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制造商竞争环境下逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制研究
引用本文:王文宾,陈祥东,达庆利,聂锐,陈伟达. 制造商竞争环境下逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(3): 136-145
作者姓名:王文宾  陈祥东  达庆利  聂锐  陈伟达
作者单位:1.中国矿业大学 管理学院,江苏 徐州 221116;2.东南大学 经济管理学院,江苏 南京 211189
基金项目:国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102164);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271054,70971022);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630249);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2013W02);中国博士后科学基金项目(20110491478);江苏省博士后基金项目(1002073C);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金(2013SJD630123)
摘    要:主要运用博弈论方法探讨制造商竞争环境下的逆向供应链奖惩机制,建立了5个决策模型,分别是逆向供应链集中式决策、以逆向供应链和不回收再制造的制造商的总利润为目标决策、逆向供应链分散式决策、政府对制造商实施奖惩机制以及政府对回收商实施奖惩机制下逆向供应链的决策模型。研究表明:竞争对回收率提高有益,竞争越激烈回收率越高;积极回收再制造的制造商的新产品零售价较低,具有价格竞争优势;奖惩制造商和奖惩回收商均能起到提高回收率的作用,奖惩力度越大,回收率越高,新产品零售价越低;奖惩制造商比奖惩回收商更能调动制造商和回收商的积极性;奖惩制造商时的回购价高于奖惩回收商时的回购价;在实施奖惩机制时,回收再制造的制造商利润高于不回收再制造的制造商的利润;不回收再制造的制造商的利润随奖惩力度的增大而降低。

关 键 词:逆向供应链  制造商竞争  博弈论  政府奖惩机制  回收率  
收稿时间:2012-09-19

Study on the Premium and Penalty Mechanism of Reverse Supply Chain Based on Manufacturers' Competition
WANG Wen-bin,CHEN Xiang-dong,DA Qing-li,NIE Rui,CHEN Wei-da. Study on the Premium and Penalty Mechanism of Reverse Supply Chain Based on Manufacturers' Competition[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(3): 136-145
Authors:WANG Wen-bin  CHEN Xiang-dong  DA Qing-li  NIE Rui  CHEN Wei-da
Affiliation:1. School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China;2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
Abstract:Mainly considering the premium and penalty mechanism of reverse supply chain under manufacturers' competition environment, using game theory, we build 5 models, which are centralized decision-making of reverse supply chain, the total profits decision-making based on the profits of reverse supply chain and the manufacturer who does not collect waste products, decentralized decision-making with no premium and penalty mechanism, government's premium and penalty mechanisms for the manufacturers and recyclers of reverse supply chain. The study presents several conclusions. Competition is beneficial to raising collection rate and the more intense the competition, the higher the collection rate; the retail price of new products offered by manufacturers actively recycling is lower, which brings about price-competitive advantage. The fourth and fifth scenarios play a part in increasing collection rate, and the greater premium and penalty, the higher collection rate, the lower retail price of new products. It is more efficient for the government to offer them premium mechanism rather than the premium and penalty mechanism, sine the former is valid for increasing both the manufacturer and the collector's enthusiasm. The buyback price of the fourth scenario is higher than that of the fifth scenario. With premium and penalty mechanism the profit of manufacturer who collects waste products is higher than that of manufacturer who does not collect waste products. The profit of manufacturer, who does not collect waste products, decreases with the increase of the degree of premium and penalty.
Keywords:reverse supply chain  manufacturer competition  game theory  government's premium and penalty mechanism  collection rate  
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