Pragmatic versus semantic contextuality in quantum physics

An approach to quantum physics (QP) is proposed that is characterized by the attempt to give up the verificationist theory of truth underlying the standard interpretation of QP. As a first step, anobservatively minimal language L is constructed that is endowed with a Tarskian truth theory. Then, a set of axioms is stated by means of L that hold both in classical physics and in QP, and the further language L_e of all properties is constructed. The concepts ofmeaning andtestability do not collapse in L and L_e, hence quantum logic is interpreted as a theory of testability in QP, and QP turns out to be semantically incomplete. Furthermore, semantic and pragmatic compatibility of physical properties are distinguished in L_e, and the concepts of testability and conjoint testability of statements are introduced. In this context some known quantum paradoxes can be avoided, and a new general principle (MGP) characterizes the truth mode of empirical physical laws. MGP invalidates the Bell theorem and, presumably, the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem, and introduces apragmatic contextuality in QP in place of thesemantic contextuality that should occur because of these theorems.