Public Disclosure Programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm

A Public Disclosure Program (PDP) is compared to a traditional environmental regulation (exemplified by a tax/subsidy) in a simple dynamic framework. A PDP aims at revealing the environmental record of firms to the public. This information affects its image (goodwill or brand equity), and ultimately its profit. A firm polluting less than its prescribed target would win consumer’s sympathy and raise its goodwill, whereas it is the other way around when the firm exceeds its emissions quota. The evolution of this goodwill is assumed to depend also on green activities or advertising expenditures. Within this framework, we analyze how a PDP affects the firm’s optimal policies regarding emissions, pricing and advertising as compared to a traditional regulation. We show that advertising acts as a complementary device to pricing and that emissions are increasing in goodwill. The role of a standard or target level for emissions turns out to be totally different under both policy regimes. In the case of a tax/subsidy approach, this target level only acts as constant who increases or decreases profit by a fixed amount, but it does not affect the policy of the firm. On the contrary, if a PDP is implemented, the target value for emissions enters in an important way in the goodwill accumulation mechanism and determines how the firm reacts to the regulation and what is the time path for the economic and environmental variables. Moreover, this value is also crucial to determine the possibility that a PDP is profit improving. A policy implication of this fact is that regulators should be particularly careful in fixing the emission standard when a PDP is applied. The theoretical results are complemented with a numerical illustration.     

Global facility network design in the presence of competition

We study the facility network design problem for a global firm that is a monopolist seller in its domestic market but faces local competition in its foreign market. The global firm produces in the face of demand and exchange rate uncertainty but can postpone localization and distribution of the output until after uncertainties are resolved. The competitor in the foreign market, however, enjoys the flexibility of postponing all production activities until after uncertainties are resolved. The two firms engage in an ex-post Cournot competition in the foreign market. We consider three potential network configurations for the global firm. Under a linear demand function, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition that one of the three networks is the global firm’s optimal choice, and explore how the presence of foreign competition affects the sensitivity of the global firm’s design to various cost parameters and market uncertainties.     

考虑库存和市场占有率的纵向一体化

本文将传统的双重加价模型扩展到包含库存因素的上下游厂商均为垄断企业、下游厂商为寡头垄断企业而上游厂商为完全垄断企业以及上游厂商为寡头垄断企业而下游厂商为完全垄断企业的一体化模型，着重探讨了库存成本和市场占有率对纵向一体化的影响。研究结果表明，只有在库存成本较低时，传统的结论才得以维持；一体化始终导致消费者福利上升而不受市场占有率的影响，但一体化使厂商的总利润增加要在市场占有率较高时才能实现。     

Capacity switching options under rivalry and uncertainty

Deregulated infrastructure industries exhibit stiff competition for market share. Firms may be able to limit the effects of competition by launching new projects in stages. Using a two-stage real options model, we explore the value of such flexibility. We first demonstrate that the value of investing in a sequential manner for a monopolist is positive but decreases with uncertainty. Next, we find that a typical duopoly firm’s value relative to a monopolist’s decreases with uncertainty as long as the loss in market share is high. Intriguingly, this result is reversed for a low loss in market share. We finally show that this loss in value is reduced if a firm invests in a sequential manner and specify the conditions under which sequential capacity expansion is more valuable for a duopolist firm than for a monopolist.     

Optimal input substitution of a firm facing an environmental constraint

In this paper we consider the dynamic behavior of a firm subject to environmental regulation. As a social planner the government wants to reduce the level of pollution. To reach that aim it can, among others, set an upper limit on polluting emissions of the firm. The paper determines how this policy instrument influences the firm's decisions concerning investments, abatement efforts, and the choice whether to leave some capacity unused or not. The abatement process is modeled as input substitution rather than end-of-pipe. Using standard control theory in determining the firm's optimal dynamic investment decisions it turns out that it is always optimal to approach a long run optimal level of capital. In some cases, this equilibrium is reached within finite time, but usually it will be approached asymptotically. Different scenarios are considered, ranging from attractive clean input to unattractive clean input, and from a mild emission limit to a very tight one. It is shown that for large capital stocks and/or when marginal cash flow per unit of emissions is larger for the dirty input than for the clean input, it can be optimal to actually leave some production capacity unused. Also, since the convex installation costs suggest to spread investments over time, it can happen that investment in productive capital is positive although capacity remains unused.     

社会互动视角下的服务型企业最优运营策略研究

本文主要研究在社会互动的影响下,服务型企业如何制定以价格、服务速率为代表的运营管理策略,从而实现利润最大化。首先,基于M/M/1排队模型对顾客购买决策过程进行建模分析,考虑单个服务型企业在实现利润最大化的目标条件下,社会互动的作用如何影响定价和服务速率决策;其次,研究在竞争市场环境中,社会互动如何影响市场均衡状态下各企业的运营决策和市场份额。结果表明,无论在垄断还是竞争的市场环境中,社会互动对服务型企业的最优运营决策均有不同程度与方向的影响。     

An economic model of pollution prevention

Pollution prevention is modelled with an approach that combines the substitutability of inputs in the twice-differentiable neoclassical production function and the discreteness of linear activity analysis. The polluting firm's emissions, which result from its use of a toxic input, can be reduced by substituting other inputs for the toxic input and&2.urule;or by switching to a nonpolluting process. The strengths of the model are that zero emissions are achievable at a finite marginal cost, the nonconvexity that may occur in conventional activity analysis does not occur in this model, and there is a range of output levels at which polluting and nonpolluting firms in the same industry realistically coexist.     

Network externalities in a dynamic monopoly

We reconsider the role of network externalities in a dynamic spatial monopoly where the firm must invest in order to accumulate capacity, while consumers may have either linear or quadratic preferences. We (1) characterise saddle point equilibria, (2) prove that the extent of market coverage is increasing in the network effect and (3) unlike the existing static literature on the same problem, the monopolist may not make introductory price offers. Then, we briefly deal with the socially optimal solution, showing that, in general, a planner would serve more consumers than a profit-seeking monopolist.      

环境治理政策的减排、增效与结构优化效果动态评价

为测度环境治理政策波动对产出、减排、要素配置、消费与产业结构的影响及其传导机制,将异质性消费偏好、产出差异性、环境效用和环境损失函数引入E-DSGE模型。政策强度分析发现,技术进步、排污税和消费税政策效果较强,环境控制和治污支出冲击效果较弱。政策效应分析发现,技术进步政策效应最优,能实现增产和减排双重目标,促进要素配置和居民消费、产出与消费结构改进;排污税和政府治污支出政策次优,能实现增产和减排的双赢目标,促进要素供给和产出结构清洁化,不利于消费提升和消费结构优化;环境控制与消费税政策效果最差,以牺牲产出实现减排,不利于要素配置,产出与消费结构改进效果较弱,消费税会抑制居民消费,但消费税政策效果随环境友好型家庭比例提升而加强。     

Exploring the trade-off between immediate gratification and delayed network externalities in the consumption of information goods

Our motivation for this paper originates from recent advances in consumption and payment technologies available for mobile commerce. Ubiquitous computing is enabling consumers worldwide to reach digital content and services whenever and wherever they request it. This capability further fuels “impatience” in consumption of such information goods. We model such consumer behavior using a hyperbolic discounting approach. A subset of these products, especially software, also inherit delayed network externalities as part of their consumption characteristics. This builds a tension between decision to consume now or to expedite consumption. We build a stylized model to assess the impact of immediate gratification on the profit maximizing behavior of a monopolist firm which produces an information good with network externalities. We find that serving “impatient” consumers is always profitable for a monopolist. For lower levels of network externalities, the monopolist can increase first period and decrease second period prices in equilibrium. As network externalities effect increases, prices converge to the traditional market (with exponential discounters) levels.     

Evaluating eco-efficiency with data envelopment analysis: an analytical reexamination

This paper reexamines the unintended consequences of the two widely cited models for measuring environmental efficiency—the hyperbolic efficiency model (HEM) and directional distance function (DDF). I prove the existence of three main problems: (1) these two models are not monotonic in undesirable outputs (i.e., a firm’s efficiency may increase when polluting more, and vice versa), (2) strongly dominated firms may appear efficient, and (3) some firms’ environmental efficiency scores may be computed against strongly dominated points. Using the supply-chain carbon emissions data from the 50 major U.S. manufacturing companies, I empirically compare these two models with a weighted additive DEA model. The empirical results corroborate the analytical findings that the DDF and HEM models can generate spurious efficiency estimates and must be used with extreme caution.     

The effect of vertical integration on consumer price in the presence of inventory costs

This paper investigates the effect on consumer price of a vertical merger between a monopolist manufacturer and his retailer, when inventory costs are taken into consideration. We find that the traditional result (lower prices) remains true only when inventory costs are sufficiently small. The direction of the price change also depends on the market size.     

Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing

We study the effects of revenue and investment cost uncertainty, as well non-preemption duopoly competition, on the timing of investments in two complementary inputs, where either spillover-knowledge is allowed or proprietary-knowledge holds. We find that the ex-ante and ex-post revenue market shares play a very important role in firms’ behavior. When competition is considered, the leader’s behavior departs from that of the monopolist firm of Smith (Ind Corp Change 14:639–650, 2005). The leader is justified in following the conventional wisdom (i.e., synchronous investments are more likely), whereas, the follower’s behavior departs from that of the conventional wisdom (i.e., asynchronous investments are more likely).     

Inducing efficiency in oligopolistic markets with increasing returns to scale

We consider a Cournot oligopoly market of firms possessing increasing returns to scale technologies (which may not be identical). It is shown that an external regulating agency can increase total social welfare without running a deficit by offering to subsidize one firm an amount which depends on the output level of that firm and the market price. The firms bid for this contract, the regulator collects the highest bid upfront and subsidizes the highest bidding firm. It is shown that there exists a subsidy schedule such that (i) the regulator breaks even, (ii) the subsidized firm obtains zero net profit and charges a price equal to its average cost, (iii) every other firm willingly exit the market and (iv) market price decreases, consumers are better off and total welfare improves.     

The Nash solution of a maintenance-production differential game

A simple two-person nonzero-sum differential game between the maintenance crew of a firm and the production department of the same firm is considered. It is assumed that preventive maintenance decelerates the decrease in quality of a machine, whereas the production activities set by the firm reduces the quality of the machine. Due to the special structure of the game a system of two differential equations for the non-cooperative Nash solution trajectories can be derived. This provides a possibility to obtain qualitative insights into the structure of the solution paths by phase diagram methods without solving the necessary optimality conditions explicitly.For small salvage values of the machine, it is shown that the optimal maintenance expenditures decrease over time whereas the optimal production rate increases monotonically.Moreover, another interpretation of the differential game analyzed is given as a conflict situation between a firm polluting the environment by producing an output and a governmental agency cleaning up the pollution.     

二手市场对耐用品垄断厂商再制造决策的影响分析

考虑耐用品可多周期使用的特点,从消费者效用角度建立了无限周期中存在二手市场时耐用品垄断厂商再制造决策模型。运用稳态均衡分析方法得到,二手市场会降低耐用品垄断厂商选择再制造策略的成本临界值;提高再制造耐用品的最优定价、降低新耐用品的最优定价;新耐用品价值越高、再制造成本越低,二手市场对耐用品垄断厂商的最优决策影响越大。最后,通过数值分析验证了理论分析的结论。     

在位创新厂商对潜在进入者的专利许可研究

通过研究技术市场竞争性对创新者许可激励的影响,为在位创新厂商确定对潜在进入者的固定费用许可策略提供理论指导.首先利用消费者效用函数推导出在位创新厂商向潜在进入者发放许可时的差异C ournot寡占均衡一般式.然后,利用特定寡占均衡,研究多个对称创新厂商(技术市场存在竞争)与唯一创新厂商(技术市场无竞争)向潜在进入者发放许可的最优策略.着重分析了产品替代系数、厂商数量与知识可占有程度对创新者许可策略的影响.结果表明:在技术市场竞争压力下,多家对称创新厂商的最优策略是不向潜在进入者发放许可;而唯一创新厂商的均衡许可数量与知识可占有程度、产品替代系数以及在位厂商的数量成正比与交易费用成反比.     

Equilibrium two-part cost structures

We consider an oligopolistic product market in which two competing firms instead of paying a competitive input price choose a two-part tariff. Costs for the input are divided up into upfront fixed costs independent of the output level and reductions in marginal costs. We explore under which competitive settings will such a two-part cost structure correspond to equilibrium behavior in a two stage game. We find that firms in a static model do have an incentive to choose a two-part cost structure when competition in the product market is not too strong and oligopoly rents can be shifted form the rival to the own firm. In a dynamic market when firms use Markov strategies competition is so intense that there are no rents to be shifted and firms do not benefit from two-part cost structures.     

Selling multiple units to strategic consumers

We consider a monopolist firm selling to strategic customers who may purchase more than one unit of a product in a two-period model. We provide closed-form solutions for the firm’s optimal prices and show that they are non-monotonic in both the value of the second unit and the strategic level of customers. Particularly, the first-period price can increase as customers become more strategic, in contrast to the single-unit setting where it always decreases in the strategic level of customers.     

Environmentally friendly facility location with market competition

Many traditional facility location models assume spatial monopoly where market competition is ignored. Since facility locations affect the firm’s market exposure and subsequently its profit, accounting for the impact of the location decisions on customers while anticipating the reaction of competitor firms is essential. In this paper, we introduce a competitive facility location problem where market prices and production costs are determined through the economic equilibrium while explicitly considering competition from other firms. In order to accommodate for the growing efforts on limiting carbon emissions, the presented model includes constraints on the amount of carbon emissions that are due to transportation, while allowing carbon trading. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer non-linear model. Through numerical examples, we illustrate the effect of market competition on the location decisions and discuss the impact of emission limits and carbon trading on customers.