质量调整的价格指数编制中hedonic插补法的应用

在数据缺失的情况下,插补法是一种常用的推断缺失数据的方法。在价格指数的编制中,在基期存在的产品可能在报告期从市面上消失,或者报告期出现了新产品。这都可以看作是数据缺失的情形。同时由于前后时期产品质量发生变化,所编制的价格指数中可能包含"质量变化偏差"。Hedonic插补法将hedonic方法与缺失数据的插补方法结合起来,既处理了缺失数据,又克服了价格指数中的质量变化偏差。本文讨论了hedonic插补法的多种可能形式,并比较了各种方法的特点。本文还利用中国笔记本电脑的数据编制了hedonic插补价格指数,进行了相关的实证分析。     

基于数据包络分析的混合多属性第二分值拍卖机制

多属性拍卖在传统价格拍卖的基础上纳入了价格和质量多个属性,已广泛应用于许多领域。本文针对输入几乎没有先验结构且投标人数量足够大的情况,在以往有关多属性拍卖研究的基础上将单个投入扩展为多个投入,将物品的多个属性(价格、完成时间、劳动力数量、质量等因素)合理划分为投入或产出,设计了运行有效的基于数据包络分析的多属性第二分值拍卖机制。与其他方法相比,数据包络分析方法可以有效解决多投入多产出问题,结合多目标规划方法,可以帮助采购方在最大化自身利益的同时,找到整体表现更好的供应商。该机制满足个人理性和激励相容,与传统第二分值拍卖机制相比,在吸引投标人的前提下能够最大化拍卖人的利益。     

Modeling and analysis of an auction-based logistics market

We consider a logistics spot market where the transportation orders from a number of firms are matched with two types of carriers through a reverse auction. In the spot market, local carriers compete with in-transit carriers that have lower costs. In order to analyze the effects of implementing a logistics spot market on these three parties: firms, local carriers, and in-transit carriers and also the effects of various system parameters, we develop a two-stage stochastic model. We first model the auction in a static setting and determine the expected auction price based on the number of carriers engaging in the auction and their cost distributions. We then develop a continuous-time Markov chain model to evaluate the performance of the system in a dynamic setting with random arrivals and possible abandonment of orders and carriers. By combining these two models, we evaluate the performance measures such as the expected auction price, price paid to the carriers, distribution of orders between local and in-transit carriers, and expected number of carriers and orders waiting at the logistics center in the long run. We present analytical and computational results related to the performance of the system and discuss operation of such a logistics spot market in Turkey.     

不同质量调整法在消费者价格指数(CPI)中的应用

传统的消费者价格指数(CPI)存在着一定的质量偏差,不能真实地反映实际价格的变化.直接比较法、交叠法、生产成本法、链接法等质量调整法的应用均有一定的局限性,且缺陷较多,均指插补调整借助于缺失值插补的原理,以同一组内商品价格的平均变化率作为质量调整系数,能有效地降低价格指数的质量偏差。Hedonic质量调整法是以实际资料建立的回归方程为基础,运用数学的手段科学的将质量变化程度加以量化,因此与传统的质量调整法相比含有较少的主观因素,为CPI指数的准确度量提供了科学的质量调整依据.     

Dual mechanism for an online retailer

While posted price and auction have typically been seen as alternatives to each other, we observe Web stores selling a product at a posted price and simultaneously running auctions for the identical product, a phenomenon that has not been studied fully. In this article, we study a dual mechanism, where an online retailer combines the two conventional mechanisms (posted price and auction) for multiple units of a product. We demonstrate that the dual mechanism can be used to achieve market segmentation when customers discount the expected utility of auctions. We characterize the customer’s decision rule and formulate a retailer’s profit function under the dual mechanism. Finally, we compare the performance of three selling mechanisms (posted price, auction, and dual) through computational experiments.     

国债招标拍卖的最优机制:数量与价格歧视

过去已有相当多的文献讨论国债拍卖,米勒和弗雷德曼认为统一价格比歧视价格拍卖有比较优势.研究国债拍卖最优分配方式的选择问题,采用最优机制设计方法分析国债拍卖活动,内生地得到最优拍卖机制.然而结果表明,如果使用价格歧视及数量歧视(定量分配),那么政府的销售收益会得到改善,这是一个最优拍卖机制,不同于米勒和弗雷德曼的观点.     

Bidding under price uncertainty in multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auctions for power systems reserve

In this paper a methodology for profit maximized bidding under price uncertainty in a day-ahead, multi-unit and pay-as-bid procurement auction for power systems reserve is proposed. Within this novel methodology a bidder is considered to follow a Bayes-strategy. Thereby, one bidder is assumed to behave strategically and the behavior of the remaining is summarized in a probability distribution of the market price and a reaction function to price dumping by the strategic bidder. With this approach two problems arise: First, as a pay-as-bid auction is considered, no uniform price and therefore no single probability distribution of the market price is readily available. Second, if historic bidding data of all participants are used to estimate such a distribution and market power is a relevant factor, the bid of the strategically behaving bidder is likely to influence the distribution. Within this paper for both of the problems solutions are presented. It is shown that by estimating a probability of acceptance the optimal bidding price with respect to a given capacity can be calculated by maximizing a stochastic non-linear objective function of expected profit. Taking the characteristics of recently established markets in Germany into account, the methodology is applied using exemplary data. It is shown that the methodology helps to manage existing price uncertainties and hence supports the trading decisions of a bidder. It is inferred that the developed methodology may also be used for bidding on other auction markets with a similar market design.     

Reverse mortgage pricing and risk analysis allowing for idiosyncratic house price risk and longevity risk

Reverse mortgages provide an alternative source of funding for retirement income and health care costs. The two main risks that reverse mortgage providers face are house price risk and longevity risk. Recent real estate literature has shown that the idiosyncratic component of house price risk is large. We analyse the combined impact of house price risk and longevity risk on the pricing and risk profile of reverse mortgage loans in a stochastic multi-period model. The model incorporates a new hybrid hedonic–repeat-sales pricing model for houses with specific characteristics, as well as a stochastic mortality model for mortality improvements along the cohort direction (the Wills–Sherris model). Our results show that pricing based on an aggregate house price index does not accurately assess the risks underwritten by reverse mortgage lenders, and that failing to take into account cohort trends in mortality improvements substantially underestimates the longevity risk involved in reverse mortgage loans.     

变动供给下的多物品拍卖

变动供给下的多物品拍卖是在线拍卖的形式之一，但对这一问题的相关研究未能真正地解决销售商如何确定待拍商品的数量和价格问题。本就变动供给下的多物品拍卖问题，建立了一个新的决策分析模型，与已有的模型相比，它不仅能同时确定待售商品的数量与价格，而且能有效地避免替代性商品间的外部性损失，为销售商的决策提供参考。     

Application of multi-dimensional procurement auction in single-period inventory models

Procurement is one of the major activities in the Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II), which is closely coupled with inventory management. Any improvement in this area will have a direct impact on the performance of the entire supply chain. Auction mechanism can be a successful procurement method when there are several potential suppliers available. In this paper, we consider a single-period inventory model when the selection of the supplier is done through a reverse auction with bids consisting of several attributes, namely price, shortage quantity, and lead time. The multi-dimensionality of the bid increases the complexity of the underlying problem creating a need for an approach to determine an approximate optimal target level. This is needed for the initiation of the auction and the procurement process. Monte-Carlo simulation method was used to investigate the performance of the approximation. Simulation results show that the analytical method provides an acceptable approximation for the optimal target inventory level.     

收入管理的MMV动态拍卖机制研究

随着互联网上交易的增多,多单位同质产品销售的拍卖机制成为了一个新的研究方向.针对易逝性服务产品的收入管理问题,提出将产品销售分为多个拍卖期的MMV(Multi-period and Multi-unit Vickrey(Auction with Reserve Pricing)动态拍卖机制,给出每期最优拍卖单位数和保留价格的确定方法,证明了最优拍卖单位数分别关于剩余存量和销售时间单增的性质,以及保留价格关于剩余存量的单降性.最后证明MMV机制的每期实际成交价格将高于Vulcano(2002)提出的MSP(Modified Second-Price)机制,根据易逝性服务产品的需求特点得到MMV机制优于MSP机制的结论.     

带赔偿的云计算服务拍卖机制研究

云计算提供了按需获取、按使用付费的IT资源获取模式,由于存在大量的云计算服务提供商,以市场化的形式来组织云计算资源的分配与获取是一种合理的方式.以面向市场的云计算服务架构为基础,研究了云计算用户和服务提供商之间的匹配问题.采用拍卖方式实现具体的匹配过程,并将服务失败时的赔偿问题纳入考虑,结合服务提供商的违约率提出了两种带赔偿的云计算服务拍卖机制一在逆向一级密封拍卖上增加赔偿因子,分析了其二人博弈和多人博弈的均衡;同时,研究了服务权再分配对该机制的影响.     

Contingent payment auction mechanism in multidimensional procurement auctions

This paper considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several suppliers who hold private information about their own efficiency type. Both quality and price need to be determined. Different from scoring auctions, we present a new method, i.e., contingent payment auction mechanism (CPAM), which can effectively deal with the optimal procurement strategy in multidimensional procurement auctions. CPAM can implement the optimal mechanism for the buyer and is thus optimal among all possible procurement strategies. CPAM implies that the buyer should first design and announce a contingent payment function that specifies a payment for each possible quality level before the bidding begins. Compared to scoring auctions, CPAM has some advantages. It does not require a special form of scoring rule and can be generalized in a more broad auction formats. Furthermore, it can help us to solve the ex post moral hazard problem. We consider two kinds of CPAM. For the CPAM I is sensitive to different auction formats, we come up with CPAM II which can improve the performance of CPAM I. Broadly speaking, CPAM integrates the idea of dimension reduction from scoring auction into that of incentive contract design from contract theory to solve the problem of ex post moral hazard.     

On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions

Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favoring Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (ICAs). Several promising ICA formats were developed based on primal–dual and subgradient algorithms. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution. iBundle(3), dVSV and Ascending Proxy Auction result in VCG payoffs when the coalitional value function satisfies buyer submodularity and bidders bid straightforward, which is an ex-post Nash equilibrium in this case. iBEA and CreditDebit auctions do not even require the buyer submodularity and achieve the same properties for general valuations. Often, however, one cannot assume straightforward bidding and it is not clear from the theory how these non-linear personalized price auctions (NLPPAs) perform in this case. Robustness of auctions with respect to different bidding behavior is a critical issue for any application. We conducted a large number of computational experiments to analyze the performance of NLPPAs with respect to different bidding strategies and valuation models. We compare NLPPAs with the VCG auction and with ICAs with linear prices, such as ALPS and the Combinatorial Clock Auction. While NLPPAs performed very well in case of straightforward bidding, we observe problems with revenue, efficiency, and speed of convergence when bidders deviate.     

城市二手住房特征价格研究——以石家庄市为例

将特征价格理论应用于具体的二手住房市场,通过搜集、整理得到2075个石家庄市二手住房价格和特征样本数据,选取了住房的建筑自身、区位和邻里等三类特征作为解释变量,采用最小二乘法（OLS）进行回归,分析了城市二手住房特征价格,构建了适用于二手住房市场的特征价格模型并解释了住房特征与住房价格之间的定量关系．     

预算约束下广义第二价格关键字拍卖均衡分析

在关键字拍卖中,广告主预算约束是影响投标策略均衡的重要因素。针对广泛应用的广义第二价格机制,分析了预算约束下的关键字拍卖均衡性质。按照广告主的点击估价和预算分布情况,将广告主划分为天然完全赢家、天然部分赢家和天然输家这三种类型,提出了广告主投标临界值与关键值的概念,基于关键字拍卖不断重复进行的特点,分别从长期视角与短期视角建立了静态模型与动态模型,研究结果表明:静态环境下拍卖存在唯一的纯策略纳什均衡;动态环境下当广告主采用最优反应投标策略时拍卖将收敛至唯一的纳什均衡点,并且动态环境下拍卖商收入不低于静态环境下的拍卖收入。数值算例的结果表明在动态环境下不同的初始报价会导致拍卖收敛至不同的均衡点。研究结果为拍卖商提供了拍卖收入预测和拍卖机制优化的决策依据。     

公共资产预算配置的拍卖机制设计

本文探讨在财政部门作为政府出资人的框架下,通过设计一套可行的竞标机制来提高预算项目的配置效率。结合运用机制设计理论和拍卖理论与方法建立竞标机制设计模型,在保证竞标预算单位参与投标和真实显示自己效率的条件下最大化拍卖者——政府出资人的期望效用,并通过求解此模型得到最优的竞标机制。鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,给出了第二高得分拍卖这种最优拍卖方式。最后对公共资产配置预算的规则如何确定才能减少效率损失进行了归纳。     

Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: A discrete model with private information

The Spanish Treasury is the only Treasury in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell government debt: winning bidders pay their bid price for each unit if this is lower than the weighted average price of winning bids (WAP), and pay the WAP otherwise. Following Gordy [Gordy, M., 1996. Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common-value auction. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System], we model the Spanish auction as a common value auction of multiple units with private information, allowing for multiple bids. Numerical analysis shows that bidders spread their bids more in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction and bid higher for the first unit, and that the expected seller’s revenue is higher in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction within a reasonable set of parameter values.     

Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction

When buyer valuations are drawn IID from a known regular distribution, a second price auction with a symmetric reserve price is the revenue-optimal single-item auction. When this distribution is irregular, we provide the first separation result showing that a second price auction with reserves earns at most 0.778 times the revenue of Myerson’s optimal auction, even when the reserves can be asymmetric. Since the lower bound is 0.745 for i.i.d. buyers, our result is nearly tight.     

A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms

Combinatorial exchanges have existed for a long time in securities markets. In these auctions buyers and sellers can place orders on combinations, or bundles of different securities. These orders are conjunctive: they are matched only if the full bundle is available. On business-to-business (B2B) exchanges, buyers have the choice to receive the same product with different attributes; for instance the same product can be produced by different sellers. A buyer indicates his preference by submitting a disjunctive order, where he specifies the quantity he wants of each particular good and what limit price he is willing to pay for each good, thus providing a subjective valuation of each attribute. Only the goods with the best prices will be traded. This article considers a doubled-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes, that is, a uniform price auction where buyers and sellers place both types of orders, conjunctive (AND orders) and disjunctive (XOR orders). We show that linear competitive prices exist. We also propose an algorithm to clear the market, which is particularly efficient when the number of traders is large, and the goods are divisible.