Abstract: | Cognitive radio (CR) is a novel intelligent technology which enables opportunistic access to temporarily unused licensed frequency bands. A key functionality of CR is to distribute free channels efficiently amongst Secondary Users (SUs) boosting spectrum usage to assist the escalating wireless applications world wide. In this context, this paper introduces a channel allocation mechanism which enables SUs (CR enabled unlicensed users) to dynamically access unused spectrum bands to fulfill their spectrum needs. We model the channel allocation problem as a sealed-bid single-sided auction which primarily aims at maximizing the overall spectrum utilization. Market based spectrum auctions in CR networks motivate licensed users to participate and lease their under utilized radio resources to gain monetary benefits. Sequential bidding is applied to this model for auctioning homogeneous channels, which reduces communication overhead. Bid submission takes into account two major CR constraints, namely, dynamics in spectrum opportunities and differences in channel availability time, which on incorporation provide disruption free data transmission to the SUs. We reduce resource wastage in this model by performing multiple auction rounds. Application of second price auction determines winning bidders and their respective payments to auctioneer. The design of our auction mechanism is supported with the proofs of truthfulness and individually rational properties. Furthermore, experimental results indicate that our model outperforms an existing auction method. Spectrum utilization values show 22 to 75% improvement in our model with changing number of SUs, and 23 to 93% improvement in our model with changing number of channels. |