The average tree solution for multi-choice forest games |
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Authors: | S Béal A Lardon E Rémila P Solal |
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Institution: | 1. CRESE, Universit?? de Franche-Comt??, 30 avenue de l??observatoire, 25000, Besan?on, France 2. CNRS UMR 5824 GATE LSE, Universit?? de Saint-Etienne, 6 rue Basse des Rives, 42023, Saint-Etienne, France 3. CNRS UMR 5668 LIP, ENS Lyon and IXXI, Universit?? de Lyon, 46 all??e d??Italie, 69364, Lyon Cedex 07, France
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Abstract: | In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected forest on the player set. Players in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the forest. We introduce a new (single-valued) solution concept which is a generalization of the average tree solution defined and characterized by Herings et?al. (Games Econ. Behav. 62:77?C92, 2008) for TU-games played on a forest. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. It belongs to the precore of a restricted multi-choice game whenever the underlying multi-choice game is superadditive and isotone. We also link our solution with the hierarchical outcomes (Demange in J. Polit. Econ. 112:754?C778, 2004) of some particular TU-games played on trees. Finally, we propose two possible economic applications of our average tree solution. |
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