Electronic service matching: Failure of incentive compatibility in Vickrey auctions |
| |
Authors: | Tobias Widmer Joerg Leukel |
| |
Institution: | Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Hohenheim, Germany |
| |
Abstract: | We consider pricing schemes for matching customers and providers on double-sided markets for electronic services. While existing second-best solutions are incentive compatible, the associated payment functions are difficult to implement in real-world settings. Based on the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) and the -pricing mechanism, we propose two straightforward payment schemes that offer a practical alternative to the second-best solution. Our experiments provide evidence that the VCG payments fail to implement incentive compatibility. This failure is due to the interdependency of the participants’ utilities. |
| |
Keywords: | Mechanism design Electronic services Pricing Double-sided markets Vickrey auction |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |