Searching for equilibrium positions in a game of political competition with restrictions

This paper considers a problem of political economy in which a Nash equilibrium study is performed in a proposed game with restrictions where the two major parties in a country vary their position within a politically flexible framework to increase their number of voters. The model as presented fits the reality of many countries. Moreover, it avoids the uniqueness of equilibrium positions. The problem is stated and solved from a geometric point of view.     

General economic equilibrium and variational inequalities: existence,uniqueness and sensitivity

In this paper we use the theory of variational inequalities to study the general economic equilibrium problem with production. The variational inequality is defined on a bounded set. Existence, uniqueness and sensitivity of the equilibrium point (pair of price vector and activity vector) are discussed through studying this variational inequality.     

GLOBAL STABILITY OF AN SIRS EPIDEMIC MODEL WITH DELAYS

In this article, an SIRS epidemic model spread by vectors (mosquitoes) which have an incubation time to become infectious is formulated. It is shown that a disease-free equilibrium point is globally stable if no endemic equilibrium point exists. Further, the endemic equilibrium point (if it exists) is globally stable with a respect "weak delay". Some known results are generalized.     

Dynamic Walrasian price equilibrium problem: evolutionary variational approach with sensitivity analysis

Many authors have been devoted to the study of the static general economic equilibrium problem regulated to Walras’ law (see e.g. Arrow and Debreu in Econometrica 22:265–290, 1954; Arrow and Hahn in General competitive analysis, 1991; Arrow et al. in Econometrica 27:82–109, 1959; Border in Fixed point theorems with application to economics and game theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985; Dafermos in Math Programm 46:391–402, 1990; Dafermos and Zhao in Oper Res Lett 10:396–376, 1991; Donato et al. in J Glob Optim, 2007; Hahn in Stability, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1982; Jofré et al. in Math Oper Res, 2007; Nagurney in Network economics—a variational inequality approach, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999; Nagurney and Zhao in Network formalism for pure exchange economic equilibria, World Scientific Press, Singapore, 1993; Walker in J Polit Econ 94(4), 1987; Walras in Elements d’Economique Politique Pure, Corbaz, Lausanne, Switzerland, 1874; Zhao in Variational inequalities in general equilibrium: analysis and computation, PhD thesis, Brown University, 1988; and their bibliography). The aim of this paper is to provide a first approach to a particular dynamic general economic equilibrium problem: a Walrasian price equilibrium problem when the data are time-dependent. The equilibrium conditions that describe this pure exchange economic model are expressed in terms of an evolutionary variational inequality, for which existence and sensitivity results are given. Moreover, our problem can be expressed in a common way to many other equilibrium problems.     

A Simplex Approach for Finding Local Solutions of a Linear Bilevel Program by Equilibrium Points

In this paper, a linear bilevel programming problem (LBP) is considered. Local optimality conditions are derived. They are based on the notion of equilibrium point of an exact penalization for LBP. It is described how an equilibrium point can be obtained with the simplex method. It is shown that the information in the simplex tableaux can be used to get necessary and sufficient local optimality conditions for LBP. Based on these conditions, a simplex type algorithm is proposed, which attains a local solution of LBP by moving in equilibrium points. A numerical example illustrates how the algorithm works. Some computational results are reported.     

Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for Regular–Singular Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

We consider a class of regular–singular stochastic differential games arising in the optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. The information available to the two players is asymmetric partial information and the control variable of each player consists of two components: regular control and singular control. We establish the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the saddle point of the zero-sum game. Then, as an application, these conditions are applied to an optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. Furthermore, we generalize our results to the nonzero-sum regular–singular game with asymmetric information, and then the Nash equilibrium point is characterized.     

Mean-field type forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations and related stochastic differential games

We study a kind of partial information non-zero sum differential games of mean-field backward doubly stochastic differential equations, in which the coefficient contains not only the state process but also its marginal distribution, and the cost functional is also of mean-field type. It is required that the control is adapted to a sub-filtration of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motions. We establish a necessary condition in the form of maximum principle and a verification theorem, which is a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point. We use the theoretical results to deal with a partial information linear-quadratic (LQ) game, and obtain the unique Nash equilibrium point for our LQ game problem by virtue of the unique solvability of mean-field forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equation.     

A model of a two-stage all-pay auction

The present paper studies a simple two-stage model of an all-pay auction under complete information. All-pay auctions are often used to model competition with irreversible investments such as political lobbying, and in the existing models, the equilibrium outcomes are quite different from the winner-pay auctions (under complete information): The unique equilibrium is in non-degenerate mixed strategies in the sealed-bid all-pay auction, and the highest value bidder wins at (virtually) no cost in the dollar auction. In sharp contrast with those existing models, the equilibrium outcome in the present setting is almost identical to the winner-pay auctions. That is, (a) the highest value bidder wins with probability one, and (b) the revenue of the seller is equal to the second highest value among the bidders. Also, from a mechanism-design point of view, the present game form is more robust than other all-pay mechanisms in that the seller does not need any information about the bidders’ valuations. Although the analysis focuses on the two-bidder two-stage case, the results extend to arbitrary numbers of bidders and stages.     

一个淋病扩散模型的定性分析

本文利用奇点理论与Ｂｅｎｄｉｘｓｏｎ定理对淋病扩散模型进行了定性分析,给出了可行平衡点附近,特别是高阶平衡点附近轨线的定性结构,研究了可行平衡点的全局渐近稳定性,得到了完整的结果。     

一个求解约束非线性优化问题的微分方程方法

本文构造的求解非线性优化问题的微分方程方法包括两个微分方程系统,第一个系统基于问题函数的一阶信息,第二个系统基于二阶信息．这两个系统具有性质:非线性优化问题的局部最优解是它们的渐近稳定的平衡点,并且初始点是可行点时,解轨迹都落于可行域中．我们证明了两个微分方程系统的离散迭代格式的收敛性定理和基于第二个系统的离散迭代格式的局部二次收敛性质．还给出了基于两个系统的离散迭代方法的数值算例,数值结果表明基于二阶信息的微分方程方法速度更快．     

Maximum Principle for Stochastic Differential Games with Partial Information

In this paper, we first deal with the problem of optimal control for zero-sum stochastic differential games. We give a necessary and sufficient maximum principle for that problem with partial information. Then, we use the result to solve a problem in finance. Finally, we extend our approach to general stochastic games (nonzero-sum), and obtain an equilibrium point of such game.     

The Influence of Human Behavior on Heroin Dynamics

In this paper, considering the influence of human behavior on heroin abuse, we establish a mathematical model to describe the spread of heroin. When the basic reproduction number is less than one, the heroin-free abuse equilibrium point is globally asymptotically stable. When the basic re- production number is greater than one, the model has a unique heroin abuse equilibrium point which is globally asymptotically stable, and the heroin-free abuse equilibrium point is unstable. Finally, based on the partial rank corre- lation coefficients (PRCCs) and numerical simulations, the dynamic behavior of the model is further revealed. Our results show that human behavior can reduce the heroin abuse level.     

Saddle point equilibrium under uncertain environment

The saddle point equilibrium problem is of great importance in differential game theory. In this paper, an optimistic value model for the saddle point equilibrium problem under uncertain environment is investigated. The equilibrium equation for the proposed model is presented. Then a linear quadratic model is discussed. Finally, a counter terror problem is analyzed by the results obtained in the paper.     

Stability of equilibrium solutions of Hamiltonian systems under the presence of a single resonance in the non-diagonalizable case

The problem of knowing the stability of one equilibrium solution of an analytic autonomous Hamiltonian system in a neighborhood of the equilibrium point in the case where all eigenvalues are pure imaginary and the matrix of the linearized system is non-diagonalizable is considered. We give information about the stability of the equilibrium solution of Hamiltonian systems with two degrees of freedom in the critical case. We make a partial generalization of the results to Hamiltonian systems with n degrees of freedom, in particular, this generalization includes those in [1].      

Stochastic Nash equilibrium problems: sample average approximation and applications

This paper presents a Nash equilibrium model where the underlying objective functions involve uncertainty and nonsmoothness. The well-known sample average approximation method is applied to solve the problem and the first order equilibrium conditions are characterized in terms of Clarke generalized gradients. Under some moderate conditions, it is shown that with probability one, a statistical estimator (a Nash equilibrium or a Nash-C-stationary point) obtained from sample average approximate equilibrium problem converges to its true counterpart. Moreover, under some calmness conditions of the Clarke generalized derivatives, it is shown that with probability approaching one exponentially fast by increasing sample size, the Nash-C-stationary point converges to a weak Nash-C-stationary point of the true problem. Finally, the model is applied to stochastic Nash equilibrium problem in the wholesale electricity market.     

A New Pareto Optimal Solution in a Lagrange Decomposable Multi-Objective Optimization Problem

In this paper a committee decision-making process of a convex Lagrange decomposable multi-objective optimization problem, which has been decomposed into various subproblems, is studied. Each member of the committee controls only one subproblem and attempts to select the optimal solution of this subproblem most desirable to him, under the assumption that all the constraints of the total problem are satisfied. This procedure leads to a new solution concept of a Lagrange decomposable multi-objective optimization problem, called a preferred equilibrium set. A preferred equilibrium point of a problem, for a committee, may or may not be a Pareto optimal point of this problem. In some cases, a non-Pareto optimal preferred equilibrium point of a problem, for a committee, can be considered as a special type of Pareto optimal point of this problem. This fact leads to a generalization of the Pareto optimality concept in a problem.     

官员腐败的经济学分析及对策研究——基于信号传递博弈模型

针对官员腐败现象,从经济学的视角出发,在信息不对称条件下展开分析,基于斯宾塞的劳动力模型弓l入信号传递模型的建立廉洁声誉信号博弈模型.通过分析,得出官员选择存在逆向选择问题的结论,并进一步研究了分离精炼贝叶斯均衡及其影响.在分离均衡范围一定存在的情况下,建立财产公示制度、加强监督、提高查处力度以及高薪养廉对策能配合模型系统地提高反腐效果.     

Filtration stability of backward sde's

This paper studies the stability of the solution of backward stochastic differ­ential equations under small perturbations of the underlying filtration. The problem is interesting from the mathematical point of view, but also for its possible applications in Finance Theory, as it might represent a model to describe approximate information, inside or delayed information for an economic agent     

Open access fisheries utilization with an endogenous regulatory structure: An expanded analysis

The paper expands the Homans/Wilen model of endogenous fisheries management by providing a more general dynamic formulation, by introducing a disaggregated vessel level analysis, by comparing three different strategies to achieve the target harvest level, and by considering the possibility of political intervention in setting target harvest levels based on the economic conditions of participants. It is demonstrated that using different regulations to support the same total harvest program will cause the fishery to behave differently with respect to the shape of the time path, equilibrium fleet size, season length, vessel daily output level, and in some cases the possibility of achieving an equilibrium. Also, political intervention to relax total harvest levels will change the time path and can change the equilibrium.     

含公共开支的R&D经济增长模型

本文讨论了含公共开支的经济增长模型,避免了对生产函数的不恰当的假设,生产函数的形式是很一般的,因此经济系统是复杂的,但通过精巧的数学方法,得到确定的均衡点,并且给出解为正的充分条件.最后,分析了系统的动态性质,给出了经济沿稳定流形收敛于均衡点的条件.