Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach |
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Institution: | 1. Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, United States;2. Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Canada;3. Lancaster University Management School, United Kingdom |
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Abstract: | We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented. |
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Keywords: | Game Theory Stackelberg Equilibrium Mixed Integer Programming |
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