On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q–separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. Therefore, in centralized markets like entry-level professional labor markets if the proposed matching is the workers-optimal stable matching then, no group of workers can never benefit by reporting untruthfully their preference relations. We exhibit an example showing that this property fails if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q–separable.Revised August 2004We are grateful to Flip Klijn, Howard Petith, William Thomson, a referee and an associate editor of this journal for helpful comments. The work of R. Martínez, A. Neme, and J. Oviedo is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis through Grant 319502, by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas CONICET, through Grant PICT-02114, and by the Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Técnica, through Grant 03-10814. The work of J. Massó is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, through Grant BEC2002–2130, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, through Grant 2001SGR-00162 and the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA). All authors acknowledge financial support from the Grant PCI España-Iberoamérica 2003 (Programa de Cooperación Interuniversitaria de la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional-AECI).