Design issues for combinatorial auctions |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Jawad?AbracheEmail author Teodor?Gabriel?Crainic Michel?Gendreau |
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Institution: | (1) Département dinformatique et de recherche opérationnelle, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville, H3C 3J7 Montréal, Canada;(2) Département management et technologie, Université du Québec á Montréal, CP 6192, succursale Centre-ville, H3C 4R2 Montréal, Canada;(3) Centre de recherche sur les transports, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville, H3C 3J7 Montréal, Canada |
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Abstract: | Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose avenues for further research.Received: April 2003, Revised: July 2003, AMS classification:
91B26, 90BXX, 90C27All correspondence to:Jawad Abrache |
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Keywords: | E-commerce mechanism design combinatorial auctions bidding languages iterative auctions advisors |
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