供应链中的生产能力投资风险分配

在供应链中,每个管理者都会面临各种各样的供应和需求不确定性.这些不确定性会造成生产能力的过剩或不足,从而导致很大的利益损失,但是未必每个公司都会面临生产能力投资风险.针对一个单生产商单零售商系统,本文分析了三种不同的合同设计（推进式批发价合同,拉动式批发价合同和期权合同）对生产商和零售商的利润和生产能力投资风险的影响,推进式批发价合同和拉动式批发价均不能协调供应链,故我们找到其帕累托集;而对于期权合同,它能够协调整个供应链并且整合推进式和拉动式两种批发价合同使得生产商和零售商共同承担生产能力投资风险.在分析的过程中,我们将结果与已有的结果进行了比较,指出了其异同之处.

Risk Allocation of Capacity Investment in Supply Chains

In a supply chain,heach manager will face kinds of supply and demand uncertainties which may induce significant costs.But tney may not bear capacity investment risk.In this paper,we consider a one-retailer supply chain.We analyze the impact of different contracts(push contract,pull contract and option contract) on their profit and risk of capacity investment.With a push contract,the retailer pays a high wholesale price to make the supplier construct a capacity.In selling season,the supplier is given an order by the retailer,so the retailer bears all supply chain's capacity investment risk.With a pull contract,the supplier decides how much capacity to construct,and the retailer orders according to its customers's demand.So the supplier bears all supply chain's capacity investment risk.With a pull contract,the supplier decides how much capacity to costruct,and the retailer orders according to its customers's demand.So the supplier bears all supply chain's capacity investment risk.The pareto sets for push and pull contracts are given.To coordinate the supply chain,finally,we construct the option contract in which the supplier and the retailer share the risk.We compare our results with Cachon(2004)'s and get similarities and defferences.