保险公司的最优投资和再保险策略

在保险公司既可以做证券(股票和债券)投资,同时又采取比例再保险策略的情况下,通过对经典的Cramér-Lundberg保险公司盈余过程模型的连续扩散近似,利用动态规划原理分别得出了在破产概率最小和终值期望效用最大两种目标函数下,保险公司的最优投资和最优再保策略的显式解和对应的目标函数值.对两种目标函数下的最优策略做了比较研究.     

最佳投资策略下投资额函数的渐近性质

本文考虑一个经典风险模型,且允许保险公司投资股票市场,通过选择适当的投资策略使破产概率达到最小,并求出当分布函数F(x)是正则变化函数时,投资额函数A(x)的近似表达式.     

索赔次数为复合Poisson-Geometric过程下的破产概率和最优投资和再保险策略

本文对索赔次数为复合Poisson-Geometric过程的风险模型,在保险公司的盈余可以投资于风险资产,以及索赔购买比例再保险的策略下,研究使得破产概率最小的最优投资和再保险策略.通过求解相应的Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程,得到使得破产概率最小的最优投资和比例再保险策略,以及最小破产概率的显示表达式.     

共享单车平台定价策略研究

共享单车市场规模的高速增长,形成了以摩拜单车和OFO共享单车为代表的双寡头竞争局面,共享单车平台的定价策略在平台竞争过程中起了重要作用.通过构建两阶段Hotelling双寡头竞争模型,探讨双寡头在市场均衡状态下稳定的定价机制.研究表明,在阶段一以用户扩张速度最大化为目标的平台1和以利润最大化为目标的平台2为争取市场份额展开竞争,均衡情况下平台1占优的定价策略为低接入费用、高租赁费用,其条件为用户感知的平台横向差异化程度较高;平台2占优的定价策略为高接入费用、低租赁费用,其条件为用户感知的平台横向差异化程度较低.在阶段二两平台均以利润最大化为目标时,网络外部性大小、用户感知的平台横向差异化程度以及单车与用户匹配概率对两平台竞争的均衡结果均有一定的影响;平台为获取更多的市场份额和平台利润,最优的定价策略为采用高接入费用、低租赁费用,其条件为该平台单车与用户的匹配概率较高并且交易成本较低.     

马氏需求和随机供应下的订货和定价问题

考虑到零售商的固定订货费用以及在供应商供货不确定因素的影响下,研究了零售商的联合定价和订货问题.在一定的条件下,以极大化销售周期中的利润为准则,证明了零售商联合订货和定价最优策略的存在性,并且得到了最优策略具有$(s,S,p)$的结构.分析了供货的不确定性对最优策略的影响,特别是零售商所获得的最大利润与得到供货的概率成正比的关系,即每阶段得到货的概率越大,零售商获得的利润越多.     

线性混合模型方差分量的检验

对于含有两个方差分量的随机效应设计阵为任意阵的线性混合模型的方差分量单边检验问题给出了精确的F检验和基于广义p值的检验.对于给出的精确的F检验给出检验存在条件以及是一致最优无偏检验的条件.通过数值模拟,基于广义p值检验的功效和犯第一类错误的概率被讨论,由模拟结果可以看出基于广义p值的检验很好地控制了犯第一类错误的概率.     

生存概率控制下的周期性红利优化问题

文章主要在带有利息收益的离散时间盈余模型中,在生存概率和有界红利率的约束条件下,讨论周期性红利优化问题:最大化破产前累积的周期性支付的红利现值的期望,并获得最优红利策略.假设在每个单位时间内收到的保费是正实值随机变量,且保费序列构成一个马尔科夫链.此外,我们还假设任意单位时间内索赔发生的概率和相应单位时间内收到的保费相关.首先,给定生存概率的约束条件,得到了红利支付的约束门槛.然后,通过变换值函数和运用不动点原理,得到了最优红利策略的一些性质和算法.最后通过数值实例解释该算法,并讨论生存概率对最优红利策略的影响.数值结果显示,最优红利策略是一个条件多门槛策略.这为现代企业(尤其是保险和金融公司)的决策者在兼顾和平衡公司健康发展与股东利益而进行红利决策和定量分析时提供了理论依据.     

非恒定概率下基于不完全检查的受限维护优化研究

研究了一个以三个不同状态为特征的单组分体系,针对考虑检查错误的非恒定概率的模型,给出了在给定维护策略下的确切成本和可靠性评估,目标是在可靠性约束下,在无限的时间范围内尽可能降低平均成本.最后,将真实模型与考虑检查错误的常数概率的模型进行比较,通过计算研究发现近似模型的平均成本比真实模型高出26%.此外,当使用近似模型时,发现可靠性约束可能严重受到最大25%的影响.     

两种估计区间解法的讨论

依据等概率对称区间和等密度对称区间的概念引出两种估计区间求解方法,并通过两种方法推导证明了等密度对称区间即为最短估计区间.然后分别就F分布和χ2分布情形对这两种区间估计方法作以比较.比较发现,在同样条件下,等密度对称区间总比概率对称区间要短,并且随着自由度增加,两种区间趋于重合.     

n值G(o)del命题逻辑系统中的F度累积理论

在n值G(o)del命题逻辑系统中指出概率逻辑学基本定理成立,并提出了与真度相对应的F度,证明了F度累积定理.并比较了概率逻辑学基本定理与F度累积定理的异同.     

Comparison of scoring systems in two-sided competitions

For a simplified model of a competition which incorporates an inherent advantage (as service in tennis) it is shown that the probability of winning is independent of whether the two contestants alternate this advantage or whether the contestant who wins a part of the competition (e.g., a game in tennis) is permitted to have this advantage for the next part.     

Probability of Winning at Tennis I. Theory and Data

The probability of winning a game, a set, and a match in tennis are computed, based on each player's probability of winning a point on serve, which we assume are independent identically distributed (iid) random variables. Both two out of three and three out of five set matches are considered, allowing a 13-point tiebreaker in each set, if necessary. As a by-product of these formulas, we give an explicit proof that the probability of winning a set, and hence a match, is independent of which player serves first. Then, the probability of each player winning a 128-player tournament is calculated. Data from the 2002 U.S. Open and Wimbledon tournaments are used both to validate the theory as well as to show how predictions can be made regarding the ultimate tournament champion. We finish with a brief discussion of evidence for non-iid effects in tennis, and indicate how one could extend the current theory to incorporate such features.     

乒乓球赛制的概率分析

乒乓球比赛的每局原先是21分制现在是11分制,单打由5局3胜制改为7局4胜制。赛制的改变增加了比赛结果的偶然性。本文用概率方法对赛制的改变进行了定量分析,给出了新赛制和旧赛制下运动员取胜的概率。     

Game theoretic modelling of service agent warranty fraud

When a warranty provider outsources warranty servicing to an external service agent this agent may act in a fraudulent manner. In this paper we consider a special case of service agent fraud—with the service agent overbilling the warranty provider for some of the warranty claims. A detailed inspection of a claim may be made to identify whether or not the service agent has committed fraud, but this inspection involves an additional cost to the warranty provider. This cost may be recovered by imposing a penalty on the service agent whenever a fraud is committed and it is detected. This penalty is specified in the maintenance service contract. A game theoretic approach is used to find the optimal overbilling strategy for the service agent and the optimal inspection strategy for the warranty provider. The optimal solution is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a static game between the two parties.     

公众参与视角下的央地环境规制博弈分析

本文首先构建环境规制中中央政府和地方政府的两方演化博弈模型,并在此基础上将公众作为第三方参与主体,构建中央政府、地方政府和公众三方演化博弈模型,详细比较两方和三方博弈模型的区别,探究各个主体策略行为的影响因素。研究发现:(1)未有公众参与下,地方政府策略选择主要受地方政府积极执行成本、环境收益、经济损失,消极执行的环境政绩损失,中央政府监管力度、治理补贴和对地方政府的处罚等因素影响;中央政府的监管策略主要受到严格监管的成本以及对地方政府的治理补贴和处罚等因素影响。引入公众参与后,在央地两方博弈的基础上,地方政府环境规制执行策略的影响因素还增加了地方政府被举报后所受到的追加处罚,中央政府监管策略的影响因素还增加了中央政府监管力度、对地方政府的追加处罚以及中央政府的公信力损失。(2)未有公众参与下,中央政府严格监管的概率随地方政府积极执行概率的增大而减小。引入公众参与后,中央政府严格监管率随地方政府积极执行概率的增大而增大。说明在公众参与下,地方政府积极执行环境规制对中央政府严格监管产生的抑制作用转变成了促进作用。(3)地方政府积极执行的概率、中央政府严格监管的概率都随公众举报概率的增大而增大。说明公众参与不仅对地方政府承担环保责任具有促进作用,而且有利于促使中央政府落实环境治理政策。     

连续对策的最大熵策略密度对策解

对于正方形[0,2]×[0,2]上的连续对策,将局中人的非纯策略(概率分布函数)的导数称为这个局中人的策略密度(概率密度函数).建立了这种连续对策的最大熵理论.主要证明了当每个局中人都没有最优纯策略时,具有最大熵的最优策略密度集合的非空紧凸性,研究了最优策略密度的最大熵,给出一类带有最大熵的连续对策.     

The impact of power structure on the retail service supply chain with an O2O mixed channel

While the Internet has provided a new means for retailers to reach consumers, it has fundamentally changed the dynamic of competition in the retail service supply chain. The mix of offline and online channels adds a new dimension of competition, and one central issue of this competition is the pricing strategy between the two channels. How to set prices for both online and offline channels? What is the impact of the supply chain power structure on pricing decisions and the performance? This research aims to address these questions by focusing on a retail service supply chain with an online-to-offline (O2O) mixed dual-channel. From the Supplier-Stackelberg, Retailer-Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretical perspectives, we obtain the optimal prices and maximum profits for both the retailer and supplier under different power structures. The analysis result provides important managerial implications, which will be beneficial to retailers to develop proper pricing strategies.     

Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games

An absorbing game is a repeated game where some action combinations are absorbing, in the sense that whenever they are played, there is a positive probability that the game terminates, and the players receive some terminal payoff at every future stage.  We prove that every multi-player absorbing game admits a correlated equilibrium payoff. In other words, for every ε>0 there exists a probability distribution p _ε over the space of pure strategy profiles that satisfies the following. With probability at least 1−ε, if a pure strategy profile is chosen according to p _ε and each player is informed of his pure strategy, no player can profit more than ε in any sufficiently long game by deviating from the recommended strategy. Received: April 2001/Revised: June 4, 2002     

消费者非均匀偏好条件下高校项目开发策略

为了探究教育项目消费者随机需求条件下的不同层次高校的竞优策略, 运用Stackelberg博弈方法, 构建了消费者偏好服从非均匀分布的不同层次高校开发同类教育项目的定位设计模型, 分析了消费者偏好行为对教育项目收益的影响规律以及双方的竞优策略。结果显示, H型高校(声誉较高)不受消费者偏好等市场因素影响, 始终选择最大差异化策略。L型高校(声誉较低)在消费者无差异偏好偏向自己一方时也不受市场因素影响采取最大差异化策略; 而在消费者无差异偏好偏向它方时, 若市场需求概率小于0.5则选择最大差异化策略, 否则其决策将受到自身初始位值、市场概率等因素的综合影响, 并适时选择最大差异化、有限差异化或有限趋同化策略。     

On the core of cost-revenue games: Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues

In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility, called cost-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum net revenues that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. We show that if every connection cost can take only two values (low or high cost), then, the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues has a nonempty core. Furthermore, we provide an example of a minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues with an empty core where every connection cost can take only one of three values (low, medium, or high cost).