Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium |
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Authors: | William H. Sandholm |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706 (e-mail: whs@ssc.wisc.edu), US |
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Abstract: | A population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy symmetric game. Players update their strategies by sampling the behavior of k opponents and playing a best response to the distribution of strategies in the sample. Suppose the game possesses a -dominant strategy which is initially played by a positive fraction of the population. Then if the population size is large enough, play converges to the -dominant equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability. Received December 1999/Revised version November 2000 |
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Keywords: | : evolutionary game theory coordination games |
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