| 考虑零售商风险规避及努力因素的供应链协调与优化模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 许民利,王俏,欧阳林寒.考虑零售商风险规避及努力因素的供应链协调与优化模型[J].运筹与管理,2014,23(2):73-81. |
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| 作者姓名： | 许民利 王俏 欧阳林寒 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.中南大学商学院,湖南 长沙 410083; 2.南京理工大学 经管学院,江苏 南京 210094 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(71171203);湖南省软科学重点项目(2009ZK2004) |
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| 摘 要： | 引入零售商风险规避偏好,在努力水平影响需求的两种模式下,分别建立了销售回馈与惩罚契约模型。随后,探讨了单纯的销售回馈与惩罚契约能否实现供应链协调,以及协调时各契约参数满足的条件。最后,通过数值分析对契约的协调性进行进一步分析。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险规避 努力水平 销售回馈与惩罚契约 供应链协调与优化 |
| 收稿时间： | 2013-03-01 |
Supply Chain Coordination and Optimization with Risk-averse Retailer and Sales Effort Dependent Demand |
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| XU Min-li,WANG Qiao,OU Yang Lin-han.Supply Chain Coordination and Optimization with Risk-averse Retailer and Sales Effort Dependent Demand[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2014,23(2):73-81. |
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| Authors: | XU Min-li WANG Qiao OU Yang Lin-han |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha410083, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper introduces the retailer's risk aversion in a two stage supply chain. Under both the additive and multiplicative sales effort dependent demands, the issue of supply chain coordination and optimization with risk-averse retailer and sales effort sensitive demand under a single sales rebate and penalty contract is explored. Besides, the optimal conditions that the contract parameters must satisfy in order to achieve supply chain coordination are determined. Numerical analysis is presented to further illustrate the role of sales rebate and penalty contract. |
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| Keywords: | risk aversion sales effort sales rebate and penalty contract supply chain coordination and optimization |
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