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基于关系合同的外包服务商成本问题分析
引用本文:汪云峰,刘仲英. 基于关系合同的外包服务商成本问题分析[J]. 同济大学学报(自然科学版), 2005, 33(5): 706-710
作者姓名:汪云峰  刘仲英
作者单位:同济大学,经济与管理学院,上海,200092
摘    要:通过构建外包活动的关系合同模型,对服务商成本与关系合同自执行特性之间的联系进行考察.证明在不同合同模式之间的服务商成本增量是保持关系合同自执行特性的关键因素.根据这一发现可以避免依赖于服务商成本总量信息,而针对服务商成本增量来设计关系合同或者制定服务商选择策略,从而有效改进外包谈判和招标的效果.

关 键 词:外包  关系合同  不可验证性目标  自执行
文章编号:0253-374X(2005)05-0706-05

Analysis of Vendor''''s Cost in Relational Contract Based Outsourcing
WANG Yun-feng,LIU Zhong-ying. Analysis of Vendor''''s Cost in Relational Contract Based Outsourcing[J]. Journal of Tongji University(Natural Science), 2005, 33(5): 706-710
Authors:WANG Yun-feng  LIU Zhong-ying
Abstract:With the quantitative model of relational contract of outsourcing,we explore the affection of vendor's cost on self-enforcing characteristic of relational contract.And we find that cost increment between different contract modes is the key point to keep relational contract's self-enforcing feature.In the light of this discovery outsourcer can avoid relying on the vendor's total cost information and develop better strategy to design contact and select vendors.
Keywords:outsourcing  relational contract  unverifiable target  self-enforcing
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