Semantic incompleteness of quantum physics and EPR-like paradoxes

In the approach to quantum physics (QP) forwarded by the author ana priori formalization of the observative language of the theory is yielded. It is shown here that this formalization allows one to avoid both ontological realism and verificationism, which are the philosophically opposed positions that are usually assumed in the debate on the paradoxes that seem to follow from the analysis of the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) thought experiment. Some recent results are summarized (in particular, the semantical incompleteness of QP) obtained by the author in the framework of the aforesaid approach, and it is shown that they can be used in order to deal with some EPR-like paradoxes. Thus one can legitimately affirm that at least some of them can be a consequence of semantical ambiguities and of the acceptance of a philosophical dichotomy which is not logically unavoidable.