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Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism |
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| Authors: | Mourad Baï ou,Michel Balinski |
| Affiliation: | a Laboratoire LIMOS, Université Clermont II, Campus des Cézeax, B.P. 125-63173 Aubière Cedex, France b École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d’Économétrie, France c CNRS and École Polytechnique, Laboratoire d’Économétrie, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France |
| Abstract: | The stable allocation problem is the generalization of (0,1)-matching problems to the allocation of real numbers (hours or quantities) between two separate sets of agents. The same unique-optimal matching (for one set of agents) is characterized by each of three properties: “efficiency”, “monotonicity”, and “strategy-proofness”. |
| Keywords: | Stable marriage Stable assignment Ordinal transportation University admissions Two-sided market Many-to-many matching |
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