The paradox of group behaviors based on Parrondo’s games |
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Authors: | Neng-gang Xie Jia-yi GuoYe Ye Chao WangLu Wang |
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Institution: | Department of Mechanical Engineering, Anhui University of Technology, Maanshan City, Anhui Province, 243002, China |
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Abstract: | We assume a multi-agent model based on Parrondo’s games. The model consists of game A between individuals and game B. In game A, two behavioral patterns are defined: competition and inaction. A controlled alternation strategy of behavioral pattern that gives a single player the highest return is proposed when game A+B is played randomly. Interesting phenomena can be found in collective games where a large number of individuals choose the behavioral pattern by voting. When game B is the capital-dependent version, the outcome can be better for the players to vote randomly than to vote according to their own capital. An explanation of such counter-intuitive phenomena is given by noting that selfish voting prevents the competition behavior of game A that is essential for the total capital to grow. However, if game B is the history-dependent version, this counter-intuitive phenomenon will not happen. The reason is selfish voting results in the competition behavior of game A, and finally it produces the winning results. |
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Keywords: | Parrondo&rsquo s paradox Majority rule Behavior Competition |
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