terms of their service valuation and waiting time cost. We analyze the stability of the system and properties of the revenue maximizing fee and socially optimal fee.     

在D-策略控制下服务员单重休假且休假不中断的M/G/1排队系统分析

该文研究在D-策略控制下服务员单重休假且休假不中断的M/G/1 排队系统,其中当服务员休假结束归来时,如果系统中等待服务的顾客所需的总服务时间之和不小于事先给定的正数阀值D,服务员就立即开始服务.运用全概率分解技术、更新过程理论和拉普拉斯变换工具,本文在任意初始状态下讨论了队长的瞬态分布,导出了队长瞬态分布的拉普拉斯变...     

Two thresholds of a batch arrival queueing system under modified T vacation policy with startup and closedown

This paper studies the operating characteristics of the variant of an M^[x]/G/1 vacation queue with startup and closedown times. After all the customers are served in the system exhaustively, the server shuts down (deactivates) by a closedown time, and then takes at most J vacations of constant time length T repeatedly until at least one customer is found waiting in the queue upon returning from a vacation. If at least one customer is present in the system when the server returns from a vacation, then the server reactivates and requires a startup time before providing the service. On the other hand, if no customers arrive by the end of the J th vacation, the server remains dormant in the system until at least one customer arrives. We will call the vacation policy modified T vacation policy. We derive the steady‐state probability distribution of the system size and the queue waiting time. Other system characteristics are also investigated. The long‐run average cost function per unit time is developed to determine the suitable thresholds of T and J that yield a minimum cost. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

排队论在销售管理中的应用

销售性企业如何才能降低销售时的综合成本是一个值得研究的问题.以排队论为基础对这一问题展开讨论,分析了顾客到达企业时的排队方式,得出了单队多服务通道要比多队多服务通道排队方式要优;分析了系统的服务规则及评价指标,并建立了一个输入率可变、服务率可变且先到先服务的、有不耐烦顾客的销售模型,以及一个输入率可变、服务率可变且有非强占优先权的销售模型,分别得出了系统的平均服务率及顾客在系统中的平均等待时间,从而建立了企业销售时的综合成本函数,并结合实例给出了求综合成本函数最小值的方法.