竞争环境下供应链的BOPS合作策略及其对交通拥堵改善的影响

针对由一个拥有线上直销渠道的制造商以及一个线下零售商组成的供应链，考虑消费者对不同渠道的偏好构建了供应链博弈模型，研究了竞争环境下制造商与零售商的最优BOPS合作策略，并分析了BOPS合作在改善交通拥堵方面的作用。研究表明，BOPS合作在缓解供应链双重边际效应的同时会加剧渠道之间的价格竞争，所以并不总是对供应链有利；仅当消费者线上渠道偏好程度比较低且线下麻烦成本比较大时，制造商和零售商才会都从BOPS合作中受益从而自愿达成合作，其他情形下制造商可根据供应链利润变化设计转移支付契约促成与线下零售商的BOPS合作并实现双赢；此外，一定条件下BOPS合作能够通过调整渠道需求结构，在保证供应链成员利润的同时对交通拥堵改善也带来正向作用。

BOPS Cooperation Strategy in a Supply Chain with Competition and the Corresponding Influence on Traffic Congestion Reduction

This paper studies the BOPS cooperation strategy in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer with an online direct channel and one offline retailer. By establishing and comparing the game model in different cooperation strategies, this paper analyzes the optimal BOPS cooperation strategy in the supply chain, and further explores the impact of BOPS cooperation on traffic congestion reduction. Our results show that BOPS cooperation would mitigate double marginalization as well as intensify price competition in the supply chain, thus BOPS cooperation is not always beneficial for the supply chain. Only when consumers’ preference for online channel is low and the offline hassle cost is high enough, both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit from BOPS cooperation. In other cases, the manufacturer could design a transfer payment contract to facilitate the BOPS cooperation with the retailer. Besides, by adjusting demands of different channels, BOPS cooperation can lead to less online orders while maintain the profits of supply chain members. It indicates that BOPS cooperation would lead to a decreased online logistics volume and then generate a positive effect on traffic congestion reduction.