On generalized operator quasi-equilibrium problems

In this paper, we will introduce the generalized operator equilibrium problem and generalized operator quasi-equilibrium problem which generalize the operator equilibrium problem due to Kazmi and Raouf [K.R. Kazmi, A. Raouf, A class of operator equilibrium problems, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 308 (2005) 554-564] into multi-valued and quasi-equilibrium problems. Using a Fan-Browder type fixed point theorem in [S. Park, Foundations of the KKM theory via coincidences of composites of upper semicontinuous maps, J. Korean Math. Soc. 31 (1994) 493-519] and an existence theorem of equilibrium for 1-person game in [X.-P. Ding, W.K. Kim, K.-K. Tan, Equilibria of non-compact generalized games with L^∗-majorized preferences, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 164 (1992) 508-517] as basic tools, we prove new existence theorems on generalized operator equilibrium problem and generalized operator quasi-equilibrium problem which includes operator equilibrium problems.     

Multistep games with information lag

One investigates multistep antagonistic games with a variable information lag with alternative sets of arbitrary cardinality. One gives a theorem on the properties of the measure on the set of the trajectories of the game, induced by measurable behavior strategies, and a functional relation which generalizes Bellman's optimality principle. One shows the validity of the results for the general case of dynamical games.Translated from Zapiski Nauchnykh Seminarov Leningradskogo Otdeleniya Matematicheskogo Instituta im. V. A. Steklova AN SSSR, Vol. 142, pp. 152–159, 1985.     

A set optimization approach to zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoffs

A new solution concept for two-player zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoffs is introduced. It is based on extensions of the vector order in \(\mathbb {R}^d\) to order relations in the power set of \(\mathbb {R}^d\), so-called set relations, and strictly motivated by the interpretation of the payoff as multi-dimensional loss for one and gain for the other player. The new concept provides coherent worst case estimates for games with multi-dimensional payoffs. It is shown that–in contrast to games with one-dimensional payoffs–the corresponding strategies are different from equilibrium strategies for games with multi-dimensional payoffs. The two concepts are combined into new equilibrium notions for which existence theorems are given. Relationships of the new concepts to existing ones such as Shapley and vector equilibria, vector minimax and maximin solutions as well as Pareto optimal security strategies are clarified.     

Constrained games as complementary eigenvalue problems

A class of two-person nonzero sum games where the strategy choices are constrained in some form for each player is analyzed here to show the equivalent nonlinear programs which must be solved for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium solution is shown in appropriate cases to lead to complementary eigenvalue problems, which have applications in normal solutions of stochastic LP models and optimal design problems in linear regression theory.     

On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different equilibrium concepts for 2 ×  2 games; larger games are also studied. It is argued that the procedure leads to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games as well as to alternative ways of representing, comparing and testing equilibrium concepts.     

Existence of equilibrium for generalized games in choice form and applications

This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems of vector quasi-equilibrium problems as an application. Our work outlines that there still is much to be gained from using the results concerning the existence of equilibrium of games as tools of research for other optimization problems.     

A viscosity of extragradient approximation method for finding equilibrium problems, variational inequalities and fixed point problems for nonexpansive mappings

In this paper, we investigate the problem for finding the set of solutions for equilibrium problems, the set of solutions of the variational inequalities for k-Lipschitz continuous mappings and fixed point problems for nonexpansive mappings in a Hilbert space. We introduce a new viscosity extragradient approximation method which is based on the so-called viscosity approximation method and extragradient method. We show that the sequence converges strongly to a common element of the above three sets under some parameters controlling conditions. Finally, we utilize our results to study some convergence problems for finding the zeros of maximal monotone operators. Our results are generalization and extension of the results of Kumam [P. Kumam, Strong convergence theorems by an extragradient method for solving variational inequalities and equilibrium problems in a Hilbert space, Turk. J. Math. 33 (2009) 85–98], Wangkeeree [R. Wangkeeree, An extragradient approximation method for equilibrium problems and fixed point problems of a countable family of nonexpansive mappings, Fixed Point Theory and Applications, 2008, Article ID 134148, 17 pages, doi:10.1155/2008/134148], Yao et al. [Y. Yao, Y.C. Liou, R. Chen, A general iterative method for an finite family of nonexpansive mappings, Nonlinear Analysis 69 (5–6) (2008) 1644–1654], Qin et al. [X. Qin, M. Shang, Y. Su, A general iterative method for equilibrium problems and fixed point problems in Hilbert spaces, Nonlinear Analysis (69) (2008) 3897–3909], and many others.     

向量拟平衡问题系统及其应用

引入了向量拟平衡问题系统并证明了其解的存在性定理．作为应用,还得到约束多目标对策和无约束多目标对策弱Pareto平衡的一些存在性结果．     

Generalized Nash equilibrium

For accep/reject games and coalitionless games, the classical Roos-Nash equilibrium is generalized to a so-called strongly dependent equilibrium, which exists for a wider class of games than the classical equilibrium. The following hierarchical chain of progressively stronger equilibria is established: symmetrical activeA-equilibrium, strongly dependent equilibrium, symmetricalB-equilibrium, Roos-Nash classical dependent equilibrium. The first three of these have been proposed by the author as weaker versions of the classical coalitionless equilibrium. Translated from Nelineinaya Dinamika i Upravlenie, pp. 217–227, 1999.     

Balanced contributions for TU games with awards and applications

Calleja et al. [Calleja, P., Borm, P., Hendrickx, R., 2005. Multi-issue allocation situations. European Journal of Operational Research 164, 730–747] introduced multi-issue allocation situations with awards. In this paper, we extend the classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility to the cooperative games with transferable utility and awards. We define a run-to-the-bank rule for cooperative games with transferable utility and awards and characterise it in terms of a property of balanced contributions. We apply our main result to bankruptcy problems and multi-issue allocation situations with awards.     

Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games

The concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism. A relationship between this solution concept and the sequential Nash equilibrium for an associated extended game is established. This correspondence result, which can be related to previous results obtained by Baar and Haurie (1984), is then used for studying the existence of such solutions in a class of sequential games. For the zero-sum case, the sequential Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to a sequential maxmin equilibrium. An algorithm is proposed for the computation of this particular case of equilibrium.This research was supported by SSHRC Grant No. 410-83-1012, NSERC Grant No. A4952, and FCAR Grants Nos. 86-CE-130 and EQ-0428.The authors thank T. R. Bielecki and J. A. Filar, who pointed out some mistakes and helped improving the paper.At the time of this research, this author was with GERMA, Ecole Mohammedia d'Ingénieurs, Rabat, Morocco.     

Split equilibrium problems for related games and applications to economic theory

ABSTRACT

In this paper we introduce the concept of split Nash equilibrium problems associated with two related noncooperative strategic games. Then we apply the Fan-KKM theorem to prove the existence of solutions to split Nash equilibrium problems of related noncooperative strategic games, in which the strategy sets of the players are nonempty closed and convex subsets in Banach spaces. As an application of this existence to economics, an example is provided that studies the existence of split Nash equilibrium of utilities of two related economies. As applications, we study the existence of split Nash equilibrium in the dual (playing twice) extended Bertrand duopoly model of price competition.     

A regular equilibrium solves the extended HJB system

Control problems not admitting the dynamic programming principle are known as time-inconsistent. The game-theoretic approach is to interpret such problems as intrapersonal dynamic games and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A fundamental result of time-inconsistent stochastic control is a verification theorem saying that solving the extended HJB system is a sufficient condition for equilibrium. We show that solving the extended HJB system is a necessary condition for equilibrium, under regularity assumptions. The controlled process is a general Itô diffusion.     

ɛ-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games

We introduce the concept of ɛ-consistent equilibrium where each player plays a ɛ-best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an ɛ-consistent equilibrium induces an ɛ-equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of ɛ-consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states. Received January 1995/Revised version October 1996/Final version September 1997     

A Discrete-Time Dynamic Game of Seasonal Water Allocation

We present a method for the derivation of feedback Nash equi- libria in discrete-time finite-horizon nonstationary dynamic games. A partic- ular motivation for such games stems from environmental economics, where problems of seasonal competition for water levels occur frequently among heterogeneous economic agents. These agents are coupled through a state variable, which is the water level. Actions are strategically chosen to max- imize the agents individual season-dependent utility functions. We observe that, although a feedback Nash equilibrium exists, it does not satisfy the (exogenous) environmental watchdog expectations. We devise an incentive scheme to help meeting those expectations and calculate a feedback Nash equilibrium for the new game that uses the scheme. This solution is more environmentally friendly than the previous one. The water allocation game solutions help us to draw some conclusions regarding the agents behavior and also about the existence of feedback Nash equilibria in dynamic games. The paper draws from Refs.1–2. Its earlier version was presented at the Victoria International Conference 2004, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand, February 9–13, 2004. We thank the anonymous referee and Christophe Deissenberg for insightful comments, which have helped us to clarify its message. We also thank our colleagues Sophie Thoyer, Robert Lifran, Odile Pourtalier, and Vladimir Petkov for helpful discussions on the model and techniques used in this Paper. Gratitude is expressed to the Kyoto Institute for Economic Research, Kyoto University, for this author's support in the final stages of the paper preparation     

Equilibrium solutions for multiobjective bimatrix games incorporating fuzzy goals

Equilibrium solutions in terms of the degree of attainment of a fuzzy goal for games in fuzzy and multiobjective environments are examined. We introduce a fuzzy goal for a payoff in order to incorporate ambiguity of human judgments and assume that a player tries to maximize his degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal. A fuzzy goal for a payoff and the equilibrium solution with respect to the degree of attainment of a fuzzy goal are defined. Two basic methods, one by weighting coefficients and the other by a minimum component, are employed to aggregate multiple fuzzy goals. When the membership functions are linear, computational methods for the equilibrium solutions are developed. It is shown that the equilibrium solutions are equal to the optimal solutions of mathematical programming problems in both cases. The relations between the equilibrium solutions for multiobjective bimatrix games incorporating fuzzy goals and the Pareto-optimal equilibrium solutions are considered.     

不确定性下的一主多从博弈及其ε-平衡稳定性分析

本文对主从博弈以及不确定性等问题进行研究,建立了不确定性下的一主多从博弈模型,并利用极大值定理证明了该模型均衡点的存在性。对于不确定性下的一主多从博弈的均衡点问题建立了有限理性模型,进而得到其均衡点的稳定性,即结构稳定以及对ε-平衡是鲁棒的。     

Lexicographic domination in extensive games

We extend a notion of a lexicographic domination between strategies, introduced for normal form games in Okada (1988), to extensive games via the transformation from the extensive form to the agent normal form. It is shown that lexicographically undominatedness implies subgame perfection of an equilibrium point in extensive games with perfect recall.I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and suggestions. A preliminary draft of this paper was written while I was visiting the MEDS Department of Northwestern University in 1986–87. The warm hospitality of that department is gratefully acknowledged.     

向量拟平衡问题的本质解及解集的本质连通区

本文研究向量拟平衡问题,得到了向量拟平衡问题解的一个存在性结果,证明了在满足一定的连续性和凸性条件的问题构成的空间Y中,大多数(在Baire分类意义下)问题的解集是稳定的,并证明Y的某子集中,每个向量拟平衡问题的解集中至少存在一个本质连通区。作为应用,我们导出了多目标广义对策弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性,证明了在满足一定的连续性和凸性条件的多目标广义对策构成的空间P中,大多数对策的弱Pareto-Nash平衡点是稳定的,并证明了P中的每个对策的弱Pareto-Nash平衡点集中至少有一个本质连通区。     

Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: A new proof

A new proof is offered for the theorem that, in “almost all” finite games, the number of equilibrium points isfinite andodd. The proof is based on constructing a one-parameter family of games with logarithmic payoff functions, and studying the topological properties of the graph of a certain algebraic function, related to the graph of the set of equilibrium points for the games belonging to this family. In the last section of the paper, it is shown that, in the space of all games of a given size, those “exceptional” games which fail to satisfy the theorem (by having an even number or an infinity of equilibrium points) is a closed set of measure zero.